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Solidarity rights protect interests of individuals that can only be meaningfully 
experienced in the context of society as a whole (“common-good interests”). This thesis 
applies Charles Beitz’s approach, in which rights are modelled as political presumptions, 
to determine whether solidarity rights can be considered human rights. 
Solidarity rights have been treated with scepticism by rights scholars, yet the 
states and regional bodies that promote them are increasingly influential in international 
politics. While this has brought discourses about solidarity rights to new prominence, we 
lack a corresponding theoretical assessment. 
The first part of the thesis will explore the key tenets of Beitz’s model, with a 
focus criteria used to identify those interests which merit recognition as rights. It will 
argue that Beitz’s approach is preferable to orthodox accounts of human rights, for the 
purposes of this project, because it offers a model that more closely reflects how rights 
manifest in international law and politics.  
Human rights traditionally protect interests held by the individual against the 
group. In the second part of the thesis it is argued that they can also protect common-
good interests. The transnationally interconnected nature of post-industrial modernity 
means that individuals necessarily have interests, experienced in a collective context, on 
a global scale. These interests can be urgent in a manner equivalent to those protected by 
other classes of rights. They therefore merit protection with the rights mechanism. 
Solidarity rights protect these interests by imposing duties on states to work together to 
address corresponding transnational threats. 
The strength of this case will be demonstrated with an argumentum a priori 
exercise, examining the case for solidarity rights from a hostile perspective. The 
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arguments will then be applied in practice, with case studies of the rights to self-
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Recognition as a human right elevates an interest to a high political status. The 
general accord about the standing of human rights is not, however, matched by 
consensus around which interests should, and should not, be included in that class. 
“Solidarity rights”1 are especially controversial because they protect interests that are 
held by individuals yet meaningfully experienced in the context of society as a whole. 
Critics of solidarity rights maintain that human rights can and should only protect 
interests are experienced independently of our fellow humans.2 Should solidarity rights, 
then, be considered human rights? In this thesis, I will attempt to answer that question. 
The time is ripe for a re-evaluation of solidarity rights. The states and regional 
bodies that promote them are increasingly influential in the United Nations.3 This has 
brought discourses about solidarity rights to new prominence.4 Theory, however, has not 
kept pace with practice. We still lack a satisfactory theoretical assessment of the status of 
solidarity rights as human rights. In this thesis solidarity rights will be justified using the 
“political approach” of Charles Beitz5. This model offers a persuasive account of human 
rights. For Beitz, recognising an interest as a right is a political decision. If an interest 
can be justified as sufficiently important, from a sufficiently wide range of perspectives, 
                                                          
1 This refers to a class in rights theory and thus should not be confused with the “Solidarity Rights” in Title 
IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which, conversely, contains economic, 
social and cultural rights. (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02) 
2 See, for example, Jack Donnelley, “In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and politics of the Right 
to Development”, [ 1985] 15 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 473, pp. 473-509 
3 Rosa Freedman, “Third Generation Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs Within International 
Human Rights Law?” 2 CJICL 4 (2013), pp. 935-959 
4 Ibid, p. 936 
5 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2011). p. 2 
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then it can be recognised as a right. The task of the advocate for solidarity rights is, thus, 
a political one: to make an argument that can be understood from the widest possible 
range of perspectives.  
For Beitz, human rights cannot be fully understood in purely legal terms. A 
comprehensive model of human rights must take into account their manifestation in law, 
politics, culture, and society. For this reason, Beitz adopts Allan Buchannan's metaphor 
of the “Practice” of human rights.6 Talking about “the Practice” allows us to consider the 
full scope of human rights and the broad range of inputs in the human rights discourse. 
“The Practice” encompasses the legal manifestation of human rights, the political 
processes which lead to their creation and impacts, their use in the international system, 
and the wider discourses about human rights which feed and inform these political 
processes. In this thesis, like Beitz, I will consider human rights in terms of the Practice 
rather than in purely legal terms. 
The thesis is in two parts. In the first part, the key tenets of Beitz’s model, and 
how it is distinguished from orthodox accounts of human rights, are examined. This part 
also includes a detailed examination of the distinguishing features of solidarity rights. In 
the second part of the thesis, Beitz’s model is utilised to make a positive argument for 
solidarity rights. I will begin with the theoretical case and progress to three case studies, 
of solidarity rights at various stages of acceptance in the Practice. Finally, it is argued 
that that the application of Beitz’s political approach answers the principal critiques of 




                                                          
6 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, (New York: OUP, 2013), p. 2 
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Part One: Addressing the Theoretical Bases 
 
In Chapter One the fundamental features of Beitz's political approach are set out, 
bearing in mind that his model was developed to justify civil and political rights and 
economic, social, and cultural rights (I call these the “accepted classes” of rights). Thus, 
when Beitz’s model is applied to solidarity rights in Part Two, it will demonstrate that 
solidarity rights can be justified on the same terms as other classes of rights.  
Human rights are, according to Beitz, political presumptions, worked out at the 
international level. They make the individual a subject of global concern. Rights 
empower the individual in relation to the state. They protect interests accepted as 
important by the international community from threats that are reasonably predictable. 
They do this by imposing a "two-level" duty on states. The first-level duty is to protect 
the interest in question. The second-level duty is, as part of the international community, 
to intervene when another state fails to fulfil its first-level duty.  
According to Beitz, an interest can be recognised as a right if it is sufficiently 
important or "urgent". There is no utility in protecting interests that are not under threat, 
so rights only protect interests that are faced by reasonably predictable, or “standard”, 
threats. Similarly, there is no utility in applying the rights mechanism unless doing so 
will have a tangible impact on the interest in question. Therefore, an interest will not be 
recognised as a right unless the rights mechanism can be reasonably effective in 
protecting it. Rights take effect generally, so an interest will only be recognised as a right 
if the (a) urgency, (b) standard threat, and (c) the reasonable effectiveness of the rights 
mechanism, can be recognised from both the perspective of the interest holder and from 
the perspective of a non-interest-holder.  
 10 
In Chapter Two the reasons that Beitz’s political approach differs from other, (as 
Beitz calls them) “orthodox”,7 justificatory theories are examined. By contrast to 
Agreement, Naturalistic and Juridical theories, Beitz's political approach avoids 
unverified and unverifiable assertions about the foundations of rights, and accounts for 
the full range of rights recognised in the Practice, in an international context. It thereby 
provides a much more satisfactory model of human rights for analysing rights in the light 
of the Practice as it stands.  
In Chapter Three, a working description of solidarity rights is set out. It is argued 
that solidarity rights are “human rights that protect the common-good interests of 
individuals, by imposing both outward-facing and inward-facing duties on states”. 
Outward-facing duties compel states to act in cooperation with each other, to achieve 
common, long-term goods. They thus require states to show solidarity with each other, 
and with individuals outside their borders. Inward-facing duties are directed entirely at 
the domestic population of a state.  
In this chapter the identity of the holders of solidarity rights is also examined 
given that this has been a topic of controversy in the relevant literature. Some scholars 
have attempted to identify a collective entity, a “people”, as the holder of solidarity 
rights. It is argued that solidarity rights are better understood as rights belonging to 
individuals. The accepted classes of rights protect, what I call, “independent-good 
interests” and are thus experienced independently of the rest of society. Solidarity rights 
protect common-good interests, which are experienced, by the individual, in common 
with other individuals. Thus, solidarity rights are held by individuals but they can only 
be meaningfully experienced in a social context.  
 
                                                          
7 Beitz, n. 5, p. 2 
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Part Two: The Case for Solidarity Rights 
 
In Chapters Four and Five Beitz’s approach is applied to demonstrate that 
solidarity rights should be considered human rights. As noted in Chapter One, Beitz’s 
approach requires that the urgency of an interest must be understandable from both 
sympathetic and non-sympathetic perspectives. In Chapter Four, the case is made from 
the sympathetic perspective. It is argued that the class of “common-good interests” can 
include interests that meet Beitz’s criteria for recognition as a right: to be urgent, faced 
with a standard threat, and protected, to reasonable effect, by the rights mechanism. The 
transnationally interconnected nature of post-industrial modernity8 means that 
individuals experience important interests in a global context, similarly, threats to those 
interests manifest globally and transcend state borders. Solidarity rights are particularly 
suited to protect transnational interests from transnational threats.  
According to Beitz, if an interest (or class of interests) is to be considered a right 
then its urgency, vulnerability to a standard threat, and the reasonable effectiveness of 
the rights mechanism in protecting it, must also be understandable from perspectives that 
are not sympathetic to the interest. Chapter Five demonstrates that the case for solidarity 
rights conforms to this standard by undertaking an argumentum a fortiori exercise, 
utilising the political theory of F. A. Hayek: a perspective that is as hostile as possible to 
the concept of solidarity rights. Hayekian theory rejects solidarity as a concept. It rejects 
                                                          
8 For an exploration of some of the elements of the transnational interconnection of post-industrial 
modernity see Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and 
Labor Flow, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 126-170 and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
"Judicial Globalisation", 40 Va. J. Int'l. L. 1103 1999-2000, pp. 1103-1126 
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the active state, embraces inequality, and sees appeals to common interests as a veil for 
the dictatorial agendas of socialist regimes9. Nevertheless, in Chapter Five it is 
demonstrated that, despite its hostility to solidarity per se, the case for solidarity rights 
can be understood from the Hayekian perspective. The purpose of this chapter is not to 
endorse the Hayekian perspective. It is rather to demonstrate that, even from a hostile 
perspective, the case for solidarity rights can be understood. 
In Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight the political approach is applied to justify three 
different solidarity rights: the (established) right to self-determination, the (emerging) 
right to peace, and the (prospective) right to a clean and healthy environment.10 Each of 
these rights  are analysed according to the Beitz criteria of (1) protecting interests that are 
urgent, (2) faced with a standard threat and (3) can be protected to reasonable effect by 
the rights mechanism. These three case studies demonstrate the efficacy of Beitz’s model 
for analysing solidarity rights in practice. 
In Chapter Nine it is demonstrated that the application of Beitz’s political 
approach to solidarity rights also answers the principal critiques of solidarity rights. 
These concern (1) the compatibility of solidarity rights with other classes of rights, (2) 
their enforcement, (3) their necessity, and (4) the hybrid nature of solidarity rights.  
In the concluding chapter, the application of Beitz’s model to solidarity rights, 
beyond those already considered, is examined. Finally, it is concluded that, according to 
Beitz’s political approach, solidarity rights must be considered human rights.  
 
  
                                                          
9 See F. A. Hayek, The Road To Serfdom, (London; Routledge, 2001, first published 1944), pp. 33-45 
10 While recognised in a number of regional instruments, the right to a clean and healthy environment 
remains a prospective right at the international level. See pp. 217-219 
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PART ONE: ADDRESSING THE THEORETICAL BASES 
 




To argue that solidarity rights should be considered human rights, one must first 
decide what “human rights” are. For Charles Beitz, human rights are “reasons for action” 
and are best understood by studying their role in international relations. This chapter 
explores the key tenets of Beitz’s approach. According to Beitz’s, rights are political 
presumptions, worked out at international level, that protect the urgent interests of 
individuals from standard threats. A right differs from a mere interest. Rights protect 
interests that are (a) urgent, (b) faced with a standard threat and (c) for which the rights 
mechanism can provide reasonably effective protection. I will refer to these three criteria 
as the “Beitz criteria”. To explain Beitz’s model, I will first examine how Beitz 
conceptualises human rights. I will consider what, in Beitz’s model, human rights are, 
what they do, how they do it, how one distinguishes between a right and a mere interest, 
and why rights have authority. The elements of Beitz’s model, identified in this chapter, 
will be applied, in Part Two, to make the case for solidarity rights.  
Beitz’s approach to human rights was originally developed with the civil and 
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights in mind. These two classes of 
rights are widely accepted by practitioners. I will refer to them as the “accepted classes” 
of rights. In this chapter I will explore Beitz’s model purely in relation to the accepted 
classes of rights. This is important because, when I turn to solidarity rights in later 
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chapters, it must be clear that I am holding them to the same standards as the accepted 




Beitz develops a “practical” or “political” approach11 to human rights. Human 
rights must be understood as “reasons for action”.12 A useful theory of human rights 
must, for Beitz, reflect their role in the existing international system and, in particular, 
the manner in which they cause states to take some actions and refrain from others.  
Beitz attributes scholarly scepticism about human rights to the unsatisfactory 
nature of existing theories.13 He criticises human rights theorists who move models of 
human rights too far away from their practical application in international law, politics 
and culture.14 Beitz seeks a new theory of human rights, focusing on how rights provide 
reasons for action.15 He adopts Richard Rorty’s approach to understanding the basis of 
human rights. For Beitz and Rorty, human rights are already a “fact” of international 
politics16: rational people generally understand that humans should receive a basic 
standard of respect, guaranteed by rights. It is no longer necessary to convince people 
about the moral rightness of human rights as a concept. A useful theory of rights will, 
                                                          
11 Beitz, n. 5, p. 102 
12 Ibid. p. 3-7 
13 Ibid, pp. 3-7 
14 Ibid, pp. 59-74 and 89-96 
15 Ibid, pp. 7-14, for Beitz, theories that model rights based on values that are external to the Practice, such 
as natural law or cultural agreement, engender scepticism about rights. They make rights discourse about 
the external value, not about human rights themselves. The advantages of Beitz’s model compared to 
orthodox theories is discussed in Chapter Two. 
16 Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality” in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On 
Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, (New York; Basic Books, 1993), p. 112 
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therefore, focus on their practical manifestation and impact rather than attempting to 




Beitz adopts the idea of the “Practice” of human rights18. He defines human 
rights in a broader sense many other theorists19. His approach encompasses the impact 
that human rights have in a broad “political” sense,20 including the political and social 
impact of rights, but also the processes by which new rights are recognised and existing 
rights refined. Beitz’s Practice includes international law (encompassing human rights 
treaties, declarations, customary international law, and “soft law”) but also the legal, 
quasi-legal and political institutions that deal with human rights at the international level, 
their equivalents at domestic level, and the “discourse” that surrounds human rights21. 
The “discourse” describes the role of human rights in relations between states, their 
application, and their development in international institutions. It also includes the use of 
human rights language and norms among the agents engaged in the human rights debate, 
including politicians, diplomats, academics, lawyers, judges and civil society22.  
                                                          
17 Ibid, pp. 112-134 
18 Beitz, n. 5, pp. 14-49 
19 See, for example, R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (New York; Bloomsbury, 2013) (first published 
1977), pp. 13-29 
20 Beitz owes a debt to Amartya Sen in this respect. See, Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human 
Rights”, 32 Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, pp. 316-356 
21 Ibid, pp. 27-31 
22 Ibid, pp. 27-31 
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The Practice is “emergent” and “evolving”: it is relatively young and still 
developing.23 The Practice dates back only to the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Other areas of international relations, such as trade, have existed for much longer.24 The 
Practice has therefore had less time to develop than other international norms. Beitz does 
not, however, identify a point at which the Practice will have fully “emerged” and thus 
cease to evolve. Older classes of international relations norms, such as trade25 or 
humanitarian26 norms, evolve continuously. Nothing in Beitz’s model suggests that the 
Practice will not also evolve indefinitely. As long as international relations evolve there 
is no reason why the Practice will not evolve with them.  
 
Beitz’s debt to Rawls 
 
 Beitz owes a debt27 to John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples.28 Rawls sets out a theory 
of international relations based the principle of non-interference between states. For 
Rawls, respect for human rights is a condition of non-interference. Human rights provide 
reasons for action because states respect them in order to avoid becoming vulnerable to 
interference from other states.  
                                                          
23 Ibid, pp. 42-44 
24 Ibid, pp. 42-44 
25 See John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling and Richard H. Steinberg, The Evolution of 
World Trade Law: The Politics and Economics of the GATT and WTO, (Princeton University Press; New 
Jersey, 2006) 
26 Theodor Meron, “The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 
90 AJIL 2 (1996), pp. 238-249 
27 Beitz acknowledges this debt. See Beitz, n. 5, pp. 96-102 
28 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999) 
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Rawls calls his system the “society of peoples”. For Rawls, the term “peoples” 
generally corresponds to nation states.29 The “society of peoples” is thus, broadly put, an 
idealised system of international relations. According to Rawls, if a rational individual 
was to design a system of norms to regulate relations between “peoples”, but did not 
know to which “people” she would belong nor what comparative advantages each 
“people” would enjoy,30 she would choose a system of norms based on mutual respect 
and non-interference.31 For Rawls, however, only certain classes of people should enjoy 
these norms. Rawls identifies these as “liberal peoples” and “decent peoples”. “Liberal 
peoples” are constitutional democracies.32 “Decent peoples” are polities which broadly 
include all citizens in the decision-making process, but may not open every aspect of the 
polity to every individual. Rawls identifies three characteristics of “decent peoples”: 
They have (a) some form of consultative hierarchy, (b) permit (peaceful) dissent and (c) 
respect human rights.33 For Rawls, no external attempt should be made to convert 
“decent peoples” into “liberal peoples”.34 States that are neither “liberal” nor “decent” 
are “outlaw peoples”. They are defined by their failure to live up to the standard required 
of “liberal” or “decent” peoples35 and, in particular, by their failure to respect human 
rights. “Outlaw peoples” are not entitled to the mutual respect and non-interference 
                                                          
29 Rawls thus does not use the term “people” in the same sense in which it is used in relation to solidarity 
rights.  
30 This is based on Rawls’ thought experiment: “the original position”. One must make decisions about the 
design of society without knowing one’s prospective social position. Rawls uses this experiment to justify 
moral arguments. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1971), pp. 15-19 
31 Rawls, n. 28, pp. 59-88 
32 Ibid, pp. 1-10 
33 Ibid, pp. 59-88 
34 Ibid, p. 86 
35 Ibid, pp. 59-88 
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enjoyed by “liberal peoples” and “decent peoples”. They are therefore vulnerable to 
interference from other polities up to and including violent incursions or invasion36. 
Thus, for Rawls, respect for human rights is the price of safety from interference by other 
states.  
 Beitz points out that Rawls’ list of human rights is more limited than those 
recognised in the International Bill of Human Rights.37 Rawls’ model thus does not 
account for the Practice as it stands. Nevertheless, it provides Beitz with a foundation on 
which to build his model. The value of Rawls’ theory is that it demonstrates that human 
rights can be modelled based purely on their practical role in international relations.38 
For Rawls, respect for human rights is a necessary criterion for membership of the 
“society of peoples” and the advantages that confers.  
Beitz adopts this aspect of Rawls’ theory. He seeks a theory of rights based on 
their political role. Beitz, however, aims to reflect the nature of the international political 
system as it stands more accurately than Rawls’ Law of Peoples. In Beitz’s words: 
"We attend to the practical inferences that would be drawn by competent 
participants in the Practice from what they regard as valid claims of human 
rights. An inventory of these inferences generates a view of the discursive 
functions of human rights and this informs an account of the meaning of the 
concept."39 
Like Rawls, Beitz sees rights as justifications for intervention. Rights provide reasons for 
action because, if a state fails to protect and provide for the rights of its citizens, other 
states are justified in intervening in its internal affairs. Thus, for both Beitz and Rawls, 
                                                          
36 Ibid, pp. 59-88 
37 Beitz, n. 5, p. 100 
38 Ibid, p. 101 
39 Ibid, p. 102 
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the fear of intervention remains the consistent motivating factor behind the normative 
force of human rights. 
 
What Are Human Rights? 
 
 In Beitz’s approach, human rights are political presumptions, worked out at the 
international level, that make each individual a subject of global concern and, 
consequently, empower individuals in relation to states. The Practice has its basis in 
negotiations in the aftermath of the Second World War. The framers of the Practice 
aimed to create a system that would prevent the atrocities connected with that war, and 
the associated international instability, from happening again. Before the war, states were 
generally not accountable to the rest of the international community for the treatment of 
their citizens.40 The framers believed that this facilitated the atrocities associated with the 
1930s and 1940s and the global violence and instability that accompanied them41. In the 
hope of avoiding such atrocities in the future, the framers created a system in which 
certain individual interests would be protected by the international community. Thus, for 
Beitz, the aim of the Practice is (a) to avoid the subjugation of individual interests and 
(b) to avoid the international instability that occurs when a state is allowed to infringe on 
urgent individual interests to a significant extent.42  
The Practice creates accountability at an international level for the treatment of 
the individual. The failure, by a state, to adequately protect the rights of its citizens gives 
                                                          
40 See Phillipe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 
(London, W&N, 2016), pp. 137-190 
41 Ibid, pp. 102-109 
42 Beitz, n. 5, p. 14-16 
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the international community a reason to intervene in that state. As Beitz puts it, rights 
represent the “articulation in the public morality of world politics that each person is the 
subject of global concern.”43 For Beitz, the Practice thus reflects an explicit international 
agreement that individual humans all have interests that must be accorded a basic, and 
generally equal, level of respect, guaranteed by the international community. 
 
What Do Human Rights Do? 
 
 What is involved when a political presumption makes individuals a matter of 
international concern? The Practice achieves its aim by protecting the particularly 
important, or “urgent”, interests of individuals from reasonably predictable, or 
“standard”, threats.44 In doing so, it empowers the individual in relation to the state. Put 
another way: rights disperse political power. The state system concentrates power in the 
hands of governments,45 human rights disperse power to individuals. The Practice gives 
individuals claims against their states and, in some cases, against other states, thus 
putting power in the hands of individuals. It is not an equal dispersal of power. The 
Practice is often inadequate, for example, in addressing the differing abilities of 
individuals to make their rights claims heard.46 Yet it nevertheless represents a loss of 
power on the part of states, and a general sharing out of that power amongst individuals. 
                                                          
43 Ibid, p. 1 
44 Ibid, p. 110 
45 Some theorists argue that globalisation represents a loss of power on the part of states (See, for example, 
David Kennedy, “The Forgotten Politics of International Governance”, 2 E.H.R.L.R. [2001], pp. 117-125). 
But globalisation theory suggests that power is concentrated elsewhere. For example, in the hands of multi-
national corporations (Ibid, p. 121), 
46 See generally, Rosa Freedman, Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights, 
(London; Hurst, 2014) 
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Rights thus give individuals the power to compel action on the part of states to address 
their urgent interests. 
 
How Do Human Rights Protect Urgent Interests? 
 
 How are urgent interests protected? In Beitz’s theory rights impose a “two level” 
duty on states.47 The first-level duty requires states to act, within their own borders, to 
give effect to human rights through domestic law and public policy. The second-level 
duty is imposed on the international community collectively. It requires the international 
community to intervene if a particular state fails in its first-level responsibility. This is a 
pro tanto, rather than absolute, responsibility.48 As Beitz puts it: 
“The conventional contrast [with pro tanto reasons] is with conclusory reasons. 
Conclusory reasons require us to act regardless of the other considerations in 
play. These reasons override other reasons, whatever their content. Pro tanto 
reasons are genuine reasons for action, but they do not necessarily override 
competing reasons that may also be in play. According to the model, when a 
state’s institutions fail to respect human rights, appropriately placed outside 
agents have a pro tanto but not necessarily conclusory reasons to act.”49 
The second-level responsibility is thus important without being compulsory. Intervention 
to protect human rights is a high priority, but it is not the only priority for states acting in 
international politics.50  
                                                          
47 Beitz, n. 5, p. 106 
48 Ibid, pp. 116-117 
49 Ibid, p. 117 
50 Ibid, pp. 106-117 
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 Beitz’s conception of intervention is broader than Rawls’. It can include 
developing international measures to ensure that states are accountable for their first-
level responsibilities (such as reporting mechanisms in the Human Rights Council), 
providing incentives or assistance to fulfil those duties (such as development aid), 
engaging with domestic political parties or NGOs, and adapting international structures 
to facilitate compliance with first-level responsibilities. The armed intervention 
envisaged by Rawls is encompassed in Beitz’s theory, but only as one possibility 
amongst several.51 
 Rights have both legal and, what I will call, “persuasive” impact. Recognising 
rights in international law is but one way in which states hold each other accountable for 
discharging their first-level duties. Rights also operate beyond the legal system. They can 
be used to encourage and, in some cases, coerce states into taking measures without the 
need to resort to legal action. This does not minimise the importance of the legal 
manifestation of rights. In the international political system, recognition in international 
law is a mark of the importance of a norm. Recognition in a treaty, or customary 
international law, or (to a lesser extent) recognition in a UN instrument, denotes a norm 
of high importance. Recognition in international law is, thus, important to the persuasive 
impact of human rights as well as the legal impact of human rights.  
 Beitz’s model could be criticised as excessively statist.52 The political approach 
casts states as the only bearers of direct duties. Non-state actors may have 
responsibilities because of human rights, but these responsibilities are imposed upon 
them by states, rather than imposed directly by the rights themselves. When a human 
rights duty is imposed on a non-state actor it represents a state respecting its duty under 
                                                          
51 Ibid, pp. 33-42 
52 Ibid, pp. 128 
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the right (albeit in part). Put another way, human rights do not have a truly horizontal 
impact.53 For example, the right to privacy imposes a duty on states. In discharging that 
duty, a state may legislate to restrict newspapers from photographing children in private 
contexts, or it might enshrine a right to privacy in domestic law, or it might do both.54 
This imposes an obligation upon non-state actors (such as newspapers) because of a 
human right. But it is an indirect imposition, stemming from the primary responsibility 
of the state itself.55 The right may be the animating norm but the domestic law or policy 
is the directly impacting law. Even when non-state actors play a role in human rights 
issues, duties accrue primarily to states. John Ruggie’s guiding principles on multi-
national corporations and human rights address the role of non-state actors. Ruggie 
considers “best practice” standards for non-state actors, but he only assigns explicit 
duties to states.56 For Ruggie, it is for states to enforce human rights standards on multi-
national corporations and other non-state actors.57 This is reflected in the European Court 
of Human Rights doctrine of Drittwirkung or “third party applicability”.58 When a non-
state actor violates a right, the state with authority over that actor can be held responsible 
                                                          
53 Nicholas Bamforth, “The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private 
Bodies”, 58 Cambridge L.J. 159 (1999), p. 160 
54 For example, in Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd and Another [2007] EWHC 1908 
55 Beitz, n. 5, pp. 122-125 
56 Ibid, pp. 122-125 
57 Whether the Practice should evolve, to impose duties directly on non-state actors, is an interesting 
question. An argument could be made, for example, that some non-state actors exercise power that is 
equivalent to or greater than that exercised by states (See, for example, Jessica T. Mathews, "Power 
shift." 1 Foreign Affairs 50 (1997), pp. 50-66). They should, therefore, be subject to the same basic norms 
as states, including human rights. Such a discussion is, however, beyond the parameters of this project.  
58 E. Alkema, "The Third Party Applicability or 'Drittwirkung' of the European Convention on Human 
Rights", in F Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: the European Dimension 
(Cologne; C. Heymanns Verlag, 1988), p. 38. See, generally, A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private 
Sphere (Oxford; OUP, 1993), chs. 4, 7  
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for the violation. As Judge Dimitros Evrigenis puts it, Drittwirkung imposes an 
“ecological liability”:59 the state is not the author of the violation but can be held 
responsible because it had a duty to take preventative measures. The state is, therefore, 
“not merely answerable for violations committed by itself but also, in a more general 
sense, for all violations committed within its territory”.60 Right have, thus, a generally 
vertical, rather than horizontal, effect. An individual will not, prima facie, succeed in a 
human rights claim against a non-state actor unless the state has taken measures to 
facilitate such claims in domestic law. The individual can, however, succeed in a claim, 
based on the same facts, against the state. The state has a duty to actively protect human 
rights, respecting this duty can involve taking domestic measures to prohibit non-state 
actors from violating the interests of individuals.  
 Beitz also considers whether his decision to assign only general duties means that 
his mechanism lacks force. If a specific, achievable duty cannot be identified, are rights 
anything more than aspirations?61 Beitz applies Joel Feinberg’s idea of “manifesto 
rights”62 to resolve this issue. Feinberg considers economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Conditions of conflict and scarcity may prevent the realization of such rights in the 
immediate term. For Feinberg, however, this doesn't mean that they are no longer rights. 
Such rights impose a floating obligation, to be picked up as the capability to do so is 
achieved.63 Thus, for Feinberg and Beitz, rights include a two-part duty at the first level: 
the first part obliges state to reach a point at which the measures necessary to address the 
right become a practical and political possibility. The second part obliges states to take 
                                                          
59 6 "Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights on Articles 8 and 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights" (1982) 3 H.R.L.J. 121, p. 137, quoted in Bamforth, n. 53, p. 167 
60 Ibid, p. 167 
61 Onora O’Neil, “The Dark Side of Human Rights”, 81 International Affairs (2005), pp. 427-439 
62 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Prentice Hall; Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1973), pp. 41-67 
63 Beitz, n. 5, pp 117-121 
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those measures. This reflects the reality of the Practice. Article 2(2) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:  
“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps 
[emphasis added], in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the 
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”64 
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
provides:  
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”65 
The language of both provisions recognises that protecting the interests recognised by 
the covenants may require multiple steps. Respecting a right is a process, not a discrete 
action.66 Rights are often recognised when they are mere aspirations in many states.67 
                                                          
64 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Art. 2(2) 
65 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
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67 Ian Brownlie, “The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law” in James Crawford (ed.), The Rights 
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 26 
The recognition of aspirational rights is still an effective way to protect urgent interests. 
It indicates that the protection of the interest is a priority in the eyes of the international 
community and should, therefore, be a priority. In states in which the interest is not yet 
protected, governments should prioritise those policies that will put the state in a position 
to protect and provide for the interest in the future. Part of the reason for recognising an 
interest as a right is to give political and legal support for the struggle to protect that 
interest. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights notes that the Covenant 
obligations do not require the immediate realization of every right contained therein. 
Rather, states parties must “take steps” or “action” to move towards a point at which the 
rights can be realised.68 When rights against apartheid were recognised at the 
international level,69 the system remained the official policy of the government of South 
Africa for a further decade. But the recognition of the right assisted in the struggle to 
overturn the policy. Indeed, rights have limited utility if they are only recognised once 
the duty element is easily performable.  
 
What Makes an Interest a Right? 
 
 Which interests will the Practice protect? For the purposes of this thesis, the most 
important question to ask of Beitz’s model is how it differentiates between mere claims 
and rights. This will allow us to test whether claims of solidarity rights merit recognition 
as rights. All rights protect interests, but not every interest merits recognition as a right. 
For Beitz, an interest can be recognised as a right if it meets three criteria; The interest 
                                                          
68 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, “The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations”, (14th December 1990), 
UN Doc. E/1991/23  
69 See, for example, the United Nations General Assembly The Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, (20th November 1963), A/Res/18/1904 
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must be (1) urgent, and its urgency must be understandable from both the perspective of 
those sympathetic to the interest-holder and from the perspective of non-sympathetic 
non-interest holders. This means that even those who do not hold the interest in question, 
and are likely to be non-sympathetic to the claims of interest-holders, must at least be 
able to understand why it would be a “bad thing”70 for the interest holder if that interest 
were to be set back. The interest must be (2) threatened by a “standard threat” and, 
similarly, the nature of this threat must be understood from both sympathetic and non-
sympathetic perspectives. Finally, recognising the interest as a right must have (3) a 
practical impact. If recognition will change nothing, then there is little value in the 
exercise. Therefore, the rights mechanism must be reasonably effective in protecting the 
interest.  
Only by identifying these criteria does it become possible to determine whether 
solidarity rights should be considered genuine human rights, according to the political 
approach. The statement “x is a human right” is a normative statement within the 
Practice. It means “x is an interest which should be given the high level of protection and 
authority that the two-level model accords”.71 Only interests of high importance merit 




 Beitz recognises that there is no single quality that inherently distinguishes rights 
from mere interests. Rights are identified through debate, refinement, and political 
positioning, as part of the Practice. From this process Beitz identifies general criteria that 
                                                          
70 Beitz, n. 5, p. 103 
71 Ibid, p. 104 
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are consistently present in the interests recognised as rights. A successful argument to 
recognise a particular interest as a right will “make good on three contentions: 
1. “That the interest should be protected by a right is sufficiently important when 
reasonably regarded from the perspective of those protected that it would be 
reasonable to consider its protection to be a political priority. 
2. “That it would be advantageous to protect the underlying interest by means of 
legal or policy instruments available to the state. 
3. “That, in the central range of cases in which the state might fail to provide the 
protection, the failure would be a suitable object of international concern.”72 
Not all parts of this schema carry equal weight. In practice, Beitz’s schema is better 




The first of the schema contentions concerns the urgency of the interest. It is not 
sufficient that the holder of the interest merely has a preference in its favour. It is also 
necessary that an agent, who does not share the interest, would understand it to be of 
sufficient importance. Both the holder of the interest and a reasonable agent, who does 
not hold the interest, must be able to appreciate that it is a particularly “bad thing” for the 
holder if the interest is set back.73  
The urgency of the interest is, however, also relevant to the satisfaction of the second 
and third schema contentions. Under Beitz’s second criterion “it would be advantageous 
to protect the underlying interest by means of legal or policy instruments available to the 
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state”. Political institutions such as states must balance competing interests. The urgency 
of an interest, therefore, generally determines whether it is advantageous to protect the 
interest “by means of the legal and policy instruments available to the state”. There are 
certain interests to which the protection of the state would make only minimal difference 
or no difference at all. There are, however, other interests for which protection by the 
state is difficult considering the political conditions of the time. This second class is 
often treated in the same manner as the first. Governments claim that it is not possible to 
protect a certain interest, when measures to protect the interest would face significant 
political headwinds, but are not physically impossible or undesirable. In a political 
institution, prioritising one interest generally means compromising another. The question 
in these cases is not “is it advantageous to protect this interest?”, but “is this interest 
important enough to justify the compromises that protecting it will require?” This is a 
question of the relative urgency of the interest. For example, protecting indigenous rights 
requires compromising other interests. It generally requires making policy that impacts 
on the interests of richer and more powerful groups of citizens. There is little motivation 
for governments to do this because indigenous peoples, historically, have little role in 
national politics. Protecting the interests of indigenous peoples can demand reassessing 
long standing legal and political doctrines.  
In Australia, it was, for much of the 20th century, considered politically impossible to 
protect indigenous land rights. One of the founding principles of white Australian law 
and national identity was the doctrine of terra nullis: the understanding that land in 
Australia had belonged to no one before white settlers arrived. It was, literally, not 
“land” in the legal sense. Based on this doctrine, the land claimed by indigenous 
Australians had been in the possession of white Australians for centuries. It had been 
traded, made the subject of mortgages, easements, entailments, and the full range of 
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proprietary interests. The white Australians who held rights in land in the 20th century 
believed themselves to have purchased it fairly. Those who did not own land believed 
that it should remain available, as part of a free market. Recognising indigenous land 
rights in Australia required setting certain pieces of land outside the market and the 
Australian law of real property, to be administered by representative bodies of the 
indigenous community. To many white Australians, this seemed like an unjust and 
arbitrary appropriation of their property by the government. White Australians were, and 
continue to be much better represented in Australian politics than indigenous 
Australians, and therefore exercise greater political power. The political conditions in 
20th Century Australia were, therefore, particularly hostile to the measures required to 
protect indigenous land rights. Yet realising those interests of indigenous peoples, in 
living with dignity and respect for their culture (to which land rights were essential), was 
ultimately considered more important than avoiding the real political inconvenience that 
it would cause74. The urgency of the indigenous peoples’ interest in land rights 
outweighed the urgency of the rest of the population’s interest in maintaining their law of 
real property and doctrine of terra nullius, thus protecting them became possible. The 
Practice requires that states find a way to make that which is difficult, possible. If an 
interest is sufficiently urgent, it should be possible to overcome most political 
impediments to its protection and will generally meet the second schema contention. The 
urgency of an interest is, therefore, determinative as to whether it meets the second 
schema contention 
The third schema contention also turns on the urgency of the interest. It requires that 
(a) it is practically possible to correct a state’s failure to fulfil its first-level duty with 
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international action, (b) that such action would “satisfy the relevant standards of public 
morality”,75 and (c) that those in a position to carry out the intervention have “sufficient 
reason to bear the burdens involved with intervention”.76 This requires that the urgency 
of the interest outweigh the presumption of non-intervention in other states. Non-
intervention is a basic principle of global political morality.77 The Practice itself (as will 
be examined in Chapter Six) enshrines the principle of non-intervention as part of the 
right to.78 An individual interest that is a “suitable object of international concern” is an 
individual interest of sufficient urgency to rebut the presumption against intervention.  
The matter of whether states will have “sufficient reason to bear the burdens 
associated with intervention” can also be reduced to a question of the urgency of the 
interest. The question of burden bearing demands, prima facia, an assessment of the 
capabilities of states in relation to the costs of intervention. If a state has significant and 
appropriate capabilities, such as a booming economy generating a large public budget, an 
experienced, well-equipped and mobile military, or highly effective mechanisms for 
exerting soft power, then it will be able to bear the burden of a costly intervention with 
relative ease. Most of the time the burden of intervention will, therefore, appear 
relatively manageable. It will, thus, be easier to find a reason that justifies the burdens of 
intervention. By contrast, a state with limited capabilities will find the even a low-cost 
intervention imposes a significant burden, and it will consequently be more difficult to 
find a reason that justifies bearing that burden. This means that the question of whether 
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an interest offers sufficient reason to bear the burdens of intervention requires a different 
assessment in the case of every state and every intervention.  
When we make the case for a right, however, we cannot accurately predict which 
states will be called upon to intervene, in service of that right, beyond (at most) the next 
few years. We cannot predict whether those states called upon to intervene will have 
extensive capabilities or limited capabilities. We cannot predict whether the costs of 
intervention will be significant or limited. We cannot, therefore, assess whether the 
burdens of intervention will be great or small and, consequently, what sort or reason will 
be “sufficient” to justify bearing them.  
This is not to say that we cannot address the question of burden bearing. We can 
argue that an interest is so important that an assessment of the capabilities of particular 
states and costs of particular interventions become unnecessary to the question of burden 
bearing. We can argue that an interest is of such high importance that, within a central 
range of reasonably predictable cases, it will always provide sufficient reason to justify 
the burdens of intervention. In other words, even if the capabilities of a state are 
relatively limited and the costs of intervention relatively high, the interest is of sufficient 
importance that it will nevertheless justify the burdens of intervention. This is a question 
of urgency: it requires us to ascertain whether the interest in question can be understood 
as of high importance from a sufficiently broad range of perspectives. An assessment of 
the urgency of an interest is, therefore, relevant to all three of Beitz’s schema criteria and 








Under Beitz’s second criterion the interest must be at risk from a standard threat. 
In Beitz’s words, a standard threat is "reasonably predictable under social circumstances 
in which the right is intended to operate. The human rights of international doctrine are 
not, for the most part, best understood as unrestricted blanket protections of urgent 
interests"79. Even if an interest is urgent, there is no point in protecting it if it is not under 
threat. A standard threat must be reasonably immediate. There is no point in protecting 
an interest from a threat that has no impact in the present and is unlikely to have an 
impact in the foreseeable future.  
The assessment of a standard threat is global in scope. The Practice is 
international so the absence of a standard threat on one state does justify discounting the 
threat per se. In Sweden, for example, there is no discernible threat to the freedom to 
criticise the government. In Zimbabwe, Russia, China, or North Korea (for example) 
such a threat exists. The right to criticise the government is, from a global perspective, 
therefore subject to a standard threat. The existence of a standard threat in a significant 
subsection of states is sufficient to justify the recognition of a right at the international 
level.  
 
(3) Reasonable Effectiveness 
 
Beitz’s second and third schema contentions require that the available rights 
mechanism, in principle, be effective in protecting the interest. For the second 
contention, it must fall within the power of the state to protect the interest by means of 
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law or public policy. For the third, it must fall within the ability of the international 
community to intervene in the event that a state fails in its first-level duty. In both cases 
the action taken must make a tangible difference. If, in principle, the legislative and 
public policy tools available to a state (notwithstanding the political balancing 
considered above) will have no impact in protecting the interest, then the Practice is 
simply the wrong mechanism with which to protect that interest. If intervention by the 
international community, if a state fails to respect its first-level duty, can have no impact, 
then the Practice is the wrong mechanism with which to protect that interest. Therefore, 
the final step, in deciding whether to recognise an interest as a right, is to determine 
whether the rights mechanism will be effective in protecting that interest. Rights contain 
a duty to protect an interest. They oblige states to take some form of action, but states 
have latitude as to the specific steps they take to protect the interest in practice. Indeed, 
the specific action required may differ in different states. In some cases, states may agree 
further practical steps at international level. As such, answering the question of 
reasonable effect does not require specific policy recommendations. It is sufficient that 
the rights mechanism can effectively prescribe identifiable general duties on states in 
relation to the interest protected by the right.  
 
Why Do Human Rights Have Authority? 
 
So far Beitz’s work identifies how the Practice provides reasons for action. But it 
is not yet clear why it does so. Why do states accept the duty that the two-level model 
places on them? For Beitz, this is the wrong question. There is no single source of 
authority for rights. Different states will observe their duties for different reasons. The 
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Practice functions in the same manner regardless of the reasons that states have for 
applying its norms. As long as its norms are applied, it is effective.  
Rawls makes a normative argument: "the great evils of human history - unjust 
war and oppression, religious persecution and denial of liberty of conscience, starvation 
and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder - follow from political 
injustice"80. In other words: bad things happen when human rights are not respected. In 
Rawls’ society of peoples, human rights provide reasons for action from a self-interested 
perspective. Respect for human rights is a necessary precondition for a state to retain its 
territorial integrity free from the fear of incursion. For Rawls, rights ultimately provide 
reasons for action because states wish to avoid the consequences of neglecting their 
duties.  
For Beitz, to search for the moral basis of the Practice as a whole is a pointless 
endeavour. States accept the authority of the norms of the Practice because they have 
agreed to do so. Interests must be justified before they are recognised as rights in the 
Practice, but they need not be justified based on the same moral criteria81. Rights are 
“mid-level norms”.82 They lie between the reason for protecting an interest and the range 
of actions required to do so. Rights do not contain the reason that they should be 
respected, nor do they necessarily specify the range of actions required to protect them. 
The content of the right is thus distinct from the reasons for respecting it. Rights have 
normative force because they reflect reasons beyond themselves. Different states will 
have different reasons for respecting the same rights. But this doesn’t detract from the 
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authority of the Practice because its norms are, for whatever reason, generally 
respected.83  
Beitz’s account of the normative force of rights can be understood with the 
metaphor of a game of tennis. One competitor obeys the rules out of respect for the spirit 
of the game. The other obeys the rules because he believes that doing so gives him the 
best chance of winning. The Practice operates in a similar manner. States may observe 
the rules of the Practice as a matter of political or ethical principle. They may believe 
that the general application of the rules gives them a competitive economic advantage 
and, thus, obey the rules out of pure self-interest. They may wish to avoid or atone for 
the deeds of colonialism. They may be coerced into respecting the norms of the Practice 
by the threat of intervention. The effect of all of these different motivations is the same: 
the norms of the Practice have force as reasons for action.84 
This understanding of normative force also applies to the second-level duty. Not 
all states will intervene every time a state fails to fulfil its first-level duty. A state’s 
motivation for supporting a particular right will inform the way it respects its duty to 
intervene. For example, when states are unable to fulfil the duties that are encompassed 
by the right to development, other states intervene by providing development aid. But 
development aid is not provided on a uniform basis. European states often provide 
development aid based on links with their former colonies. The UK, therefore, provides 
more aid to India than France does, but France provides larger sums to Algeria and 
Morocco.85 Although states respect rights for different reasons, the Practice has 
coherence because states generally respect the same set or rights.  
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This division, between reasons for respecting the norms of the Practice and 
reasons for entering the Practice ab initio, allows Beitz to distinguish between 
disagreement within the Practice and disagreement about the nature of the Practice itself. 
For Beitz, disagreements about certain rights or mechanisms are integral to the Practice. 
When different actors participate in the Practice for different reasons, disagreement 
about which interests should be recognised as rights, and the best way to protect them, is 
inevitable. Indeed, it is to be encouraged. Disagreement and debate ensures that ideas are 
thoroughly tested and forces a proposer to consider a wider range of perspectives when 
advancing a particular position. Disagreement is thus part of the discourse of human 




 For Beitz, human rights are political presumptions, worked out at international 
level, that make individuals a matter of global concern. They protect the urgent interests 
of individuals from standard threats and, in doing so, empower individuals in relation to 
states. They do this by imposing a two-level duty on states, first to address the interests 
protected by rights and, second, to intervene when another state fails to fulfil its first-
level duty. An interest merits protection by the rights mechanism if it is (1) particularly 
important (urgent), (2) faced with a standard threat, and (3) if the rights mechanism will 
be reasonably effective in protecting it. In subsequent chapters, solidarity rights will be 
tested against these three criteria to determine whether they have a legitimate place in the 
Practice. If solidarity rights protect interests that are urgent and faced with standard 
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threats, from which the rights mechanism will be reasonably effective in protecting them, 
then they should be considered human rights. 
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 Before I test solidarity rights against Beitz’s model, it is necessary to explain how 
his theory is distinct from more “orthodox” (as Beitz calls them) accounts of human 
rights. Beitz’s model is, in my view, distinct in two principle ways. It is, first, practical 
and agnostic and thus facilitates analysis of rights without the necessity of taking an 
ontological position. It is, second, able to account for the full range of rights represented 
in the Practice, where most persuasive orthodox theories can only satisfactorily account 
for a subsection of those rights. This is useful for the purpose of this project, which is to 
analyse solidarity rights in relation to the Practice as it stands. In this chapter I will 
analyse orthodox models of human rights in relation to the accepted classes of rights 
(civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights). I will not, at this 
point, consider solidarity rights because, if solidarity rights are to be seen as human 
rights, they must be justified on the same terms as the accepted classes of rights.  
In this chapter I will consider three classes of orthodox theory. I will first 
consider Agreement theories, in which human rights are modelled based on assertions of 
underlying agreement between cultures. Second, I will consider Naturalistic theories, in 
which human rights are based on objective truths. Third, I will consider juridical 
theories, in which human rights are analysed based on their role in legal systems. Finally, 
I will argue that, in addition to its specific distinctions in comparison with each class of 
orthodox theory, Beitz’s approach differs generally because it admits divergent accounts 





Agreement theories, such as those of Jack Donnelley87 and Amartya Sen,88 model 
human rights based on assertions of agreement within and between cultures about certain 
norms. This is the prevailing approach at the United Nations. Agreement theories fail to 
provide a satisfactory account of rights because they (a) rely on empirical assertions that 
they leave unverified and (b) they cannot account for the range of rights currently 
recognised in international law. Agreement89 theories have a nominally empirical basis. 
For Agreement theorists, such as Donnelley, for example, all cultures value human 
dignity. There is an underlying agreement amongst all, or the majority of, cultures that 
humans are entitled to a certain standard of treatment purely by virtue of being human. 
Not all cultures and societies use the language of rights. Yet all cultures and societies 
take some measures to protect certain basic aspects of the human condition. Agreement 
theorists do not claim to identify conscious agreement. They argue that, apparently 
coincidental, underlying similarities justify enshrining the aspects of protection, on 
which all cultures implicitly agree, in international law as rights.  
Agreement theorists differ as to the nature of the implicit agreement. For some, 
such as Donnelley,90 there is implicit agreement about the specific interests that must be 
protected. For others, such as Sen,91 the specific interests recognised may differ, but 
there is implicit agreement as to the proper process for recognising the interests that 
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merit protection. The common ground for Agreement theorists is that they locate the 
grounds for human rights in some form of underlying, cultural agreement. In my view, 
agreement theories are unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, they make nominally 
empirical claims about the nature of human society which are not supported by the 
necessary anthropological research. Second, they cannot account for the full range of 
rights recognised by the Practice. In this section I will explore two different types of 
agreement theory, (i) interest based agreement and (ii) agreement about public reason. I 
will then examine how Beitz’s model differs from Agreement theories and why it is to be 
preferred. 
 
Interest based agreement 
 
For proponents of rights based versions of Agreement theories, there is an 
underlying agreement between cultures to protect certain human interests. Not every 
culture will use the language of “rights”. Yet all cultures protect important interests in 
some way, through law or other social or political structures.92  
Jack Donnelley attempts to reconcile the Agreement approach with a system of 
internationally recognised human rights.93 He separates the substance of human rights 
from the form. For Donnelley, all cultures manifest certain basic ways of protecting 
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International, 2010), pp. 29-50 
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human dignity.94 In some cultures, this is achieved with explicitly recognised human 
rights, in others it is achieved with social conventions, or with legal duties that are 
imposed on all members of society.95 Regardless of the specific nature of the measures 
employed, on this view, all cultures seek to achieve the common aim of protecting 
human dignity. This agreement justifies protecting human dignity internationally, but it 
does not necessarily justify using the mechanism of "rights". The imperative to protect 
human dignity is universally agreed then, but it is not universally agreed political rights 
are the best way to satisfy that imperative. 
Nevertheless, Donnelley argues, international human rights are useful as an 
organising concept. Human rights provide a common language by which the 
international community can recognise the substance of underlying cultural agreements 
about protecting human dignity. The measures taken to protect the interests recognised 
by rights must, however, be left to the discretion of individual societies.96 Donnelley’s 
model accounts for both the underlying agreement as to the imperative of protecting 
certain interests and the absence of consensus as to the best measures by which to do so. 
Donnelley illustrates his model with the example of the right to a fair trial. All 
societies implicitly agree that the innocent should not be punished for crimes they did not 
commit. Methods for ensuring this differ. The right to a fair trial recognises the 
underlying agreement regarding this imperative at international level. The imperative is 
given effect at domestic level in a number of different ways. Some societies use 
adversarial trials, while others use investigatory trials. Others do not use trials at all, 
preferring alternative forms of community arbitration or mediation. For Donnelley, the 
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form of the “trial” doesn’t matter so long as it is “fair”.97 The language of international 
human rights thus makes the implicit explicit. The underlying agreement in principle is 
represented at international level with rights language. The principle is applied in 




An alternative version of Agreement theory locates the underlying cultural 
agreement in a common conception of public reason. Proponents of this model identify 
cultural agreement in the process by which important interests are recognised as meriting 
protection with the rights mechanism. In Amartya Sen’s account,99 rights allow 
individuals to realise their “capabilities”.100 This model recognises the diversity between 
individuals as well as between cultures.101 All humans have capabilities, but the specific 
nature of capabilities differs between individuals. For Sen, human dignity is most 
completely recognised when every individual is able to realise their capabilities.102 
                                                          
97 Ibid, pp. 415 - 416 
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Rights are a mechanism for ensuring that all individuals are able to realise their 
capabilities. Rights are identified through public discourse. Not all cultures share the 
language of rights. All liberal cultures, however, exhibit some form of public discourse. 
Those that do not are, for Sen, dictatorships.103 For Sen, this amounts to an underlying 
agreement between all cultures as to the value of public debate. This represents common 
agreement as to the proper process by which rights are recognised.104 
Sen shares elements of the "naturalistic" approach (discussed below). Parts of his 
model rely on qualities, like having capabilities, that are inherent in human nature. Beitz 
thus identifies Sen as a proponent of the Naturalistic approach rather than an Agreement 
theorist105. Sen’s model of human rights however, ultimately relies on an anthropological 
assertion of cultural agreement. Having capabilities is part of human nature. In Sen’s 
model, however, humans have rights because there is an underling agreement within and 
amongst cultures about the value of public discourse through which human capabilities 
can be recognised. The discourse, not capabilities, is the foundation of rights. Through 
public discourse, societies decide to recognise certain interests in a normative system, to 
best help individuals realise capabilities. For Sen, the authority of human rights comes 
from a universal underlying agreement about the value of public discourse, not from the 
existence of capabilities.  
 
The problems with Agreement theories 
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In my view, Agreement theories of all types cannot offer a satisfactory account of 
the accepted classes of rights because they (a) rely on unverified assertions about culture 
and society and (b) they cannot account for the full range of rights recognised in the 
accepted classes. This section will discuss each of these issues in turn. Agreement 
theories rely on apparently empirical statements such as "all cultures recognise human 
dignity" or "all cultures value public debate". These are anthropological statements and 
therefore should be grounded in anthropological research. A theory based on empirical 
assertions, like Donnelley’s or Sen’s, can be supported or discredited through 
anthropological study. Yet Donnelley and Sen fail to do this. Their justifications for 
human rights are based on unverified assertions rather than empirically verified facts. 
Sen acknowledges the limitations of his model. Not all societies value public debate in 
the way he claims. For Sen, however, societies that do not fit his rubric as 
"dictatorships".106 This doesn’t solve the problem. Even if Sen’s assertion is “all non-
dictatorships value public debate” rather than “all societies value public debate”, it is still 
an assertion of fact that is not supported by empirical research. Put another way, 
Donnelley’s and Sen’s approaches may be based on accurate assertions or they may be 
based on inaccurate assertions. The problem they face is that we have no way of 
knowing whether their underlying assertions are accurate because they have not 
supported their assertions with the necessary anthropological study. 
Even if Sen and Donnelley had conducted the required research, their theories 
would still be unsatisfactory if one’s purpose is to analyse the full range of rights 
recognised in the Practice. As Beitz points out, the class of “qualities that could be 
considered rights based on agreement between societies” is incredibly narrow. 
Agreement theories can only account for a small sub-section of the rights recognised in 
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the Practice. It is not possible to find universal or even widespread cultural agreement 
about the full range of interests recognised in the Practice. Beitz notes that freedom of 
religious practice and freedom from discrimination on grounds of sex cannot be said to 
be matters of agreement within and amongst cultures.107 Donnelley and Sen both identify 
a range of rights that is narrower than that recognised in international law. This thesis 
aims to argue for solidarity rights as part of the Practice as it stands.108  
 
Why Beitz’s approach is distinct from Agreement theories 
 
 Beitz’s political approach is preferable to Agreement theories. It doesn’t depend 
on an unverified empirical assertion and it accounts for the full range of rights 
recognised in the Practice. In a certain sense, Beitz himself could be described as an 
agreement theorist. His model implies an agreement (to abide by the norms of the 
Practice) among all states that participate in the Practice. Agreement theories, however, 
seek to locate the authority of rights in an underlying agreement between cultures. Beitz 
identifies agreement at a different level. For Beitz, states agree to observe the norms of 
the Practice, but they do so for different reasons. There is no underlying agreement, only 
an nominal agreement. Beitz relies on a single empirical assertion: all states in the 
Practice generally recognise by the norms of the Practice109 most of the time. Beitz’s 
assertion is therefore preferable to the assertions of agreement theorists because it is 
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generally agreed to be the case. In Rorty’s words, human rights are a “fact” of public 
morality.110 
 Beitz also accounts for the full range of rights recognised in the Practice. 
Orthodox theories work from the foundations upwards. Agreement theories, for example, 
assert that an underlying agreement exists then ask what rights it justifies. Beitz works in 
the opposite direction. He looks at the rights recognised in the Practice and asks why 
they provide reasons for action. Beitz’s model thus accounts for the content of the 
Practice as it stands, rather than in an idealised from. Applying Beitz’s approach to 
solidarity rights allows us to analyse them on the same terms as the rights already 
recognised in the Practice, by subjecting them to a fair test and achieving a more 




In Naturalistic theories,111 rights are based on objective truths that have value in 
and of themselves. This approach is represented particularly in scholarly theories such as 
those of John Finnis112 and James Griffin.113 The authority in rights comes from the 
extent to which they reflect these objective truths. Naturalistic theories do not, however, 
provide an account of rights that is useful when seeking to analyse the Practice as it 
stands because they (a) rely on unverifiable assertions and (b) cannot account for the full 
range of rights currently recognised in international law.  
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The objective truths on which Naturalistic theories are based differ depending on 
the theory. They are generally universal, transcend social and political institutions, and 
pre-exist rights. Philosophers can identify these truths, but they have always existed and 
will always exist. Naturalistic theories fall into three groups. The first group of theories 
rely on assertions about natural law. The second group rely on assertions about human 
nature. In the third group, truths are identified through deductive reasoning. In my view, 
this reliance on unsupportable assumptions about the nature of humanity and, in some 
cases, truth, makes naturalistic approaches unsatisfactory if one’s aim is to analyse the 
Practice as it stands. It also means that naturalistic theories generally can’t account for 
the full range of rights recognised in the Practice. Beitz’s approach is to be preferred 
because he models human rights without relying on assertions about abstract concepts. 
This section will (i) explore each different versions of naturalistic theories before (ii) 
identifying why their reliance on abstract concepts makes them unsatisfactory and (iii) 




John Finnis develops a natural law approach to human rights.114 For Finnis, rights 
are a mechanism for achieving “forms if human good”.115 Finnis postulates that a certain 
set of concepts are objectively and irreducibly good. They are "Knowledge", "Life", 
"Play", "Aesthetic Experience", "Sociability (friendship)", "Practical reasonableness" 
and "Religion" (or belief/faith generally).116 It is not necessary to explain why these 
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concepts are good. They are simply good as a matter of truth. For Finnis, moral values 
are good to the extent that they reflect one or more of the “forms of human good”. In 
Finnis’ model, values are either “objective” or not objective. A value that is not 
objective, can be justified according to the extent that it reflects or facilitates other 
values. Certain values, however, are “objective” and can’t be dissected. They are good in 
and of themselves, rather than because of their relationship with other values. These are 
“forms of human good”, their goodness is “self-evident”.117 
Finnis contrasts moral reasoning with geometry. The rules of geometry are 
mutually justifying. The use of degrees to measure an angle only has relevance within 
the discipline of geometry. If the discipline did not exist, then a protractor would be 
nothing but a series of meaningless lines on a piece of plastic. By contrast, "forms of 
human good" are self-justifying. They are good because they are good. If philosophy 
textbooks did not exist to explain them, knowledge, practical reasoning and play (for 
example) would not cease to be good.118 
For Finnis, morality is like physics. Physicists understand that the universe is 
made up of elements: substances that are made up of only one type of atom. While water 
may be a combination of two parts hydrogen to one-part oxygen, hydrogen itself is only 
made up of hydrogen and oxygen is only made up of oxygen. Finnis’ “forms of human 
good” are to moral reasoning as elements are to physical science. Just as an atom of 
oxygen can only be described as “oxygen”, a “form of human good”, such as 
“knowledge” can only be described as “knowledge”. Both are, for Finnis, irreducible and 
therefore self-justifying.  
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Finnis acknowledges that individuals and societies have limited resources. It is 
not possible to pursue every "form of human good" all the time. One must choose where 
to devote one's resources. The best distribution of moral resources is identified by 
applying practical reason (which is, itself, a "form of human good"). Practical reason is 
the process of making decisions objectively while balancing the needs of both the 
individual and society. One result of the application of practical reason is human rights. 
For Finnis, rights are a method of balancing individual good with public good in order to 
best realise the "forms of human good".119 In Finnis’ conception, rights are not good in 
and of themselves. They are a means of realising that, which is self-evidently good. If we 
are to analyse rights based on Finnis’ model, we must, therefore, ask what relation they 




An alternative Naturalistic approach bases human rights on truths about human 
nature. In these theories, certain qualities are inherent in all individuals by virtue of their 
humanity. Such qualities must be protected by human rights. For James Griffin,120 all 
human beings inherently have the ability to reason about what makes a "good life". 
Based on this reasoning humans calculate our impact upon the world.121 This quality 
distinguishes human from other animals. It is thus worth protecting. Griffin calls this 
quality "personhood".122 For Griffin, agency is fundamental to personhood. Humans 
already have the ability to reason. Therefore, they should have the agency to put that 
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reason into practice. Griffin identifies two essential aspects of agency. First, an agent 
must have "autonomy": She must not be compelled or constrained by another. But an 
agent must also have the means to exercise her autonomy: her "choice must be real". For 
example, she must have the resources and education123 necessary to exercise agency. 
Human rights protect agency.  
Griffin equates the necessities of "personhood" with biological necessities. For 
Griffin, respect for agency is necessary for an individual to function as a sentient human 
being, just as food, water and shelter are necessary for an individual to function 
biologically. The denial of personhood has a detrimental effect on the individual's sense 
of themselves in the same way that a denial of food has an effect on their body124. For 
Griffin, rights thus protect personhood. He illustrates this assertion with an examination 
of the right against torture. Torture causes pain, but this is not sufficient to justify a right 
against torture. Rights do not and cannot, for Griffin, protect against everything that 
causes pain, even extreme pain. Rights protect humans from torture because torture robs 
the individual of her autonomy thus compromising her personhood125. If we are to 
analyse rights based on Griffin’s account, we must, therefore, ask whether they are 
relevant to the qualities that Griffin identifies as necessary to “personhood”. 
 
The problems with Naturalistic theories 
 
Richard Rorty identifies the problem with relying on abstract concepts to support 
a model of human rights. Rorty’s focus is on the usefulness of human rights models in 
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relation to the Practice. He does not seek to fundamentally undermine naturalistic 
theories, rather to identify the reasons they are not useful for a set of practical, global, 
political norms.  
Naturalistic theories all claim to be premised on something that is objectively 
"true". In an imperfect world, however, it is not possible to identify "truth" in any 
meaningful sense. For Rorty it is impossible to develop a mechanism that will enable us 
to identify objective truths126. Rorty begins with the process that is used to ascertain 
"truths". Philosophers like Griffin and Finnis both appeal to "reason" or "rationality" as, 
in Rorty’s words, an "innate truth oriented faculty".127 For Griffin and Finnis, individuals 
can apply reason to identify the truths on which to base their model of rights. Yet, as 
Rorty points out, this relies on a circular argument. Any definition of reason must 
include a set of criteria which, when broken down themselves, can only be described as 
"reason".128 The statement “reason is reason” is meaningless.  
Finnis relies on concepts that explicitly cannot be justified by reference to 
anything other than themselves. For Finnis, this indicates the strength of his account. If a 
value cannot be justified by reference to anything other than itself, it must be 
objective.129 “Forms of human good” are good in and of themselves. The question "but 
what is good?" it could only be answered, within Finnis' theory, with a reference to the 
“forms of human good”: good is good because it is good. For Finnis’ theory to have 
practical value we must trust that one can correctly identify the forms of human good.  
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For Rorty, Naturalistic theorists attempt to treat morality in the same way that we 
might treat physical science.130 Yet statements about physical science are tested 
extensively. In Naturalistic theories, statements about moral truths are inherently 
untestable. When testing a scientific hypothesis, all factors that might distort the result 
are removed from the experiment. If a scientist wishes to test the hypothesis that two 
hydrogen atoms combined with one oxygen atom would create a molecule of water, she 
must go to considerable lengths to ensure that there are, for example, no sulphur atoms in 
the experiment. Moral philosophers do not enjoy that luxury. It is not possible to test 
moral statements in laboratory conditions. Philosophers are the product of their own 
culture, society, history and personal background.131 Philosophers might attempt to 
transcend their socio-cultural context. Yet their very understanding of "transcending 
cultural context" will have been developed within that same context.132 Thus, even our 
understanding of objectivity is subjective. For Rorty, the closest one can come to 
objectivity is, ironically, to acknowledge one’s ultimate lack of objectivity. Arguments 
are stronger when they acknowledge the context in which they are made.133 
 Rorty does not deny the existence of objective truth. Any theorist might stumble 
across truth. As no theorist can view the world from an objective standpoint, however, 
they cannot be sure to know truth when they see it. Theories of human rights are more 
coherent when they acknowledge this limitation and seek to build models of human 
rights that do not rely on assertions of objectivity. Searching for the objective truth in 
human rights is, for Rorty, a waste of time. It is not necessary to convince people that 
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human rights norms should generally be respected. Human rights have become “a fact of 
the world”.134 Only someone who is entirely unable to comprehend basic social norms, 
would require convincing that human rights norms are a “good thing”. Critical analysis 
is, for Rorty, more usefully applied to questions of the application of human rights and 
the development of the Practice.135 Ontological arguments based on claims to objectivity 
are of little use when analysing human rights in practice. They require entering into 
debates about a principle upon which there is already general agreement (that human 
rights merit general respect), which distracts from more pertinent questions, such as how 
human rights are to be more fully realised in practice.  
Moral theory does not, for Rorty, require claims of objectivity. A moral 
proposition cannot be accurately described as objectively true. It can, however, achieve a 
status that is practically equivalent. If a proposition is justified repeatedly, to a diverse 
range of different audiences, and incorporates critiques from those audiences in order to 
become stronger, then it gains widespread acceptance. For the purpose of developing 
normative systems, this is practically equivalent to the proposition being objectively true. 
If a proposition is broadly accepted by a wide enough range of agents, then it has the 
same effect as if it were inherently true. Human rights norms do not, therefore, need to 
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John Tasioulas recalibrates the Naturalistic account of human rights to address 
Rorty’s criticism. For Tasioulas, rights can be identified by applying “natural reason”.137 
In the light of Rorty’s critique, Tasioulas accepts that it is no longer viable to base rights 
on claims to objective foundations. Instead, Tasioulas develops a theory of human rights 
retaining “foundations” but eschewing “foundationalism”.138 For Tasioulas, rights must 
be based on something but that something need not be an appeal to objective truth. 
Tasioulas develops his model over several articles and book chapters.139 He rejects 
accounts that base human rights on “defective accounts of what objectivity is”.140 He 
also rejects models (like Griffin’s) that base all human rights on a single quality. 
Tasioulas strives to develop a theory that is non-parochial, demonstrates a degree of 
fidelity to the practice as it stands, and that captures the "distinctive importance" human 
rights.”141 At the same time, for Tasioulas, rights must be more than political assertions. 
They must have foundations in something more fundamental than politics.142  
For Tasioulas, human rights are “natural rights”, but are also linked to their social 
context. Human rights are “natural” because they are derivable through “natural moral 
reasoning”.143 But they are context dependent because natural moral reasoning can 
produce different conclusions in different contexts. Natural reason can be applied in two 
ways: derivative reasoning or independent reasoning.144 Derivative reasoning requires 
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examining existing rights and identifying common themes. The foundations of rights can 
be derived from these themes.145 Independent reasoning involves determining the 
foundations of rights without relying on analysis of existing rights. For Tasioulas, rights 
are grounded in human dignity. But dignity provides only the “moral background”146 to 
rights, not the content of rights themselves. Dignity is the reason that humans have rights 
in general, the content of specific rights is derived from human interests. For Tasioulas, a 
human interest is “objective [in the sense that it applies to all humans whether particular 
individuals wish to make use of it], standardised, open-ended and pluralistic.”147 An 
interest becomes a right if it is of sufficient importance to generate corresponding duties. 
The duty forms the content of the right.148  
 The importance of an interest can be determined by analysis of how it interacts 
with other interests. Tasioulas recognises that there are always competing interests. The 
analysis of an interest must recognise the extent to which it impacts on or facilitates 
others.149 Interests that, when fulfilled, facilitate the fulfilment of other interests are more 
likely to justify duties than interests that, when fulfilled, have a negative impact on other 
interests. An interest is relevant only to the holder. Only the most important interests 
generate corresponding duties and can thus be recognised as a right. A right, therefore, 
necessarily imposes duties on others. Natural reason allows us to identify which interests 
are important enough to generate duties and should therefore be recognised as rights.  
 Tasioulas avoids some of the pitfalls of other Naturalistic approaches. He is not, 
however, successful in avoiding Rorty’s critique entirely. Tasioulas’ model is pluralistic. 
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Rights are not tied to a particular set of objective values and so Tasioulas’ model can 
accommodate multiple perspectives. Yet his model of human rights still rests on the 
assertion that humans have a moral status independent of society. Tasioulas’ “natural 
reason” mechanism ultimately aspires to moral objectivity in the same way as other 
orthodox theorists. The natural reason model must reject some interests from 
consideration as rights and accept others. Otherwise it will have no critical impact. 
Furthermore, Tasioulas cannot justify the authority of rights in general without relying 
on the assertion that humans all possess an undefined quality called “dignity” purely by 
virtue of our humanity. But Tasioulas does not explain how he can achieve a standpoint 
of sufficient objectivity to (a) identify that all humans possess “dignity” and (b) 
distinguish between those interests that prescribe duties and those that do not. 
Furthermore, Tasioulas does not explain why “natural reason” is a legitimate process by 
which to distinguish between interests and rights. For Tasioulas natural reason delivers 
the correct answers because it is “natural”, it is inherent in humanity. Tasioulas applies 
“natural reason” in the same way that Finnis applies “reason” as, in Rorty’s words, an 
“innate truth oriented faculty”150. As Rorty points out, it is not possible to identify a truth 
oriented faculty because it is not possible to identify objective moral truths.  
 Neither Tasioulas nor other orthodox theorists make room in their models for the 
full range of rights recognised in the Practice. As Beitz points out, it is not clear that a 
model based on personhood, for example, would account for a right to an adequate 
standard of living. In a personhood model the right would entitle the individual to only 
“the material conditions necessary for effective agency”. The Practice, however, 
provides for a right based on the “dignity” of the individual. As Beitz puts it: “Dignity 
has a social dimension: it involves one’s standing with others and its achievement may 
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require a higher level of material well-being than the considerations of agency alone 
would justify”.151  
 
Why Beitz’s model is preferable to Naturalistic theories 
 
 Beitz’s model is distinct from Naturalistic models because it doesn’t rely on an 
appeal to objective truth or a “truth oriented faculty”. Beitz is agnostic about any 
supposed objective foundations for rights. For him, human rights are political 
presumptions. Humans have rights because humans have made a political decision to 
have rights. This was not a decision made by all of humanity acting together, but by 
political leaders acting through international political fora in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.152 The reasons political leaders have for taking (and continuing to broadly 
support) that decisions are not, for Beitz, important. The Practice has broadly the same 
practical impacts regardless of the reasons participating parties support it. The Practice 
evolves through continuing action in political fora and the range of fora through which 
the Practice can be influenced (and consequently the range of individuals who can 
influence the Practice) has broadened. The Practice can now be influenced by for a that 
are accessible to civil society, not merely political leaders. Rights need not be based on 
interests with inherent value or serve an objective truth. A right is distinguished from an 
interest by its recognition in the Practice. Beitz identifies the process for the recognition 
by analysing those rights that are already recognised in the Practice. For Beitz, rights are 
institutional. They relate to the relationship between the individual, the state, and the 
international community. If the institutions through which they take effect did not exist, 
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then human rights would not exist either. This model is more appropriate for this thesis. 
My aim is to argue for solidarity rights as part of the Practice. It is not necessary that I 
rely on an objective truth to do so because the Practice is not based on objective truth. 
This is clear because no Naturalistic theory can account for the full range of rights 
recognised in the Practice.153 It is a political exercise.  
 In Naturalistic theories, a right reflects a truth. If a right recognised in the model 
is called into question, then one must also question whether the model has correctly 
identified the truth or has applied it incorrectly. This calls into question the validity of all 
the other rights recognised by the model. If the model has misidentified the truth on 
which rights are based, then every right it recognises is based on a mistake. If it has 
misapplied the truth on which rights are based, then it may also have misapplied it in 
regard to any of the other rights it recognises. For Beitz, controversy is part of the 
Practice. If rights are political presumptions, then it is to be expected that they will be the 
subject of disagreement. Controversy about a right doesn’t undermine Beitz’s model 
because Beitz’s does not claim his model is based on objective truth. Beitz’s model 
therefore provides a more satisfying account of human rights than Naturalistic theories.  
   
Juridical Theories 
 
The third class of orthodox theories, juridical accounts of human rights, primarily 
focus on the work rights do rather than the basis for rights. leading proponent of the 
juridical approach, Ronald Dworkin,154 develops a model based on a distinction between 
                                                          
153 Beitz, n. 5, p. 50 
154 Dworkin also considers natural law theories of rights (Dworkin, n. 19, pp. 13-29). Like Rorty he is 
critical of theories which confuse the (empirically observable) laws of nature with (unobservable) natural 
 60 
“institutional” and “background” rights.155 Institutional rights are held by individuals, in 
relation to a specific institution such as the state or the courts. Background rights are 
moral rights and apply universally, regardless of institutions. One can, however only 
receive remedies in relation to institutional rights. They compel the institution in 
question to behave in a certain manner.156 From Dworkin’s perspective, human rights in 
the Practice are best understood as institutional rights. They take effect in relation to a 
series of institutions including the UN, international courts, regional and state level 
institutions. Rights act as “trumps”.157 They prevent the will of the majority from 
overwhelming the interests of the individual with regard to a limited class of interests.  
Dworkin’s juridical model is, however, of limited utility for analysing 
international human rights. Dworkin’s model generally presupposes an established 
judiciary that is able to act independently and may have confidence that its decisions will 
be enforced on their own authority. In other words, Dworkin’s model presupposes a 
judiciary akin to the domestic judiciary in a Western democracy. Some of his most 
influential work involves applying his account of rights to legal and public policy 
debates in the USA. But international politics lacks a unified court system and a 
                                                          
law. But he is more forgiving than Rorty. Dworkin accepts that there are certain observable moral interests 
that are common to all humans. But morality is a poor basis for rights. For Dworkin, morality is a “blunt 
instrument” (Dworkin, n. 19, p. 107). Its inclusion in reasoning about rights (or any aspect of law) makes it 
more difficult to resolve the “hard cases” (Dworkin, n. 19, p. 107) which require precise reasoning. Moral 
reasoning can only provide broad assertions.  
 But Dworkin does not embrace relativism. Indeed, he dismisses moral relativist critiques of 
orthodox theories. For Dworkin, to hold a certain position yet simultaneously accept that it is one of 
several equally valid positions, is not to hold a position at all (Ibid, pp. 319-335). A statement that comes 
with the qualifier that it is merely the result of subjective judgement, is not a meaningful contribution to 
discourse. It makes the original statement critically meaningless.  
155 Dworkin, n. 19, pp. 13-29 
156 Ibid, pp. 13-29 
157 Ibid, p. 14 
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comprehensive or cohesive means of enforcing judicial decisions. Therefore, an 
argument for solidarity rights based purely on Dworkin’s account is unlikely to be 
convincing in context of international human rights.  
Beitz’s model applies to the international human rights system, in which rights 
are not consistently enforced by courts with universal jurisdiction, but are better 
described as political presumptions. Beitz theory has room for rights to take effect in 
court, both in an international and domestic context. But, for Beitz, giving rights legal 
effect is only a part of fulling the two levels of duties that the Practice imposes. To give 
rights effect in the domestic legal system (as, for example, the UK Human Rights Act 
1998 or other justiciable bills of rights do) is one way in which states can fulfil their first-
level duty. To give rights effect in international law is but one way of fulfilling the 
second-level duty. Beitz’s political approach therefore offers a more satisfying account 




 In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Beitz’s political approach is distinct 
from orthodox approaches. I have argued that agreement theories rely on empirical 
claims that, although verifiable, have not been verified. Agreement theories therefore 
tend to rely on assertions. Even if agreement theories were tested, it is unlikely that they 
would support more than a small core of rights, and they are thus unable to account for 
the Practice as it stands. Naturalistic theories generally rely on claims to objectivity that 
make them of limited utility for analysis of the Practice and only account for a limited 
subset of rights. Naturalistic and Agreement theories are, thus, of limited utility for 
analysing human rights in the Practice. Juridical theories are better suited to modelling 
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rights in domestic systems and do not have space to account for the broader range of 
variables at work in the international human rights system. 
 Beitz’s political approach is the most useful model of human rights for the 
purpose of analysing rights in relation to the Practice as it stands. First, it does not rely 
on unverifiable claims of objectivity or unverified assertions because it avoids 
ontological arguments about the nature of rights altogether. In modelling rights as mid-
level norms, Beitz makes it unnecessary to engage in such debates. Second, it accounts 
for the full range of rights recognised in the Practice. Third, it embraces competing 
theories of rights.  
Beitz’s model of rights is pluralistic. It has room for all types of orthodox theory. 
For Beitz, rights are mid-level norms. One right may be respected for many different 
reasons. It doesn’t matter whether people respect a right because they believe it is based 
on an objective truth or because they are respecting a perceived cultural agreement. For a 
right to function as a political presumption, all that matters is that it is respected and 
given effect in the majority of cases. The reasons for doing so are irrelevant and so all 
reasons are compatible with Beitz’s model. Beitz’s model does not, therefore, aim to 
supplant orthodox theories. It has room for individuals or states to respect rights for any 
reason they choose. If a state respected human rights based on a national belief in 
personhood, this would be equally acceptable for Beitz’s theory as if a state respected 
rights purely in order to avoid intervention by other states.  
 Having established the key tenets of Beitz’s political approach, and the reasons it 
is to be preferred to orthodox approaches, I will now turn to solidarity rights. The next 
chapter will identify a working description of solidarity rights. This will enable solidarity 
rights to be evaluated against the key tenets of Beitz’s model in the second part of this 
thesis.  
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In order to justify solidarity rights according to Beitz’s criteria, we must 
understand, in detail, what characterises solidarity rights and marks them out from other 
classes of human rights. This chapter will sketch a detailed picture of solidarity rights. In 
my view, solidarity rights have three key features. They are rights that (1) protect 
interests in common-goods by (2) imposing an outward-facing duty on states and (3) are 
held by individuals.  
 In Beitz’s model, as identified in Chapter One, rights impose a two-level duty on 
states. The first level requires states to protect and provide for the interest recognised in 
the right. In contrast with the accepted classes of human rights, in which the first-level 
duty relates purely to the domestic realm, the duty in solidarity rights generally looks 
beyond the borders of the state: it is thus outward-facing as well as inward-facing. The 
accepted classes of rights generally impose a duty on states to provide for and protect 
urgent interests within their own borders. Solidarity rights impose a duty on states to 
protect and provide for urgent interests by taking action both within and outside their 
borders. This generally requires that states cooperate with each other or take into account 
the global impacts of their domestic and foreign policies. Solidarity rights, like all human 
rights, are held by individuals. Unlike other classes of rights, however, they have 
meaning only in a collective context.  
In this chapter I will, first, argue for a departure from established definitions of 
solidarity rights. I will then consider the three key features in my description: I will 
identify the class of interests protected by solidarity rights (common-good interests), 
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analyse the nature of the duty to cooperate (the outward-facing duty), and, finally, 
examine the nature of the holders of solidarity rights (individuals). 
 
Attempts to Define Solidarity Rights 
 
Previous attempts to identify the key features of solidarity rights have proved 
unsatisfactory. They do not accurately capture the way solidarity rights manifest in 
international law and politics. UNESCO director, Karal Vasak, set out the first 
conception of solidarity rights, what he called "Third Generation" rights, in 1977.158 
Vasak was working with limited experience of, what should now be called, solidarity 
rights. At that time the only established one was the right to.159 Examination of the state 
practice and case law that has developed since Vasak proposed his definition exposes its 
limitations. It similarly demonstrates that many subsequent definitions, that are broadly 
based on Vasak’s, are equally unsatisfactory.  
Vasak used the metaphor of “generations” to classify rights into three groups, 
corresponding to the French revolutionary slogan: “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”.160 For 
Vasak, the "First Generation" of rights are the rights of "liberté". These correspond to 
civil and political rights. They ensure individual freedoms from oppression, such as 
                                                          
158 Karal Vasak, “A 30 Year Struggle”, UNESCO Courier (November 1977), pp. 28 - 32 
159 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Art. 1 
160 Ibid, pp. 28 - 32 
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freedom of expression,161 freedom from arbitrary arrest,162 and protection from cruel or 
inhuman punishment163 at the hands of the state. The state’s role in these rights is, for 
Vasak, one of restraint.164 As the jurisprudence of rights has developed, this description 
has been challenged.165 Vasak’s "Second Generation" are the rights of "egalité". They 
correspond with economic, social, and cultural rights. They include the right to 
education166, the right to health167 and labour rights.168 For Vasak, these rights are 
identified by the requirement that governments take positive action towards their 
realisation.169 "Third Generation" rights are the rights of "fraternité". For Vasak, these 
are “solidarity rights”.170 “Third generation” rights “reflect a certain conception of 
                                                          
161 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) 
Art 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art. 19(2); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) 
162 UDHR, Art 9; ICCPR Art. 9; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Art. 5 
163 UDHR, Art 5; ICCPR, Art. 7; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Art. 3 
164 Vasak, n. 158, pp. self-determination 28 - 32 
165cf Sandra Fredman, “Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties and Positive Rights”, Oxford Legal 
Research Paper Series, Paper No 38/2006, August 2006 
166 UDHR, Art 26; International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR) Art. 13 
167 UDHR, Art 25; ICESCR, Art. 12 
168cf. UDHR Art 23; ICESCR, Art. 6; and, for example, International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (Entry into force: 
04 Jul 1950), Adoption: San Francisco, 31st ILC session (09 Jul 1948); ILO C098 - Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) 
169 Vasak, n. 158, pp. self-determination 28 – 32, of course, this distinction is no longer broadly accepted. 
For example, Aoife Nolan’s work demonstrates that, so called, “First Generation” rights also impose 
positive obligations. See Nolan, n. 66, pp. 21-28 
170 Vasak, n. 158, p. 29 
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community life”.171 They can only be implemented by collective effort of all individuals 
and states.172 In Vasak’s view, they are not held by individuals, but by the "nation" or the 
"people". They include the (at the time, nascent) rights to development, a healthy and 
ecologically balanced environment, peace, and ownership of the common heritage of 
mankind.173 
Vasak’s system of classification poses several problems. In Beitz’s account, all 
rights include both positive and negative duties. The first-level duty may be to refrain 
from imposing on an interest (a negative duty) but the second-level duty is always to 
intervene. The second-level duty is, therefore, always a positive duty. This is the same 
for both civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. This, taken 
alone, need not necessarily undermine Vasak’s system of classification. He may have 
been referring to first-level duties only. If that is the case, Vasak’s distinction between 
First and Second Generation rights is better expressed as: “First Generation rights 
impose negative duties at the first-level. Second Generation rights impose both positive 
and negative duties at the first-level.” This, however, is ultimately no more satisfactory. 
“First Generation” rights can also involve positive first-level duties.174 Civil and political 
rights require that a state (a) refrain from taking action that would impose on the interest 
in question and (b) take positive action to ensure that its citizens do not impose on each 
other’s interests. For example, courts have found that the right to life requires 
governments take measures to ensure the safety of citizens175 and institute adequate 
investigations should a citizen be killed.176  
                                                          
171 Ibid, pp. 30 - 31 
172 Ibid, pp. 28 - 32 
173 Ibid, pp. 28 - 32 
174 See, for example, Öcalan v Turkey [2005] 41 EHRR 45 
175 Ibid, at 49 
176 Makaratzis v Greece [2005] 41 EHRR 49 
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Although Vasak’s definition relies on flawed models of the accepted classes of 
rights, it usefully explains that solidarity rights entail “common-goods”. It lacks 
specificity, however, about how they do so. This has opened the door to a range of 
alternative definitions. 
The “generations” metaphor 
 
 Vasak rightly suggests that solidarity rights should be treated as a distinct class. 
His “generations” metaphor is, however, criticized for misrepresenting international 
human rights law177. The generations metaphor implies an order of succession or 
precedence178. This undermines the indivisibility of the human rights canon179 and 
ignores the evolutionary potential of "First" and "Second Generation" rights.180 
 Vasak’s choice of the generations metaphor is misleading. As Vasak himself 
argued, international human rights law is evolutionary.181 But that evolution manifests 
through in the developing application of existing rights or existing categories of rights as 
well as through entirely new categories.182 The language used to classify rights should 
reflect the true nature of the way the Practice evolves. The term "solidarity rights" is 
preferable. It identifies rights based on their application and relevance in the system of 
                                                          
177 cf. Philip Alston, “A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of 
International Human Rights Law”, 29 Neth. Intl. L. Rev. 307; Carl Wellman, “Solidarity, the Individual 
and Human Rights”, 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 639 2000; B. Algan, “Rethinking Third Generation Human Rights, 
Ankara Law Review, 1: 1 (2004) 
178 cf. Nsongura J. Udombana, “Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa”, 24 Mich. J. 
Int’l. L. 1209 2002-2003; Alston, n. 177, p. 307 
179 Wellman, n. 177, p. 639; see also UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, 12th July 1993, A/CONF/157/23, Art. 5 
180 cf. Udombana, n. 178, p. 1209 and Alston, n. 177, p. 310 
181 Vasak, n. 158, pp. 28 - 32 
182 Algan, n. 177, p. 433 
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international human rights law, rather than by a (questionable183) reference to their 




Alternatives to Vasak’s definition 
 
Alternative definitions to Vasak’s are often equally unsatisfactory. Stephen 
Marks calls solidarity rights the “rights of peoples”. He distinguishes them from other 
classes of rights by two characteristics. For Marks, the “rights of peoples” are rights that 
(a) belong to “neither the individualistic nor socialist tradition” and are (b) “at an early 
phase of the [international] legislative process184 and show promise of being accepted as 
international rights”.185  
This description is rather dated and too limited to serve as a working description 
for the purpose of this thesis. The primary forces in the clash between “individualistic 
and socialistic traditions” were, respectively, the USA and USSR. The politics of 
international human rights is no longer defined by tension between these two powers. In 
the 21st century the politics of international human rights are multi-dimensional. China 
and the EU have emerged as independent and significant voices.186 The politics of the 
UN Human Rights Council subject to multipolar tensions, with groupings originating in 
                                                          
183 Alston, n. 177, p. 310 
184 At the time Marks was writing, in 1980, Stephen P. Marks, “Emerging Human Rights: A New 
Generation for the 1980s?”, 33 Rutgers l. Rev. 435 1980-1981 
185 Ibid, p. 437 
186 Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im and Abd Allah Ahmad Naim, Human Rights in Cross Cultural 
Perspectives, (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), p.71 
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the Global South, such as the Organisation of Islamic Co-Operation, exercising 
increasing influence.187 Non-state entities also increasingly play an important role in UN 
institutions and other aspects of human rights discourse.188  
Many solidarity rights are no longer "at an early stage" of development. Some 
solidarity rights, such as the right to a clean and healthy environment or the right to 
tourism,189 are undoubtedly in their infancy. Others, however, such as self-determination 
are well established as part of international law. It is now misleading to suggest that 
solidarity rights, as a class, are "at an early stage" of development in comparison with 
other rights. Furthermore, the Practice is “emergent”: rights jurisprudence, no matter 
how well established, is constantly evolving. To identify a certain class of rights as being 
early in the evolutionary process tells us relatively little when all classes of rights are 
evolving continuously.  
An alternative definition can be found in the work of Jason Morgan-Foster.190 For 
Foster, solidarity rights are only experienced as a group and impose duties on both the 
state and the individual.191 This distinguishes solidarity rights from other classes of 
human rights, which only impose duties on the state. For Morgan-Foster, solidarity rights 
require that individuals, as well as states, act to protect and preserve the interest they 
protect. It is, however, misleading to suggest that solidarity rights impose duties on the 
individual. The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (the Banjul Charter) is 
                                                          
187 See Eric Heinze, “Even Handedness and the Politics of Human Rights” 21 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 7 (2008) 
and Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment, 
(London; Routledge, 2013), pp. 119-147 
188 See John H. Knox, “Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations”, 33 Harv. Envr. 
L. Rev. 2009, pp. 477-498 
189 See Ch. 8 
190 Jason Morgan - Foster, “Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the International 
Human Rights Movement”, 8 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 67 2005, pp. 67 - 116 
191 Ibid, pp. 67 - 116 
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the only international human rights instrument to recognise a range of solidarity rights on 
a significant scale. The Banjul Charter also includes duties that the individual owes to the 
state. But these duties are in addition to the rights for which it provides. They not related 
to the rights themselves. The Banjul Charter is not a contract. Individuals’ entitlements to 
Banjul Charter rights are not contingent on performance of the Banjul Charter duties. 
Indeed, they are contained in entirely separate chapters. The Charter provides for 
obligations that individuals owe to the state (such as the obligation to pay taxes). But 
these are separate from the provisions that address solidarity rights (or any other 
rights).192 The Banjul Charter simply provides for rights and provides for duties. These 
are entirely separate, non-contingent provisions.  
Solidarity rights impose primary obligations on individuals, as of necessity, to the 
same extent as the accepted classes of rights. In the course of respecting the first-level 
duty (imposed by a right of any class), a state may impose duties on individuals. States 
have imposed duties on individuals in the course of respecting duties imposed by civil 
and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. Such duties are not, 
however, necessarily imposed by the right itself. Rather, they are imposed through 
domestic legislation or public policy. It may be necessary for a state to impose 
obligations on individuals to ensure that rights are respected. For example, the right to 
education (a member of the accepted classes of rights) imposes a duty on states to 
provide their citizens with a reasonable standard of education in a non-discriminatory 
manner.193 The UK respects this duty by providing fully funded school places to children 
                                                          
192 For a more thorough examination of language of duties in the Banjul Charter see Makau W. Mutua, 
“The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evolution of the Language of Duties”, 35 
Va. J. Int’l. L. 339, (1995) 
193 See UNESCO, Convention Against discrimination in Education, 14th December 1960, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3880.html [accessed 1 September 2016] 
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until the age of 18 and, through domestic law, imposing a duty on parents to ensure that 
their child attends school until the age of 16.194 This obligation is arguably necessary for 
the respect of the UK’s first-level duty. Parents have legal control over their children. It 
is possible, therefore, for parents to deny their children access to education despite the 
public provision of free school places. Parents might, for example, compel or encourage 
their children to work from an early age195 rather than attend school. Imposing a duty on 
parents, to ensure their children attend school, the UK ensures that children cannot be 
denied access to education by the actions of their parents. The right to education, 
however, does not specify a duty to impose obligations on parents. The duty is imposed 
by the state as an, arguably necessary, step in respecting its duty under the right. The 
right is the animating force but the direct impact obligation on the individual is created 
by domestic law. 
The same analysis applies to solidarity rights. Human rights associated with the 
common heritage of mankind196 impose duties on states to protect mankind’s heritage. 
                                                          
194 Education Act 1996, s. 7 (UK) 
195 The employment of children is also regulated by English law. See, for example, The Children and 
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These duties are outward-facing so they require states to cooperate with each other197 
States have partially fulfilled their duty to cooperate to protect the common heritage of 
mankind by creating Art. 8, part 2 of the Rome Statute. This prohibits: “Intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, […] provided they are not military objectives” 
and “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”198 On 22nd August 2016 the 
International Criminal Court conducted the first prosecution under Art. 8(2). The man 
charged, Ahmad al-Mahdi, pleaded guilty to the offence.  
The Art. 8(2) offence and the human rights associated with the common heritage 
of mankind must be distinguished. The right to common heritage of mankind is the 
animating force for states. It requires that states take some sufficient action to protect the 
common heritage of mankind. One of the actions that states have taken to respect this 
duty is the Rome Statute. This treaty imposes further duties on individuals, such as the 
duty not to destroy cultural heritage. Mr al-Mahdi pleaded guilty to committing the Art. 
8 offence. In doing so he admitted to failing the duty, imposed by states upon 
individuals, not to destroy cultural heritage. Mr al-Mahdi has not, however, violated the 
right to the common heritage of mankind. He has violated a duty that states have 
collectively imposed upon individuals in respecting their own duty under the right. In 
other words, the duty imposed on individuals is a different duty, one removed, from that 
imposed by the right.  
                                                          
197 The outward-facing duty, and the questions of jurisdiction it raises, is discussed in more detail on page 
pp. 76-82 
198 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
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It is arguable that, had states not cooperated to impose the Art. 8(2) duty then 
they would have failed to respect the right to the common heritage of mankind, 
according to the doctrine of third party applicability.199 States have a duty to prevent 
individuals destroying cultural heritage. If an individual destroys cultural heritage, and 
states have taken no measure to prevent him doing so, then states have failed in their 
duty. In order to respect their duty, states, therefore, created the Art. 8(2) offence, thus 
imposing an obligation on individuals. There are thus two orders of duty at play. The 
first is the duty imposed on states by the right. The second is the duty imposed by states, 
on individuals in order to respect the first order duty. 
 The rights impose a general duty on states to protect the common heritage of 
mankind.200 The signatories to the Rome Treaty (partially) fulfills that duty by imposing 
specific obligations on individuals through Art. 8(2). But states can also fulfil their duties 
in other ways. Art. 8(2) is an effective mechanism for protecting the common heritage of 
mankind, but is not necessarily the only possible mechanism. To return to the 
comparison with the right to education: that right imposes a duty on states to provide a 
reasonable standard of education. In order to respect that duty some states impose an 
obligation on individuals to attend school until a certain age. This latter duty is one of 
many ways in which a state can respect the duty in the right. Similarly, the right to enjoy 
the common heritage of mankind imposes a duty on states to cooperate in order to 
protect the common heritage of mankind. In discharging that duty, states cooperated to 
create the Rome Statute which imposes duties on individuals. The right to enjoy the 
common heritage of mankind obliged states to take some action to ensure mankind’s 
                                                          
199 See the discussion of Drittwirkung at pp. 23-24 
200 Ian Hodder, "Cultural Heritage Rights: From Ownership and Descent to Justice and Well-being" 83 
Anthropological Quarterly 4 (2010), pp. 861-882 
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common heritage is protected, the Rome Statute requires individuals not to destroy 
common heritage. These are two separate duties, imposed by two separate classes of 
norm. Solidarity rights, like the accepted classes of human rights, impose duties only on 
states. 
 
The First Key Feature: Common-Good Interests 
 
Like other classes of rights, solidarity rights protect a certain sub-set of interests. 
Solidarity rights protect common-good interests. These are interests, held by individuals, 
in shared goods and thus generally experienced in a collective context. Shared goods are 
goods that can only have meaning when experienced in common with the rest of society. 
These contrast with independent-good interests, which are protected by the accepted 
classes of rights. An individual may experience an independent-good interest in common 
with the rest of society or she may experience it independently of society. Freedom of 
association, for example, can be experienced with just one other person. The individual 
can thus experience freedom of association regardless of whether it is also experienced 
by rest of society at the same time. By contrast, a common-good interest is, in the central 
range of cases, only meaningfully experienced in common with the rest of society. Judge 
Lionel Murphy, in the High Court of Australia, gave an illustrative description of 
common-good interests when considering the common heritage of mankind: 
"The preservation of the world's heritage must not be looked at in isolation but as 
part of the co-operation between nations which is calculated to achieve 
intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind and so reinforce the bonds between 
people which promote peace and displace those of narrow nationalism and 
alienation which promote war...[the encouragement of people to think 
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internationally, to regard the culture of their own country as part of world culture, 
to conceive a physical, spiritual and intellectual world heritage, is important in 
the endeavour to avoid the destruction of humanity."201 
 Put another way, a threat to an interest in the accepted classes may be systemic, 
but it is not necessarily so. By contrast, a threat to a common-good interest is necessarily 
systemic. For example, the extra-judicial murder of a civilian may put the rest of society 
in reasonable fear of extra-judicial murder, but it will not necessarily do so. In a state like 
North Korea extra-judicial murder is believed to be systemic: the murder of one indicates 
the threat to all. In a state like Sweden, for example, extra-judicial murder is not believed 
to be systemic: the extra-judicial murder of one will not, alone, be sufficient to overturn a 
political culture, laws, constitutional checks and balances, and social norms that protect 
society in general from the threat of judicial murder. The murder of one does not, 
therefore, reasonably constitute a threat to all. For a common-good interest, by contrast, a 
threat to one is necessarily a threat to all. Pollution, for example, is systemic damage to 
the environment resulting from the introduction of foreign substances. Pollution will 
always be a threat to all, or at least a significant subsection, regardless of the context. A 
nuclear accident, toxic waste spill, or the release of excessive amounts of carbon into the 
atmosphere is always systemic, whether it occurs in Sweden or North Korea. Similarly, 
if a site of great architectural, historical, or cultural value is destroyed then all individuals 
lose the chance to benefit from, inter alia, the increase in the collective knowledge of 
humanity that will result from the study of that site. This is the case even for those who 
live on the other side of the world from the heritage site. 
 
 
                                                          
201 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625 at 733 and 734 
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The Second Key Feature: Outward-Facing Duties 
 
 To address common-good interests, solidarity rights generally impose a duty that 
can only be respected if states take into account those beyond their borders. The first-
level duty in the accepted classes of rights is primarily domestically focussed: It is 
inward-facing. In the case of solidarity rights the duty is generally both inward-facing 
and outward-facing.202. Solidarity rights can only be effectively protected if states take 
positive action in concert, both within their own borders and in other states.203 This 
outward-facing duty was first identified by Vasak. For his "Third Generation" rights to 
be realised, states pursue the general good rather than their own specific interests.204 For 
example, to realise the right to self-determination states must cooperate by refraining 
from unreasonably violating the integrity of other states and taking action to ensure that 
territories that otherwise fulfil the criteria for statehood, have a recognised path to 
become states. This cooperation replaced the colonialism, in which states violated the 
integrity of other territories and states to advance their own, competing, ends.205 As Rosa 
Freedman puts it:  
“Third Generation Rights extend the scope of rights owing to their extension of 
the substance and subjects of rights. The right to international solidarity, for 
example, seeks to place responsibility on states for ensuring sufficient 
redistribution of wealth to enable other states to have sufficient resources for 
human rights to be realised in their territories. That scope goes beyond traditional 
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territorial and extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. Instead, 
human rights become a collective responsibility for all states insofar as there is a 
global responsibility to ensure that all states are able to implement human 
rights.”206  
  Legal realists are skeptical about basing rights on solidarity.207 In the modern 
international system, they argue, it is unrealistic to expect states to act against their 
individual interests.208 For Alston, it is unrealistic to base international legal structures on 
the idea of solidarity because states make foreign policy decisions based primarily on 
their own interests.209 Richard Bilder takes a similar view. Despite the international 
approach of the post-war period, the goals of universal human rights have not, he argues, 
been achieved.210 There is not enough commonality of interest between states at a global 
level.211  
 It would, however, be a mistake to conflate the rejection of specific instances of 
solidarity with the rejection of solidarity in totum. It would also be a mistake to draw a 
permanent distinction between a state “acting in solidarity” and “acting in its best 
interests”. It is often in the best interest of states to act in solidarity. When calculating 
their interests, states look beyond the immediate term. Sometimes it is in the interests of 
states to cooperate because they lose nothing by doing so. In securing short term interests 
states cooperate, for example, in developing common standards for air traffic control. 
Negotiations for any common standards must involve each party conceding on certain 
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points but remaining committed to the negotiations and their outcome because they 
believe their interests are better served by co-operation and compromise than by 
attempting to act alone. The commercial gains of common air-traffic control measures 
vastly outweigh any small sacrifices made in developing a consensus. 
States often concede on issues of short term interest to make gains in the medium 
term. For example, multilateral trade agreements often require states to alter domestic 
regulation in the short term to maximise commercial gain in the medium term. The 
liberalisation of trade following the ratification of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) led to large numbers of job losses in the USA.212 This was not an 
unexpected result. The USA justified the decision to ratify NAFTA based on its medium-
term interests.213 NAFTA required the USA to sacrifice certain economic interests 
because the liberalisation of tariffs and regulations meant that jobs would flow to those 
states able to provide cheaper labour. American standards for workplace safety, paid 
holidays and the minimum wage meant that labour in the USA is more expensive than in 
Mexico. The USA was willing to compromise this short-term interest in maintaining 
manufacturing jobs because it secured standards in, for example, intellectual property 
and dispute settlement that would benefit it in the medium term, and would lead to the 
creation of new, higher paying jobs, replacing those that were lost.214  
States are similarly willing to sacrifice their immediate or medium-term interests 
to secure long term interests. The development of international or regional institutions 
like the UN, EU, World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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or International Criminal Court (ICC) represents a surrender of sovereignty on the part of 
member states215. It is undoubtedly against the apparent interests of a state to surrender 
any portion of its sovereignty, but the long-term interests of states in a more peaceful 
world, the application of the rule of law to an increased extent, and common commercial 
standards, justifies the compromise of sovereignty. Indeed, states are willing to go 
further. Between 2000 and 2010 The African Union alone engaged in missions in Mali, 
Mauritania, Togo, Somalia, Sudan and Anjouan. These missions involve a significant 
expenditure on the part of member states including commitments of personnel, resources 
and capital216. It is difficult to argue that spending large sums and committing troops in a 
foreign state without expectation of financial or territorial gain is in a state’s the short-
term interests.  
 In all the examples above states acted in their own self-interest, compromising on 
short-term interests to secure long-term interests. Solidarity rights also require sacrificing 
short-term interests in the name of long-term interests. Solidarity rights do not require 
selflessness, but enlightened self-interest. They require that states cooperate and, where 
necessary, sacrifice their shorter-term interests for a shared long term interest. This is 
different from requiring states to act against their interests. It is requiring them to act on 
certain of their interests at the expense of others. Therefore, the challenge for advocates 
of solidarity rights is not to justify “solidarity” as a reason for action. It is to argue for the 
interests that will be protected by displaying solidarity to be given precedence ahead of 
other, competing, interests. In other words, to argue for the urgency of common-good 
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interests. Solidarity is not the basis of solidarity rights. It is part of the action required for 
their realisation. The basis for solidarity rights, like the other classes of human rights, is 
the urgency of the interest protected.  
 For Jack Donnelley, it doesn’t matter whether solidarity is a realistic basis for 
rights. It remains an insufficient identifying quality.217 In Donnelley’s analysis, all 
international human rights require solidarity. States voluntarily cede a degree of 
sovereignty to the international community, and a degree of power to their own citizens, 
when they recognise human rights. From a realist perspective neither concession is in the 
interest of the state, as an institution, because conceding power weakens the institution. 
Both concessions are nevertheless made because they advance longer term interests, held 
by all states. For Beitz, states respect and participate in the Practice because it is in their 
interests to do so.218 This fits the model of solidarity developed above. But, if this is the 
case then, as Donnelley argues, are not all human rights “solidarity rights”?  
 Donnelley, however, conflates solidarity in the second-level duty with solidarity 
in the first-level duty. In Beitz’s two level model219 the first-level duty requires states to 
protect and provide for the interest identified by the right. The second-level duty requires 
states to intervene when another state fails in its first-level duty. Civil and political rights 
and economic, social, and cultural rights impose a second-level duty of solidarity. States 
must cooperate as the international community to intervene when other states fail to 
perform their first-level duty.220 
 Solidarity rights require co-operation to properly respect the first-level duty. 
Solidarity rights require that states cooperate with other states and take the interests of 
                                                          
217 Donnelley, n. 2 
218 Beitz, n. 5, pp. 102-106 
219 Ibid, p. 106 
220 Ibid, pp. 106-117 
 81 
individuals beyond their borders into account. The right to development, for example, 
includes both inward-facing duties and outward-facing duties at the first level. 
Development is intrinsically linked to both global economic structures and the actions of 
other states. Under the Seoul Declaration states must take account of how the external 
effects of their economic policies impact the development of other states. States must 
cooperate to make changes to the global economic arrangements to facilitate the 
development of poorer states.221 These first-level obligations concern the basic measures 
necessary to secure the protection and realisation of the right. The second-level 
obligation is to ensure, as part of the international community, that states fulfil those 
obligations. In the case of the right to development, the Millennium Development goals, 
for example, provide criteria against which states’ performance of their first-level 
obligations are evaluated.222 The international community has created common 
requirements. Similarly, the Seoul Declaration creates a mechanism of accountability. It 
sets down specific standards to which states should be held.223 These are both forms of 
intervention.  
 Similarly, the right to peace becomes largely meaningless unless construed in the 
context of relations with other states. This right involves an inward-facing duty, but, 
taken alone, this could be subsumed into existing civil and political rights or economic, 
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social, and cultural rights.224 The right to peace also includes an outward-facing duty at 
the first-level. It requires that states refrain from promoting violence within or violence 
against other states.225 This concerns both physical and structural violence.226 States must 
cooperate to reduce physical violence and to eliminate or reform global, regional, and 
local structures that create relationships of violence between individuals, states and 
groups. The second-level obligation is respected by the creation and participation in 
international institutions intended to promote and regulate peaceful relations between 
states227. Through these organisations the international community collectively 
intervenes when a state fails in its first-level duty to promote peace.  
 
The Third Key Feature: Held by Individuals 
 
For many theorists, a solidarity right is held by a “people” or a “nation”:228 a 
collective entity without a broadly agreed definition. A better understanding is that 
solidarity rights are held by individuals. Vasak originally identified the holders of Third 
Generation rights as “peoples”. Discussion of the holders of solidarity rights has focused 
on identifying a definition of a “people” as a result of this initial definition. This, 
however, is the wrong question to ask. Solidarity rights are held by individuals. The term 
“people” is better understood as referring to the collective condition in which individuals 
meaningfully experience solidarity rights.  
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Without a specific holder to seek its enforcement, a right is unlikely to have an 
impact in practice. The precise definition of a “people” has, thus, preoccupied analyses 
of solidarity rights. For Alston, the failure of supporters of solidarity rights to identify a 
particular agent, who can seek enforcement of a right, is integral to the failure of their 
project as a whole.229 For Wellman, a right held by a people is simply a right held by 
several individuals. Each holds a “fraction” of that right. A people’s right would thus be 
more accurately described as a collection of individual rights.230 If it is supposed to mean 
something else then, Wellman concludes, it is too conceptually vague to supply a 
justiciable concept, and is better used as a “legal fiction". If Wellman is correct, 
however, then his concept of a people is not helpful at all, even as a legal fiction. If a 
“people” is essentially the collective noun for a group of individuals, each holding a 
fraction of a right, then it is not clear whether each fraction of the right is effective 
independently or whether they only have effect when combined. In the latter case, it is 
not clear how many fractions make a whole and if this means that a “people” must be a 
particular number of individuals. If Wellman actually means that a “people” is several 
individuals, each holding a complete right, who exercise their rights together, then there 
is no conceptual need for a “people” at all. Wellman’s conception thus adds to neither 
the justiciability of the concept, nor its use in a purely theoretical context. 
Furthermore, Wellman's conception does not reflect the application of the 
concept in the Practice. In Kitok v Sweden the UN Human Rights Committee was asked 
to decide on a case brought by several individuals belonging to the Sami people. The 
case concerned their right to herd reindeer. The claimants invoked their right to self-
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determination. They argued that herding reindeer in particular parts of Sweden was a part 
of the culture of the Sami people. They did not each claim to hold "part" of the right. The 
claimants argued that they all had the right to herd reindeer on all the land in question 
because they were members of the Sami nation. Their contention was never that they 
each had a claim to a part of the land in question or to a particular reindeer. The right to 
self-determination, on which they relied, was held by each of the claimants as 
individuals, but it took effect for them a members of the Sami people as a whole.231  
Hector Gros-Espiell offers an alternative to Wellman's approach.232 Gros-Espiell 
analyses solidarity rights as two-part rights,233 held by both the individual and the wider 
community.234 For example, the right to benefit from the common heritage of mankind235 
is (a) the right for “mankind” to own the heritage collectively and (b) “the individual” to 
benefit from that heritage.236 On that view, the right is held in common by some 
collective entity. Gros-Espiell, however, fails to explain why it is necessary to 
differentiate the “individual” from the “people” for this purpose. If the people, 
"mankind", owns the heritage and individuals have the right to benefit from it,237 both 
parts of the right are meaningless. Owning heritage means having the right to benefit 
from it to the exclusion of others. “Mankind” describes the sum of all individuals. 
“Mankind” cannot, therefore, own property in its own right without changing the 
meaning of ownership. A better understanding is that individuals have a right to the 
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common heritage of mankind, but only meaningfully experience it in common with 
others. An individual cannot experience the common heritage of mankind alone. 
Heritage that individuals experience alone is not the common heritage of mankind. 
Common heritage is a common-good. It is valuable to one because it is valuable to all.238 
 The instruments of international human rights law are of little help in defining a 
“people”. The term appears in several human rights instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights,239 UN Charter and Banjul Charter. Yet it is not defined in 
any of those instruments. The UN Sub Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities approved a definition in 1986, defining "peoples" as groups 
which have "some form of historical continuity", consider themselves "distinct from 
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them" and are 
"determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, 
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems".240 
 That definition is insufficiently precise. In practice, a wide range of agents rely on 
solidarity rights in court. In some cases, the claimant could best be described as a 
“nation”. For example, the Namibia case concerned a population of a defined 
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geographical area that shared a political and cultural tradition.241 By contrast, in 
Pennsylvania v National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower the claimant was the State of 
Pennsylvania, litigating on behalf of the citizens of Pennsylvania, relying on the right to 
a clean and healthy environment in the Pennsylvania Constitution.242 While it is arguable 
that a political entity, like a state, can litigate on behalf of its citizens, it is not clear that 
the state of Pennsylvania (rather than, for example, the federal US government) is the 
appropriate representative for the “people” that would have been affected by real estate 
development on the Gettysburg battlefield. In Kitok the claimants were acknowledged 
representatives of a homogenous group. In Comunidad de Chanaral v Codelco Division 
el Salvador the claimant was a child who, although unable to bring a case on his own 
behalf, was recognized as representative of future generations.243  
 For Cassese, it is better to understand a people as self-defining.244 It is not 
possible to develop a satisfactory definition of a “people” because cultural, historical, 
political and even geographic factors are entirely dependent on the self-perception of the 
people in question. This, however, leaves those attempting to identify the agent who can 
enforce a solidarity right in an even worse position than Alston describes. If it is 
impossible to identify an agent who can seek enforcement, then solidarity rights lose any 
practical meaning.  
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In practice, attempting to define a “people” is unnecessary. Solidarity rights can 
be coherently modelled as individual rights. Solidarity rights concern common-goods, so 
individuals necessarily experience the interest in a collective context. This can be 
demonstrated by contrasting the right to self-determination (a solidarity right) with the 
right to freedom of expression245 (a civil and political right).246 The individual may 
experience freedom of expression247 whether or not every other individual in society 
does so. If Citizen A were prevented from voicing certain opinions in public but Citizen 
B were not, Citizen B would not necessarily have cause to argue that her right to freedom 
of expression had been violated. Further, Citizen B would have no standing to sue for the 
violation of Citizen A’s right. By contrast,248 is meaningless for the individual unless 
experienced collectively.249 The individual is only experiencing self-determination when 
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in a collective context. The right to self-determination is a right of all individuals to have 
a voice in the political status of the polity with which they identify. Self-determination 
cannot, by nature, logically be experienced in anything but a collective context.250 Self-
determination protects the individual’s interest in determining the direction of her polity, 
so it logically presupposes the existence of the polity.251  
When elites use the rhetoric of self-determination to justify their preeminent 
position, as (for example) white South African governments did to justify the 
continuation of apartheid, no member of the group is experiencing.252 Self-determination 
requires that individuals have a voice in the political structure of their society.253 Under 
the apartheid regime, white South Africans could vote for the government but they could 
not vote or campaign to end apartheid.254 Those who attempted to do so were often 
persecuted. White South Africans thus could only exercise political agency within a pre-
determined structure. They could not truly influence the political structure of their 
society. South Africans, therefore, were not enjoying self-determination, an elite was 
merely using the term to legitimise its control over the state. 
In Kitok,255 the claimants were granted their reindeer herding privileges. This 
meant that any member of the Sami people would also have those privileges. A further 
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issue in the case therefore turned on whether another claimant was a member of the Sami 
people, and thus entitled to reindeer herding privileges. It was not enough that an 
individual had a claim to experience the reindeer herding privileges themselves. They 
had to be able to do so in a collective context.  
 When “people” is taken to refer to the necessary condition rather than the 
enforcing agent, the various claimants in the Namibia, Quebec, Gettysburg and 
Communidad de Chanaral cases can be reconciled. The claimants in those cases were 
not the sole possible claimants. The rights concerned were held by all individuals. The 
claimants were victims of specific failures, by states, to fulfill their first-level duties. In 
some cases, they represented groups of victims. In others, only themselves. In the 
Namibia case this was the political representatives of the Namibian nation. In 
Communidad do Chanaral it was a token representative exemplifying the interest of 
future generations.  
 Beitz defines rights as “urgent interests of individuals”.256 When “people” is 
understood to refer to the conditions required for the meaningful experience of the right, 




 In my view, solidarity rights are rights that (a) protect common-good interests by 
imposing (b) both inward-facing and outward-facing duties and (c) are held solely by 
individuals. A successful definition requires the identification of the class of interests 
protected, the duties required and the holders of the rights. Solidarity rights protect 
common-good interests, which are only meaningfully experienced collectively. They 
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entail duties for states to cooperate to act in their long term common interests rather than 
their short term competing interests. Thus, the duty element in solidarity rights is 
outward-facing as well as inward-facing at the first-level. Like all human rights, 
solidarity rights are held by individuals and, like all human rights, they can be enforced 
by individuals, representatives, groups, NGOs, states or any agent with a sufficient 
interest. They are sometimes described as the “rights of peoples”, but that phrase should 
be understood as describing the condition in which individuals meaningfully experience 





PART TWO: THE CASE FOR SOLIDARITY RIGHTS 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SYMPATHETIC PERSPECTIVE 
  
Introduction  
   
Under Beitz’s approach, a successful case for a right must be understandable 
from both the perspective of those sympathetic to the interest protected and from the 
perspective of those who are non-sympathetic. This chapter addresses the former 
perspective. Common-good interests cohere with Beitz’s three criteria for recognition as 
rights: they can be urgent, faced with standard threats, and protected, to reasonable 
effect, by the rights mechanism. A theoretical argument for a class of rights must account 
for both the rights currently recognised in the class and interests that may, in the future 
be recognised as rights. In other words, the argument must account for a class that 
evolves.  
The class of common-good interests contains interests, and has the potential to 
contain further interests, that are urgent in a manner equivalent to the interests protected 
by the accepted classes of rights because, in the 21st Century, individuals are part of a 
global community and thus share interests globally. Common-good interests require 
protection with the rights mechanism because they are subject to standard threats. The 
interconnected nature of post-industrial modernity means that standard threats can 
transcend states. This means that they cannot be addressed by unilateral action. 
Furthermore, transnational interconnection can disempower individuals, limiting their 
agency to demand or effect responses to standard threats. It is appropriate to protect 
transnational common-good interests using the human rights mechanism because 
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interests that transcend states can only be effectively protected if states cooperate. 
Solidarity rights compel states to cooperate to address threats that cannot be addressed 
unilaterally. They address the transnational nature of common-good interests, and the 
corresponding threats, by providing for outward-facing duties. These require that states 
act beyond their own borders, generally by cooperating or otherwise acting in solidarity 
with other states. Common-good interests can thus be protected by rights to reasonable 
effect. This chapter will analyse solidarity rights according to each of Beitz’s three 




 For Beitz, an interest is urgent if it is of high importance to the holder. It is not 
sufficient that the holder has a mere preference in its favour. It must be broadly 
understandable that it would be a particularly “bad thing” if the interest was to be set 
back.257 Common-good interests can be sufficiently urgent to be recognised as rights. It 
is relatively uncontroversial to say that humans are social animals and individuals can, 
therefore, share important interests that are meaningful in a social setting social setting. 
This does not, however, mean that urgent common-good interests are necessarily akin to 
urgent independent-good interests. The accepted classes of rights protect interests that 
individuals hold by virtue of being human. For sceptics of solidarity rights, these protect 
interests that individuals hold be virtue of identifying as part of a particular community. 
Such interests might be important but they are not important in the same way that 
independent-good interests are important. 
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 In the 21st Century, however, globalisation means that human society is 
interconnected transnationally. All individuals are therefore part of a global community, 
with interconnected interests, regardless of whether we identify as such. Common-good 
interests are held in the context of the global community. They can, therefore, be urgent 
in a manner that justifies protection with the rights mechanism regardless of how 
individuals identify in relation to particular communities.  
 
I. Individual dignity and common-good interests 
 
If solidarity rights are to be considered human rights, then interests that are 
meaningful in the collective context must be urgent in an equivalent manner to interests 
that are meaningful in an independent context. It is well established that humans are 
social animals. Living in a community is generally considered a part of being human. 258 
Interests held as part of a community can, therefore, be, prima facie, of great importance. 
Are they, however, important in the same way as independent-good interests? The 
interests protected by the accepted classes of rights are associated with a status as an 
individual human being that is independent of the rest of society. The precise nature of 
the rights and interests associated with this status is open to dispute. Yet it is difficult to 
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deny that, at some basic level, humans are individual creatures, able to reason and 
perceive the world independently from the rest of society, if only to a limited extent. By 
contrast, community, in the sense in which it relates to solidarity rights, is something that 
the individual can choose to be a part of, or to leave. The right to self-determination, for 
example, can protect traditional practices that are integral to the identity of the 
community, but it cannot be used to compel individuals to participate in such practices 
or, indeed, to identify as a member of the community.  
For Donnelley, this distinction means that solidarity rights should not be 
considered human rights: 
 “If human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person, collective 
human rights are logically possible only if we see social membership as an 
inherent part of human personality, and if we argue that as a part of a nation or 
people, persons hold human rights substantively different from, and in no way 
irreducible to, individual human rights.”259 
Solidarity rights, in Donnelley’s view, can be described as protecting the relationships 
between individuals. They thus contrast with individual rights, which protect interests 
relating to the dignity of the individual. Relationships are a conscious choice. If an 
individual is to be part of a relationship, and to value that relationship so highly that they 
consider it an urgent interest, then they must consciously perceive themselves as party to 
that relationship. According to Donnelley, conscious relationships are not necessary to 
the human condition in the same way that the status as an individual is necessary. It is 
“logically and phenomologically possible”260 to be a human being, and thus possessed of 
human rights, “without perceiving oneself to be or being considered by others to be a 
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member of the international community and thus a beneficiary of the rights of 
solidarity.”261 Therefore: 
“The very concept of human rights, as it has heretofore been understood, rests on 
the view of the individual person as separate from, and endowed with inalienable 
rights in relation to, society, and especially the state. Furthermore, within the area 
defined by these rights, the individual is superior to society in the sense that 
ordinarily, in cases of conflict between individual human rights and social goals 
or interests, individual rights must prevail. The idea of collective human rights 
represents a major, and at best confusing, conceptual deviation.”262 
As such, while it is possible, or even likely, that an individual will perceive 
themselves to be part of a community. It is not necessary that they do so. Furthermore, 
individuals are unlikely to perceive themselves as members of the same community and, 
thus, unlikely to hold the same common-good interests. Even in the event, therefore, that 
a common-good interest is of high importance to its holders, it will never be sufficiently 
widely understood to achieve recognition as a right. 263 For solidarity rights to be 
recognised as human rights the collective context, in which common-good interests are 
meaningful and the individual context, in which independent-good interests are 
meaningful, must be reconciled.  
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II. Transnational interconnection and the scale of common-good interests  
 
In the late 20th Century and early 21st Century (a period roughly corresponding to 
that referred to as “post-industrial modernity” and to which I will refer as “the 
transnational age”), individuals hold interests as part of a global community, regardless 
of whether they identify as part of that community. In the transnational age the lives of 
individuals are interconnected on a global scale. This transnational interconnection is 
independent of the manner in which individuals identify as part of a community. We are 
part of a global community regardless of whether we make a conscious choice to be so. 
A fervent nationalist is subject to transnational interconnection in the same way as 
someone with more cosmopolitan beliefs. An individual who identifies solely with their 
local community or tribe is subject to transnational interconnection even if they reject 
associations with those outside the tribe. The status of the individual as a global citizen 
is, in the transnational age, as inevitable as the status of an individual as an independent 
agent.  
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Transnational interconnection permeates throughout society.264 In the 
transnational age, economics, 265 trade, 266 labour, 267 culture, memory,268 politics, 269 
food, drink, music,270 social media, 271 and various other “layers”272 of human interaction 
are all subject to global dynamics. Society is, as a result, increasingly “horizontally 
integrated”. Before the transnational age, any international interaction between 
individuals was facilitated by the state. This was “vertical integration”.273 In the 
transnational age the role of the state in facilitating cross-border interactions between 
citizens is increasingly supplanted by multiple levels of transnational interconnection 
which transcend the state.  
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The interconnected nature of the transnational age means that self-perception 
necessarily has a global dimension. For Anthony Giddens,274 the transnationally 
interconnected nature of early 21st century, a period to which he refers as 
"modernity"275, has fundamentally altered the human experience.276 In Giddens’ analysis, 
the individual is both influenced by and influencing society.277 Individuals understand 
the world through the prism of our social development. Every experience is understood 
by reference to every other experience. Humans therefore develop self-conception 
through a "reflexive" process: reacting to the stimulus provided by our social 
environment in order to understand who we are.278 At the same time, humans also 
contribute to our social environment. When individuals interact with the social 
environment, we also shape it. Giddens demonstrates this using the example of language. 
Durkheim identified language as proof that engaging with the social is fundamental to 
being human: each individual “speaks a language he did not create”.279 Giddens goes 
further. For him, in using language, humans are influencers as well as influenced. When 
we use language, we contribute to the way in which language is understood. Language is 
not a static structure but an ever-evolving tool. The meaning of a word is not objective; it 
is simply what it is socially understood to be. In using language humans thus contribute 
                                                          
274 Giddens builds on Emile Durkheim's theory of “solidarity”. Durkheim describes the state of being in 
which an individual subconsciously makes decisions based on social norms and concerns as “solidarity”. 
See Durkheim, n. 258, p. 9 
275 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Modern Age, (Cambridge; 
Polity, 1991), pp. 1-9 
276 In developing this theory Giddens builds on Durkheim’s theory of “solidarity” in which the individual 
unconsciously relates to the rest of society at all times. See Durkheim, n. 258, pp. 88-105 
277 Ibid, pp. 10-34 
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to the social understanding of language.280 Giddens refers to this process of reflexive 
development as "practical consciousness".281 This now manifests, in the central range of 
cases, on a global scale. The English language is spoken across the globe and thus 
shaped by individuals globally. Practical consciousness is now global in scope.  
 For Giddens, the interconnections of the transnational age have created a 
"separation of time and space".282 In the past, time was related to space because the 
impact of events at one location took time to impact on another. News took days or 
weeks to communicate. Armies, food, culture, and even disease required a long period of 
time to travel long distances. In the transnational age, however, that news can be relayed 
immediately.283 Similarly, contracts can be agreed, opinions shared, trades completed, 
and culture experienced, from the other side of the world with no interval of time. 
Modern humans can relate to the entire globe, in an immediate sense. In Giddens’ words, 
modern social organisation "presumes the precise coordination of the actions of human 
beings physically absent from one another; the 'when' of those actions is directly 
connected to the 'where', but not, as in pre-modern times, via the mediation of place".284 
 This result of this is the "dis-embedding of social institutions".285 Social relations 
are "lifted out" from their local contexts and "rearticulated across indefinite tracts of 
time-space." Humans now understand social relations in multiple dimensions. For 
example, with 78% of all internet users using social media,286 social relations can take 
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place in an equally "real" way between groups on different sides of the world as they can 
between groups in the same room. This means that practical consciousness now has a 
global dimension. Humans continue to interpret the world through the prism of social 
experience, but this social experience now encompasses inputs from potentially 
anywhere in the world. Similarly, when humans reflexively influence our society, that 
influence has a global impact.287 All self-perception is, therefore, in some way global.  
This applies even to individuals whose self-perception is, prima facie, parochial. 
If, in the transnational age, self-perception is generally worked out with reference to 
global dynamics, then understandings of parochialism are also developed in this context. 
A self-identification as parochial is, therefore, based on an understanding of what it 
means to be parochial that is developed in a transnational context.  
 If individuals are interconnected on a global scale, then common-good interests 
can manifest on the same scale. For example, normativity is now a global issue. For 
Sullivan and Kymlicka, globalised communication and movement facilitate the 
spreading and interaction of norms.288 Normative debate takes place at both an 
international and transnational level. Binder argues that normativity is a “collective 
project”:289 The process of building social coalitions of those who share our normative 
preferences. Now those coalitions are built on a global scale. Normative choices are 
informed by ideas, events and debate in every part of the globe. State borders are 
increasingly irrelevant to the development of normativity. Where the state was once a 
primary source of moral authority, those sources are now almost infinite. An individual 
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may be informed by, inter alia, other individuals, organisations, peoples, or any other 
state.290 Common-good interests are, thus, necessary to the individual in the same 
manner as independent-good interests. In Donnelley’s analysis, human rights protect 
independent-good interests because “being an individual” is an inherent aspect of human 
personality. Put another way, the status by which an individual experiences independent-
good interests cannot be avoided: it is a necessary status. In the transnational age being 
part of the global community is similarly a necessary status. Urgent interests that are 
meaningfully experienced in the global collective context are thus important in an 
equivalent manner to urgent independent-good interests.  
Considering the right to peace demonstrates how common-good interests can be 
(a) transnational and (b) manifest regardless of how individuals define themselves in 
relation to the global community. Peace is essential for individuals to flourish291 and the 
interest in peace is global. Violence, the absence of peace, dehumanises and degrades 
both those who commit it and those who are victims or bystanders.292 It may occur only 
within the borders of a state or it may occur between states. Yet violence is not confined, 
nor are its impacts confined, to either of these situations. The impacts of violence, 
whether in the shape of war, terrorism, intra-community violence, rioting, or almost any 
other form, transcends state borders. When there is violence in one state, it impacts on 
individuals in others.293  
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The impacts of violence occur on multiple levels of transnational interconnection 
including the economic, political and cultural. To illustrate this, consider the 
transnational impacts of conflict in the Middle East. Conflict in the Middle East, for 
example, impacts on trade and investment. It alters the price of commodities like oil.294 
This, in turn impacts on the price of energy. When the price of energy rises, it impacts on 
industry, making production more expensive, so the prices of industrial goods rise.295 If 
the change in price is significant it can have a chilling effect on consumer spending 
(because consumers are spending more on domestic energy bills so have less to spend on 
luxury items) which can slow down consumer driven economies, like those of Europe 
and the USA.296 Conflict in the Middle East can thus impact on the economies of states 
that are, geographically, far removed from the conflict. The same conflict can also 
impact on the domestic politics of states that are geographically removed. In Europe and 
the USA leaders are judged by the electorate on their response to various issues in the 
conflict.297 Support for various factions can determine whether a political leader receives 
certain donations, air time or appeals to certain constituencies.298 At the grass roots, 
support for Israel or Palestine is a core distinguishing issue for membership of certain 
political factions299. Support for one side or another in the Israel/Palestine conflict is 
used to indicate membership within certain, Western, political communities.300 Conflict 
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in the Middle East also impacts on culture. For example, in 2016 the play “Queens of 
Syria”, in which Syrian refugees performed a version of Euripides’ “Trojan Women”, 
toured major theatres in the UK. It was the centrepiece of the summer season at the 
Young Vic,301 one of the UK’s leading theatres.302 The conflict in Syria thus made a 
significant impact on artistic culture in the UK. These examples demonstrate that 
violence in one part of the world impacts, in a direct manner, on individuals in parts of 
the world geographically removed from the violence itself. These impacts exist 
regardless of whether an individual consciously as a member of the global community. 
Therefore, all individuals have an interest in peace everywhere, not merely peace in close 
proximity to ourselves.  
Not every common-good interest is sufficiently urgent to merit protection with 
the rights mechanism. The right to resist foreign occupation, enshrined in the Arab 
Charter of Fundamental Rights,303 is unlikely to meet the threshold. Resistance to 
occupation might be justified with arguments based on the value of autonomy, but this is 
already protected (as discussed in Chapter Six) by the right to self-determination. The 
interest in resistance itself is difficult to justify as urgent because the international system 
offers a range of alternative mechanisms for responding to occupation (such as 
international organisations, structures, norms and laws). While the use of these 
mechanisms may be considered a form of resistance, access to them already provided by 
other rights. 
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Just as common-good interests are transnational, standard threats to common-
good interests are transnational as well. As discussed in Chapter One, standard threats 
are reasonably predictable, generally relevant, and have a reasonable degree of 
immediacy. The interconnected nature of the transnational age means that standard 
threats to common-good interests transcend state borders. The existence and nature of 
these standard threats makes it necessary to protect sufficiently urgent common-good 
interests with the rights mechanism.  
 Transnational standard threats are inevitable in an interconnected world. As the 
impact of our actions increasingly transcends states, so does our ability (deliberately or 
indirectly) to compromise each other’s interests. Giddens terms these "high consequence 
risks"304 because they manifest and impact on a global scale. The Skoll Global Threats 
Fund identifies five examples of global threats: Climate change, water security, 
pandemics, nuclear proliferation and the Middle East conflict.305 It describes “global 
threats” as: 
“Global threats have the potential to kill or debilitate very large numbers of 
people or cause significant economic or social dislocation or paralysis throughout 
the world. Global threats cannot be solved by any one country; they require some 
sort of a collective response. Global threats are often non-linear, and are likely to 
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become exponentially more difficult to manage if we don’t begin making serious 
strides in the right direction in the next 5-10 years.”306 
 The existence of transnational threats is recognised by both states and 
international organisations. The former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi 
Annan (in reference to “terror and AIDS”) argued that, in terms of such threats “a threat 
to one is a threat to all”.307 The US National Security Strategy now includes threats 
which originate outside the US sovereign jurisdiction but nevertheless have the potential 
to harm US citizens.308  
 Skoll's research may not have identified an exhaustive list of transnational 
standard threats. It does, however, provide an indicative sample. The threats identified by 
Skoll cannot be confined within national borders and cannot be addressed with action by 
a single state. Both the causes and impacts of these threats transcend national borders. 
Akira Iriye illustrates the transnational nature of Middle East conflict. In 2005, Paris 
suffered prolonged and destructive riots. The principle perpetrators were young men of 
Arab descent, who lived in the banlieues, the housing projects on the outskirts of the 
city. Iriye attributes these riots, in part, to conflict in the Middle East.309 For Iriye, global 
migration, partially caused by conflict in the Middle East, created the circumstances for 
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the riots310. Conflict in the Middle East caused migration to Europe on a sustained and 
significant scale. In France, many migrants fleeing the conflict congregated (or were 
compelled to congregate) in the banlieues. The poor conditions in the banlieues and the 
marginalisation suffered by migrants, as a result of government policy and cultural 
racism, increased social tension prior to the riots. Conflicts in the Middle East thus 
contributed to riots in Paris.311  
For Iriye, colonialism was an early root of transnational interconnection. The 
nature of the French withdrawal from its north African colonies led to both mass 
migration and festering resentment between the native French and new migrants. This, in 
turn, led to a series of repressive policies and actions aimed at France's Arab immigrant 
population. This too contributed to the context in which the 2005 riots took place.312  
Transnational standard threats impact across the various areas of society. The 
interconnected nature of the energy market, finance and trade mean that economic, 
environmental or violent incidents in one part of the world can have an immediate and 
direct impact on individuals on a global scale. In 2000, the US produced 1425m tons of 
energy but consumed 2052m:313 the very process of keeping the lights on in the USA is 
dependent on importing energy from a variety of markets across the globe. Similarly, the 
failure of a US financial institution in 2007 led to a global financial meltdown because 
securities, that included sub-prime US assets, are traded globally.314 The day to day 
existence of individuals in one part of the world can no longer be detached from that of 
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individuals in another. Transnational standard threats can’t be addressed by unilateral 
action because they transcend state borders. France may suffer the impacts of conflict in 
the Middle East, but it has no control over that conflict. Transnational standard threats 
can only be addressed by co-operation between states.  
Not all common-good interests are subject to standard threats. The right to own 
or possess communication technologies, for example, is both transnational and arguably 
sufficiently urgent. It is not clear, however, that it is subject to any sort of general or 
immediate threat. The proposed right would guarantee individuals the opportunity to 
possess devices required to access the internet, as well as make phone calls, text message 
and access other communication applications. The right to possess communication 
technologies differs from the right to free expression (a member of the accepted classes 
of rights). The latter concerns the suppression of forms of expression while the former 
concerns access to specific communications technologies. Even if we accept, however, 
that an argument could be made that accessing communications technologies is (a) a 
common-good interest and (b) urgent, any standard threat to the interest only exists on 
the level of free expression. States that prevent access to the internet or ownership of 
mobile telephones or other devices, are violating the right to freedom of expression. 
Indeed, it is not clear that any action could violate the communication right without also 
violating the right to freedom of expression. By contrast, the right to peace, as described 
above, is subject to a standard threat. Although that threat comes in different forms, all of 
those forms can be classified as "violence". As argued above, they transcend state 
boundaries so cannot be addressed by the unilateral action of any single state.  
 
The balance of power 
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Transnational interconnection can concentrate power in the hands of 
unaccountable agents. This creates a second layer of transnational threat. It limits the 
power of states to protect the interests of their citizens through unilateral action and 
consequently disempowers individuals. Anthony Carty takes a contrary view. For him, 
globalisation has empowered states and individuals because it has increased the range of 
options available to a state and its citizens.315 There is little doubt that increased 
transnational commerce increased consumer choice. This does not mean, however, that is 
has empowered individuals.316 Transnational interconnection is better described as 
transferring power from accountable to unaccountable agents. In terms of consumer 
choice: while the menu available may be larger, the power to set that menu is now less 
accountable to individuals.  
 The transnational mobility of capital and labour disempowers states and 
individuals in favour of transnational agents. All individuals affect and are affected by 
society on a transnational scale, but not all agents impact, and are impacted on, to the 
same extent. Some individuals and organisations are better equipped to exert 
transnational influence than others. Such agents are generally less vulnerable to the 
transnational influence of others.317 They include, inter alia, multi-national corporations 
and individuals who are wealthy enough to establish assets in multiple jurisdictions and 
move between them.318 These are “transnational agents”. States must attract investment 
                                                          
315 Anthony Carty, "The Third World claim to economic : the economic rights of peoples: theoretical 
aspects", in Chowdhury and de Waart, The Right to Development in International Law, (The Hague; 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), pp. 43-60 
316 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (London; Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 76-78 
317 Ibid, pp. 76-78 
318 Ibid, pp. 76-78 
 109 
from the private sector to keep their economies healthy.319 Private sector investors are 
increasingly mobile. This gives them bargaining power in relation to states. As a 
transnational agent, an investor can choose to locate her business anywhere in the world. 
If conditions become unfavourable in a particular state, she can simply leave and locate 
her investment in a different state.320 A state needs the investor more than the investor 
needs the state. States must compete to attract investment so have little choice but to 
accede to the demands of an investor.321 The bargaining process may be explicit, such as 
when banks threaten to leave a state if a certain policy becomes law. Or it may be 
implicit, with policymakers crafting laws intended to appease investors without an overt 
threat becoming necessary.322 International economic law facilitates the mobility of 
capital and gives international investors special rights against sovereign states. 
Investment treaties give transnational investors the advantage of private courts, which 
are outside national legal systems and are not accessible to citizens, for the settlement of 
investment disputes.323 In a democracy, an individual primarily exercises agency in the 
making of public policy through representative government. When representative 
governments are disempowered in relation to transnational agents, individuals are also 
disempowered in relation to transnational agents. Thus, although individuals have 
common-good interests on a global scale, they are often disempowered when it comes to 
protecting these interests.  
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 This can have a direct impact on communities and individuals. In the Niger delta, 
Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch oil company, holds a monopoly on extraction of 
hydrocarbons. The Nigerian government is reliant on the income that Shell provides in 
oil rents, so has been reluctant to impose regulation.324 Shell's extraction activities have 
caused pollution, destruction and, in some cases, led to forced relocation of local 
populations.325 The Nigerian government needs the income from Shell's activities more 
than it needs to ensure it wins the votes of local communities.326 As such, the 
communities affected have little agency in protecting their environment. Shell’s activities 
contribute to climate change, which impacts on individuals globally. Yet those most 
affected by climate change have no agency in relation to the Nigerian government, and 
so they are unable to protect their common-good interest in a safe and healthy 
environment. The individuals affected by the threat to the environment are thus 
disempowered when it comes to protecting that interest.  
 Transnational agents can avoid or subvert the coercive powers of states. They can 
leave the jurisdiction, compel the state to act in a certain manner, or make use of dispute 
settlement mechanisms to which only they have access. This disempowers individuals, 
who can’t avoid or compel the coercive powers state in an equivalent manner. Threats to 
common-good interests thus manifest on both a global scale and in a context that leaves 
individuals least capable of protecting their interests. 
 
Reasonable Effect 
                                                          
324 Cyril I. Obi, "Global, state and local intersections: power, authority and conflict in the Niger Delta oil 
communities", in Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (eds), Intervention and 
Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power, (CUP, 2001), pp. 173-194 
325 Ibid, pp. 172-194 
326 Ibid, pp. 172-194 
 111 
 
 Beitz model requires that, in order to be recognised as a right, an interest must be 
capable of being protected by the right mechanism to reasonable effect. In order to 
protect common-good interests from transnational standard threats, two issues must be 
addressed: (1) individuals are disempowered when it comes to protecting of common-
good interests, and (2) it is impossible for individuals or states to address transnational 
general threats by unilateral action. The rights mechanism is reasonably effective at 
protecting urgent common-good interests from standard threats because it responds to 
both issues.  
 
The disempowerment issue 
 
 Solidarity rights empower individuals in relation to common-good interests by 
giving them a globally recognisable claim against states. In the case of the Niger delta, 
the Ogoni people, some of the principal victims of Shell's activities, relied on a solidarity 
right (the right to a clean and healthy environment) before the African Commission327. 
Their case was successful and the Nigerian government was compelled to take measures 
to redress the damage caused by Shell.328 One of the primary purposes of a state is to 
protect the interests of its citizens.329 It is appropriate, therefore, that it falls to states to 
protect common-good interests. Solidarity rights give individuals a claim on states that is 
recognised by the international community. This allows individuals to effectively 
                                                          
327 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
rights Case No. ACHPR/Comm/A044/1, Decision Regarding Comm. No. 155/96 (2001) 
328 Ibid 
329 Francis Fukuyama, “Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East”, 25 Orbis: 
A Journal of World Affairs 3 (1981), pp. 571-605 
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demand that states act to address situations in which transnational agents compromise 
common-good interests. 
 
The unilateralism issue 
 
 Solidarity rights address the impotence of unilateral action by imposing outward-
facing duties. The outward-facing duty obliges states to act beyond their own borders. 
This may be through ad hoc cooperation, the creation of international institutions, or 
some other form of international solidarity. The right to peace, for example, imposes a 
general duty on states to cooperate in order to preserve or achieve peace.330 This duty 
may be partially respected merely by refraining from directly or indirectly causing 
violence in other states. It may be partially respected by intervening to promote 
peacekeeping efforts. It may be respected by creating global or international institutions 
to resolve conflicts without the need for violence.331 All of these actions involve showing 
international solidarity. It is only by acting in solidarity that states can address threats 
that transcend them individually.  
 The right to participate in the common heritage of mankind provides an 
alternative illustration. Heritage transcends national borders.332 Sometimes heritage is 
shared by all. For example, Antarctica is considered the heritage of all mankind333. 
Sometimes particular examples of heritage are more relevant to certain peoples. 
Australians consider the Gallipoli beaches to be an important part of their national 
                                                          
330 Mayer, n. 291, pp. 2-4 
331 Ibid. 2-4 
332 Hodder, n. 200, pp. 861-882 
333 Ibid, pp. 861-882 
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heritage, but those beaches fall within the territory of Turkey.334 The right provides for 
an outward-facing duty to preserve and facilitate the enjoyment of the common heritage 
of mankind. This goes beyond refraining from destroying cultural heritage sites. It may 
be respected by respecting the heritage of those in other states, such as in the case of the 
Gallipoli beaches.335 It may be respected by cooperating to protect heritage, such as in 
the agreements for the exploration of Antarctica, or by creating and participating in 
international institutions to do so, such as UNESCO.336 
 
What about democracy? 
 
Sometimes individuals can compel the state to protect and provide for their 
common-good interests by engaging in the democratic process. Recognition of a right 
sets an interest outside this process. Why should solidarity interests be set outside the 
democratic process when that process, which is based on the will of the majority, is 
suited to the protection and provision for collective interests? I submit three reasons. 
First, common-good interests, and associated standard threats, transcend 
electorates as they transcend state boundaries. Electorates are organised on a state by 
state basis. No organisation operating at a global or transnational level is accountable 
through the democratic process in a manner equivalent to democratic states. The 
provision for and protection of common-good interests requires states to act in 
cooperation. While an electorate may have the ability to compel its own state to 
cooperate, it cannot compel other states to do the same thing. The transnational nature of 
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common-good interests requires a distinctly global method of governance. Majoritarian 
democracy is insufficient to ensure protection and provision for common-good interests. 
Second, some (although not all) common-good interests are logically prior to 
majoritarian democracy. For example, self-determination is (in part) a right of 
individuals to participate in the organisation of their polity, generally along democratic 
lines.337 The process cannot provide for itself. Thus, the right to self-determination is 
logically prior to democracy.  
The third reason is that certain solidarity interests are of sufficient urgency that it 
is rational to set them outside the process of majoritarian decision making. Human rights 
protect interests of such urgency that it is not rational to subject them to arbitration by 
the majoritarian process. If urgent common-good interests are equally important to 
human dignity as urgent independent-good interests and, with the development of 
transnational interconnection, equally vulnerable to standard threats, then it is rational to 
conclude that common-good interests should be set outside the majoritarian decision 
making process in the same way that urgent independent-good interests are set outside it. 
How this can take effect in relation to specific interests will be explored in the final two 




Common-good interests can be difficult to enforce against governments because, 
while all members of a society share that interest, none has a specific claim. Citizen A’s 
interest in a clean and healthy environment is no more acute than Citizen B’s or Citizen 
C’s. As such, no agent has particular standing to enforce the protection of a collective 
                                                          
337 Cassese, n. 78, pp. 67-99 and 101-133 
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good. As argued in Chapter Three, it is not necessary for an entire people to act as a 
claimant in order for a solidarity right to be enforced. Individuals or groups, who are 
particularly affected by a government’s failure to respect its duty, can enforce solidarity 
rights in court. Sometimes this is on behalf of a “people” as a whole. But this need not be 
the case. In Communidad de Chanaral338 the interest in question was held by future 
generations. As those generations did not, at the time, exist, it was impossible for them to 
enforce their interest either through the courts or the democratic mandate. Yet this didn’t 
make the interest in question any less urgent. The actions that were the subject matter of 
the case were taking place in the present but, by the time those directly affected would 
have been in a position to enforce their interests, the harm would already have occurred. 
In permitting certain individuals to act as representatives of that future generation, the 




 In this chapter I set out to make the argument that solidarity rights should be 
considered human rights according to Beitz’s model. In Beitz’s approach, an interest can 
be recognised as a right if it is urgent, faced with a standard threat, and can be protected 
to reasonable effect by the rights mechanism. I have argued that the class of common-
good interests can contain interests that meet this test. Common-good interests can be 
urgent because they can be equally fundamental to individual dignity as independent-
good interests and, in the 21st century, they manifest on a global scale. They can be faced 
with standard threats because threats to common-good interests transcend state borders in 
the same way as the interests themselves. Common-good interests can be protected to 
                                                          
338 Comunidad de Chanaral v Codelco Division el Salador (1988) S/Recurso de Protecion Corta Suprema 
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reasonable effect by the rights mechanism because the outward-facing duty in solidarity 
rights empowers individuals to demand that states cooperate to protect the interests that 
cannot be protected by unilateral action.  
 Beitz’s model requires that the case for solidarity rights can be understandable 
from both a sympathetic and a non-sympathetic perspective. This chapter has addressed 
the sympathetic perspective. In the next chapter I will address the non-sympathetic 
perspective. I will make the argument that the class of solidarity rights has the potential 
to contain interests that meet the Beitz criteria, from the perspective of Hayekian 
political theory.   
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Solidarity rights encompass interests that should be considered human rights 
according to Beitz’s criteria of urgency, standard threat, and the reasonable effectiveness 
of the rights mechanism. In Beitz’s model, it is not sufficient to make this case from only 
a sympathetic perspective. The case must also be understandable from non-sympathetic 
perspectives. In this chapter I will address non-sympathetic perspectives by arguing for 
solidarity rights from the perspective of Freidrich Hayek. He proposes a society 
organised with the aim of limiting the coercion of the individual. Hayek’ theory is, prima 
facie, hostile to the idea of solidarity rights. For Hayekians, solidarity leads to coercion 
and retards the progress of society. This chapter is an argumentum a fortiori exercise. 
Hayek’s political theory is not endorsed as the ideal lens through which to analyse 
human rights, nor is this chapter intended as a substantive defence of Hayek’s work. 
Rather, it is applied because it is a particularly hostile perspective. This will demonstrate 
that, even from an exceptionally non-sympathetic perspective, the importance of 
common-good interests, and the effectiveness of the rights mechanism in protecting 
them, can be understood. This, in turn, indicates that the case for solidarity rights can be 
understood from non-sympathetic perspectives more generally. 
Even from Hayek’s (hostile) perspective, common-good interests can be 
understood to meet the Beitz threshold. They can be urgent, faced with a standard threat, 
and protected to reasonable effect by the rights mechanism. Hayekian theory aims to 
limit coercion. The protection of common-good interests limits coercion. They can 
therefore be understood as urgent from a Hayekian perspective. Standard threats to 
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common-good interests are a form of coercion. In an ideal Hayekian society, the market 
protects the interests of individuals from the threat of coercion, but the market cannot 
protect common-good interests effectively. The rights mechanism is the least coercive 
alternative mechanism that can effectively protect common-good interests and should 





Identifying the non-sympathetic perspective for a class of rights presents a 
challenge. It is not clear that the non-sympathetic perspective will be the same for every 
solidarity right. A perspective that is non-sympathetic to the right to peace will not 
necessarily also be non-sympathetic to the right to self-determination or the right to a 
clean and healthy environment. One approach would be to identify the non-sympathetic 
perspective for each common-good interest in turn. This would, however, be 
unsatisfactory. In the first instance, there could be more than one non-sympathetic 
perspective for each common-good interest. In the second, this would merely serve to 
provide an argument for each of the existing members of the class, not the class itself. 
The non-sympathetic perspectives identified for the existing members of the class will 
not necessarily be non-sympathetic towards future members of the class. A better method 
is to undertake an argumentum a fortiori exercise, addressing common-good interests on 
a conceptual level. This requires identifying a perspective that is unsympathetic to 
common-good interests as a concept. The strongest version of this argument will adopt a 
perspective that is actively hostile to the concept of common-good interests. If the 
importance of common-good interests can be understood from a particularly hostile 
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perspective, it will indicate that their importance can be understood from a broad range 
of non-sympathetic perspectives.  
 An alternative approach would be to argue for solidarity rights from several 
different abstract non-sympathetic positions. This would, however, make for a weaker 
case overall. To adopt a variety of positions, even in the abstract, would only serve to 
show that solidarity rights could be justified from those specific positions. The Practice 
is emergent. Therefore, any class of rights must have the potential to evolve beyond the 
interests it recognises at any one time. The strongest non-sympathetic argument will 
indicate that the importance of common-good interests and the propriety of the rights 
mechanism in protecting them, can potentially be recognised from an open-ended range 
of non-sympathetic perspectives. If the case can be made from a particularly hostile 
perspective, then it is reasonable to assume that it can also be justified from a range of 
less hostile perspectives.  
 
Why Hayek is hostile to solidarity rights? 
 
 The Hayekian perspective is particularly hostile to solidarity rights on three 
principle grounds. First, solidarity rights require that the state interfere in society and the 
market and, for Hayek, unreasonable interference in the market by the state is coercive 
towards individuals.339 The aim of Hayek’s theory is to minimise coercion340, so the 
interference required by solidarity rights is anathema to Hayek’s ideal model of society. 
Second, solidarity rights are often used to combat inequality and, in Hayekian theory, 
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340 Ibid, pp. 9-20 
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inequality is necessary in a functioning society341. Third, “solidarity” can be used as a 
rhetorical device to justify the coercion of individuals by the state342. This sub-section 
will consider each of these points of hostility in turn.  
  
i. Solidarity rights require state interference. 
 
 Protecting common-good interests generally requires states to take positive action. 
This means that states act to protect group interests, sometimes ahead of individual 
interests. For Hayek, individual interests should be prioritised over collective interests. 
The state should allow individuals to compete. It should not intervene to “pick a winner”. 
To do so is coercive. Solidarity rights often require the state to interfere in fair 
competition. For example, states often respect their outward-facing duty under the right 
to development, by providing aid to certain industries or areas of agriculture in 
developing states.343 This means that the recipients of the aid are at an artificial 
advantage. For a Hayekian, intervening in the market in this way is coercive and 
unjust.344  
 Hayekian theory admits some solidarity because it requires a degree of social 
cohesion.345 This, however, must occur organically, rather than through coercion. It must 
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pp. 89 -111 
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emerge from the voluntary actions of individuals.346 There is both an ideological and a 
practical justification for this. The ideological explanation is that, if an individual is 
forced to cohere with the rest of society then she is being coerced.347 The practical 
explanation is advanced most persuasively by Milton Friedman, who substantially 
developed Hayek’s political theory.348 For Friedman, if social cohesion is not voluntary 
then it is not effective. Friedman uses the metaphor of a game, such as football or 
basketball, that generally requires a referee or umpire to ensure that all players follow the 
rules and penalise those who do not. It also requires that the players generally accept the 
rules without the umpire having to become involved. Players must, thus, accept the rules 
without being coerced into doing so by the umpire. If the umpire must use her powers of 
penalty to coerce every player into accepting every rule, then she will be constantly 
intervening and the game could not proceed. If all players generally accept the rules the 
umpire is only required to intervene occasionally, so the game flows more effectively.349 
The same is true of society. If no individual accepted social norms there would be 
anarchy: Hobbes' "war of all against all".350 All members of society must, therefore, have 
a basic acceptance of social norms, it is not sufficient that the observe norms because 
they are coerced into doing so by the state.  
 
ii. Solidarity rights require the state to artificially suppress inequality 
 
                                                          
346 Ibid, pp. 36-48 
347 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 7 - 22 
348 Nicholas Whapshott, Keynes Hayek: The Clash that Defined Modern Economics, (London; Norton, 
2012), pp. 208-221 
349 Ibid, pp. 7 - 22 
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 In Hayekian theory, inequality is a necessary evil. It facilitates the progress of 
society as a whole. Progress naturally leads to inequality and inequality is vital to 
progress.351 It is necessary for the social progress that some people are “ahead” and some 
“behind”. It is only through this division that new ideas can be tested. Those “behind”, 
benefit from the resources of those “ahead” because they enjoy the results of their 
experiments without the need to invest themselves.352 Inequality thus motivates 
individuals to innovate in order to get ahead. 
 For Hayek and Friedman, the alternative to inequality is injustice. A planned 
society (in which the state interferes to “correct” inequality) would still require 
inequality because it would still require elites to drive society forward. The nature of the 
elite would change. The capitalist class would be replaced as the elite by whoever 
happened to control the state. The social structure, with an elite leading the rest of 
society, would remain the same. However, in a planned society, inequality would be 
mandated by the whim of the powerful rather than result from “impersonal” forces like 
the market or accident of birth.353 The latter choice is preferable because, in minimising 
coercion by the state, it more effectively facilitates social progress.354 Solidarity rights 
can require governments to intervene to remove inequality. For example, cultural rights 
can impose an obligation on governments to address inequalities between indigenous 
peoples and the rest of society.355 For Hayek, this merely prolongs inefficient cultural 
practices. Indigenous peoples should be left to compete in the marketplace. If their way 
of life puts them at a disadvantage they should abandon that way of life. 
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iii. “Solidarity” can be used to justify coercion of individuals by the state. 
 
 Solidarity is often used by states as an excuse to justify coercion. Hayek was highly 
critical of socialist and social democratic governments.356 They interfere in the market 
and other areas of society in the name of the collective good.357 This leads to the 
subjugation of individual rights. Coercion happens when the state interferes with 
individual liberty in favour of the “greater good” of society. Shared interests offer a 
proxy for the state to subjugate individual interests in favour it its own. Civil and 
political rights are acceptable because they limit the state’s capacity for coercion. 
Recognising solidarity rights requires recognising that collective interests can have an 
equivalent status to individual interests. Privileging common-good interests over 
individual interests can legitimise coercion on a broad scale. It is, in reality, more likely 
that the government has identified its own interest and claimed that it is a shared interest 
358. Hayekian theory, therefore, begins as hostile to solidarity rights as a concept. In the 
rest of this chapter I will argue that, despite this conceptual hostility, the case for 
solidarity rights can be understood from the Hayekian perspective. 
 
The Case from the Hayekian Perspective: Urgency 
 
 The overarching objective of Hayek’s political theory is to limit coercion of the 
individual. Coercion involves imposing one agent’s plan on another. It thus reduces the 
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potential for social experimentation and so reduces the cumulative knowledge of society. 
This retards the development of society. The international system in the twenty-first 
century, however, presents a different set of challenges to the mid-twentieth century 
domestic systems in which Hayek developed his theories. When Hayek wrote his most 
influential works, political power was generally concentrated in the state. In the 
transnational age, political power is multipolar. To achieve Hayek’s overarching goal, of 
minimising coercion, it is therefore necessary to depart from some of his tactical 
recommendations, when these recommendations relate solely to the political context of 
the mid-20th Century. Embracing solidarity rights represents a departure from some of 
Hayek’s tactics, to better achieve his overarching goal, reducing coercion, in the 
multipolar context of the transnational age. Coercion should, for Hayek, be limited 
because we have limited knowledge. Any attempt to plan is thus more likely to have 
adverse results than positive results. To impose the plan of one agent on others 
(coercion) is therefore harmful. Respecting common-good interests limits the imposition 
of one agents plan on others. 
 
Hayek’s overarching goal: limiting coercion 
 
 To understand Hayek’s overarching objective of limiting coercion, it is necessary 
to first understand his theory of comprehension. For Hayek, it is only possible for an 
agent to comprehend a tiny proportion of all the information in existence. Hayek and 
Friedman identify two limitations on comprehension. The first is substantive: it is 
impossible for any agent to access the sum-total, or even a significant proportion of the 
information in existence.359 It is therefore impossible for any agent to be fully informed 
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or even close to fully informed. The second limitation is cognitive. Even if it were 
possible for an agent to access sufficient information in existence, it would be more 
information than she could possibly process. Furthermore, that information is constantly 
subject to change, and reliant on additional bodies of contextual information in order to 
have meaning. It cannot possibly be processed by a single mind or even a cohesive group 
of minds.360  
 The inevitable limits on any agent’s comprehension mean that it is impossible for 
one agent to plan for the whole of society.361 In modern society, a single agent cannot 
predict the outcomes of their actions. Attempts to plan a society will, therefore, retard 
social progress. Hayek sets out this argument with five propositions: 
1. It is impossible to observe the effects of our morality in the long term. 
2. In an extended order, most ends of action are not conscious or deliberate. 
3. Extended orders are too complex to attempt to hold all possibilities in one 
mind. 
4. What is unknown cannot be rationally ordered. 
5. What cannot be known cannot be planned.362 
For Hayek, the “curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really 
know about what they imagine they can design.”363 The desire to plan a society, In the 
view of Hayek and Friedman, comes from the fear of a lack of control. Ultimately, 
however, attempts to plan afford the planner no greater control than they enjoyed before: 
“The understandable aversion to such morally blind results, results inseparable 
from any process of trial and error, leads men to want to achieve a contradiction 
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in terms: namely, to wrest control of evolution – i.e., of the procedure of trial and 
error – and to shape it to their present wishes. But the invented moralities 
resulting from this reaction give rise to irreconcilable claims that no system can 
satisfy and which thus remain the source of unceasing conflict. The fruitless 
attempt to render a situation just whose outcome, by its nature, cannot be 
determined by what anyone does or can know, only damages the functioning of 
the process itself.”364 
 Friedman calls this “the law of unintended consequences”.365 Our comprehension 
is inevitably limited so the planner can never take into account every factor necessary to 
ensure that her plan is a success. Actions will almost always have consequences that 
were not predicted. As a result, any plan is a gamble that is more likely to fail than it is to 
succeed366. When the planner imposes her plan on others it causes a double harm. In the 
first instance, it makes them subject to the outcome of her gamble, whether they wanted 
to be or not. In the second, it eliminates the chance for them to develop their own ideas 
and measures in that area. If individuals are subject to the plans of another then they 
must apply the measures that the other’s plan prescribes. This means they do not develop 
their own measures to achieve the same outcome. As such, fewer alternative measures 
are developed and there is thus chance of developing a measure that will be genuinely 
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Organising society in a non-coercive manner 
 
 Although imposing one agent’s plan on others is counterproductive, For Hayek and 
Friedman, humans must nevertheless live in society and society must progress. Anarchy 
benefits only the strong367 and societies that do not progress tend to disintegrate.368 
Central planning will retard social progress, so societies must find a way to organise 
themselves without it.369 A rational society organises itself and progresses by harnessing 
the cumulative knowledge of its members. This knowledge is beyond that which any 
individual can process. In a properly organised society, however, it is not necessary for 
the individual to process the entire body of knowledge. For Hayek and Friedman, a 
properly organised society allows the individual to benefit from knowledge that she does 
not have. In such a society, the individual can still benefit from the cumulative 
knowledge of all other members of society.370  
 To build the cumulative knowledge of society, individuals must be free to 
experiment. Liberty is thus the rational response to the limits on agents’ 
comprehension.371 Different measures and ideas, developed by individuals, will 
                                                          
367 Hayek, n. 339, pp. 201-205 
368 Ibid, p. 202 
369 For example, see Friedman, n. 347, pp. 7-22 
370 Hayek, n. 356, p. 80 
371 Attempting to capture the essence Hayek’s nascent political theory in 1955, Carl Freidrich argued that it 
was dominated by the idea of “freedom”. For Freidrich, “freedom” was achieved by limiting the ability of 
the state to coerce the individual (see Carl J. Friedrich, "The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism", 49 
American Political Science Review 2 (1955), pp. 509-525). But Friedrich mistook mechanism for 
foundation. The rational reaction to the limits on comprehension is to organise a society so that individual 
liberty is maximised. (See Hayek, n. 339, pp. 3-14) 
 128 
inevitably compete. The most effective will be adopted by more individuals and the less 
effective will be abandoned. The most effective measures do not, therefore, need to be 
identified by the state. They are adopted naturally by free individuals. When individuals 
are at liberty, modern societies “plan” themselves. Individuals must be free to learn from 
each other through trial and error.372 Hayek aspires to a society that facilitates “human 
development in its richest diversity”.373  
 For Hayek and Friedman, central planning retards the progress of society. If one 
measure or idea is imposed on others, then those others are no longer able to experiment. 
This means that society loses the benefit of their competing ideas. The ultimate 
cumulative knowledge of that society is thus less than it otherwise would have been. This 
means that coercion harms society as a whole. If the planner is only attempting to plan 
for herself then she can gamble: when individuals attempt new things, it leads to 
innovation. If the individual’s gamble is successful it may be repeated by others. If it 
fails, then the loss only impacts on the individual.374 When applied to society as a whole, 
however, planning inhibits innovation. If society as a whole must follow the plans of an 
individual or small group of agents, then this eliminates the potential for competing 
ideas: if gamble does not pay off then it cannot be corrected. Furthermore, in making the 
gamble, the planner has eliminated the opportunity to develop measures that would have 
been more effective and more widely embraced. In a planned society, alternative visions 
must be sacrificed for that of the planner. Coercion is harmful because it forces 
individuals to accept the planning of others and thus stifles their potential for innovation 
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and the potential social benefits of competition between different measures.375 A rational 
society is therefore one that is organised to minimise coercion. 
 
The nature of coercion  
 
 Coercion can come from both the state and individuals. If an individual imposes 
her plan on another individual, then society loses the benefit of the alternative measures 
that individual might have developed. The core harm remains the same whether coercion 
is the work of the state or individuals: the potential for the development of, and 
competition between, multiple measures has been eliminated. The role of the state is to 
set general rules to prevent individuals from coercing each other. If all members of 
society follow the same rules, then none is coercing the others. Hayek adopts Locke's 
mantra: "We owe our freedom to restraints on freedom. For, Locke wrote, 'who could be 
free when every other man's humour might domineer over him."376 Hayek thus supports 
                                                          
375 Keynes described Hayek’s theory of social evolution as social Darwinism: “The parallelism between 
economic laissez-faire and Darwinism ... is very close indeed. Just as Darwin invoked sexual love, acting 
through sexual selection, as an adjutant to natural selection by competition, to direct evolution along lines 
which should be desirable as well as effective, so the individualist invokes love of money, acting through 
the pursuit of profit, as an adjutant to natural selection, to bring about the production on the greatest 
possible scale of what is most strongly desired as measured by exchange value" (See John Maynard 
Keynes, "The End of Laissez Faire", (1926), reprinted in Essays in Persuasion, (London; Macmillan, 
1931), p. 284). However, Hayek draws a distinction between himself and Darwin. The latter traced single 
lines of evolution. Genetic material is handed from parent to child. But social evolution is the product of 
many parents (See Hayek, n. 463, p. 9). Any member of society may benefit from its collective wisdom. 
Even though that individual cannot comprehend the sum of the combinations of information required to 
achieve that wisdom. The political thought of Hayek and Friedman may be described as Darwinian in that 
social development is determined by the “survival of the fittest” practices. But the purpose of competition 
is the benefit of society as a whole. In eventually adopting the practices that replaced their own, even the 
losers ultimately gain from the competition. 
376 Ibid, p. 163 quoting John Locke, 2nd Treatise on Government, sect. 57 
 130 
the imposition of general rules applicable to all.377 Hayek's ideal society establishes 
general rules that limit the government and the exercise of power.378 Hayekian theory 
thus permits a trade-off between different forms of coercion. 379 Some coercion is 
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“Suddenly it’s the main object and leads to a degree of interference with the policy of other 
countries which, even if I sympathized with the general aim, I don’t think it’s in the least justified. 
. . .” (Interview by Robert Chitester with Friedrich A. Hayek, at UCLA (1978), available at 
http://www.hayek.ufm.edu/index.php?title=Bob_Chitester_part_I&p=video1&b=930&e=1037.) 
However, this analysis is a critique of the Carter administration’s foreign policy. Not human rights as a 
concept. Hayek was criticising the way in which the Carter administration used human rights as a pretext 
for intervention in other states.  
Nevertheless, the human rights tradition comes from the enlightenment ideas of rational social 
design that Hayek rejected. The roots of the practice lie in the most prominent modern examples of 
attempts to design a society based on the “reason” of elites: the American constitution of 1788 (See 
Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 53-94) and the constitution of the French First Republic from 1792 to 1804 
(See Jennings, n. 312, pp. 29-65). In both instances the enlightenment theories that dominated amongst the 
republican elites were applied to the task of reconstituting a state. Both states enshrined bills of rights in 
their constitutions, guaranteeing citizens specific rights against the state. Hayek and Friedman reject 
attempts to depart from the cumulative wisdom of past civilisations, Hayek arguing that it is hubristic to 
believe that humans should become endowed with such a quantum leap forward in their powers of 
comprehension that they might conceive the knowledge required to re-design a society as a whole.  
But the origin of the human rights tradition is less important than the actual impact of the 
Practice. Human rights ultimately reduce coercion overall. Coercion involves the imposition of a plan. If 
an urgent interest is compromised, then the plan of the compromiser replaces the plan of the holder of the 
interest. Human rights thus limit the power of the state to coerce and impose a duty to prevent individuals 
coercing each other. Hayek and Friedman explicitly endorse a number of the norms of the Practice, 
particularly civil and political rights. For Hayek, both freedom of speech and freedom of action are 
important. Individuals must be free to discuss and try ideas especially those outside the orthodoxy. For 
Hayek, human rights are the lesser of two evils. Coercion with regard to protecting a small number of 
interests is acceptable because it minimises coercion in general. 
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permissible, as long as it is minor, specific, regular and generally applied, in order to 
avoid more widespread and arbitrarily applied coercion.380  
 
Coercion and common-good interests 
 
 Compromising common-good interests is also coercive. It involves subjugating the 
plans of individuals to the plans of more powerful agents. As argued in the previous 
chapter, from a sociological perspective, common-good interests can be essential to 
individuals in the same manner that independent-good interests can be essential. 
Hayekian theory focuses primarily on the coercion of individuals by their own state. Yet 
Hayek was writing for a pre-transnational society. In the transnational age, achieving 
Hayek’s overarching goal of limiting coercion requires addressing different challenges. 
In a globalised system, states and individuals coerce those beyond their borders.381 This 
may be in a direct manner such as through war, illegitimate intervention or 
colonialism.382 These all involve the imposition of one state or agent’s preferred 
measures on another, thus extinguishing potential alternative practices. The 
transnationally interconnected nature of the twenty-first century means that the actions of 
states have an impact on individuals beyond their borders. This impact is coercive 
because those who it affects have no control over whether they are affected and are not 
compensated for their resulting losses. The common-good interest of the individual is 
subject to the plan of the more powerful agent. The potential for the individual to 
                                                          
380 There are parallels between Hayek’s statement of the permissible forms of coercion and J.S. Mill’s 
harm principle (See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, first published 1859, (London; CreateSpace Independent 
Publishing Platform, 2015), Ch. I para. 12, Ch. III para. 1, Ch. IV paras. 3, 10, 12, Ch. V para. 5).  
381 See Iriye, n. 264, pp. 681-848 
382 This argument is made in Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law, (London; Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
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experiment or innovate based on that interest is extinguished.  
When the common-good interest in peace is violated, those who are affected by 
the violence are subject to the agenda of the perpetrators of the violence: they thus suffer 
coercion. Experiencing violence inhibits the ability of individuals to develop trade, 
culture or social innovation. In an interconnected world, the scale of those affected by 
violence can be global.383 Violence has economic, cultural, and political impacts that 
extend far beyond those who are subject to the immediate instance of violence. The 
potential for millions of small experiments or innovations can be lost because of the 
violence committed by a few individuals. The perpetrators of violence thus coerce on a 
global scale.384  
When, for example, the right to common heritage of mankind is violated, every 
individual, who has a link to that heritage, suffers coercion. They are denied the 
opportunity to, inter alia, learn, develop their self-perception or profit from the piece of 
heritage. If the Antarctic is destroyed or damaged, all mankind will lose the benefit of 
what can be learned from the region. In the case of Ahmad al-Mahdi,385 the defendant 
pleaded guilty to destroying ancient tombs in Timbuktu because his version of Islam 
prescribes that tombs may not be built more than one foot off the ground.386 In doing so, 
he imposed his version of morality on the citizens of Mali and individuals throughout the 
world who might have learned from the tombs or had an emotive, cultural, traditional or 
                                                          
383 Skoll Global Threats Fund, “Mission and Strategy”, available online at 
http://www.skollglobalthreats.org/about-us/mission-and-approach/ 
384 For example, Raoul Bianchi describes how a terrorist attack in Mombasa in 2002, in which 20 people 
were killed, impacted on millions of individuals the world over. (Raoul Bianchi, "Tourism and the 
globalisation of fear: Analysing the politics of risk and (in)security in global travel", 7 Tourism and 
Hospitality Research 64 (2006), pp. 64-76) 
385 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, as discussed at p. 72 
386 Ibid as discussed at p. 72 
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theological connection to the tombs. By imposing his moral plan, Mr al-Mahdi ended all 
the potential opportunities associated with the tombs. He thus eliminated untold 
possibilities for innovation or the development of culture or learning. Even from a 
Hayekian perspective, the interest in the common heritage of mankind can thus be 
understood as important.  
On a global level, rights, like the right to peace, protect the space required for 
diverse practices to develop. Violence is coercion of weaker peoples or states by stronger 
peoples or states and leads to the elimination of competing practices by a force rather 
than fair competition387. Diversity requires the space for competing practices to develop 
and be refined, the right to peace helps create this space. Creating a non-coercive public 
space at both a global and domestic level is essential for the development of markets and 
trade. The right to peace, which gives states a duty to find ways to settle their differences 
beyond violence and this minimises violent disruption to commerce.  
Creating the space for trade and markets, however, requires the minimisation of 
coercion beyond that of direct violence. The right to development includes a duty to limit 
or remove restrictive trade practices. The EU has sought to facilitate member states in 
fulfilling their duties under the right using the common market.388 In liberalising trade 
and movement and establishing general basic standards required for labour and 
commerce, the EU has given peoples in its poorer states the opportunity to compete with 
those in richer states.389 The EU has also limited the incentive to attempt to gain 
                                                          
387Mayer, n. 291, p. 8 
388 VerLoren van Theermat and Schriver, n. 343, pp. 89 -111, it should be noted that the EU measures 
were, in this case, limited to member states. The measures are not intended to assist poor states that are not 
members of the Union.  
389 Ibid, pp. 89-111 
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commercial advantage through coercive practices, such as forcing individuals to work 
for lower wages or in worse conditions than the market demands.  
Coercing individuals into abandoning their culture is similarly problematic for 
Hayekian theory. For Hayekians, diversity is a social asset. A diverse society means that 
a broad range of different measures can compete. This increases the effectiveness of the 
competition in identifying the best measures. Cultural diversity is part of this. The 
limited nature of knowledge makes it impossible to identify a complete conception of an 
“ideal” culture so it is rational to promote cultural diversity.390  
In summary, Hayekian theory seeks to discourage coercion. Coercion means the 
imposition of one agent’s plan on others. It should be minimised because it retards the 
progress of society. In the 21st century, respect for common-good interests can prevent 
                                                          
390 Coercing individuals into abandoning their culture is problematic for Hayekian theory. For Hayek, 
diversity means that a broad range of measures can compete. The effectiveness of the competition, in 
identifying the best measures, is thus increased. Cultural diversity plays an important role in this. The 
limited nature of knowledge makes it impossible to identify a complete conception of an “ideal” culture so 
it is rational to promote cultural diversity.  
Common-good interests in respect for different cultures are interests in preventing imposition of a 
dominant culture on minority cultures. This manifests in both global and domestic spheres. In practice, the 
coercive nature of interference to protect a culture must be balanced against the coercive nature of 
interference to change or obliterate it. In order for society to progress certain cultural measures must be 
replaced with new, more effective cultural measures. Cultural rights that artificially maintain static cultures 
are detrimental to social progress. However, the interest in respect for culture encompasses cultural 
development. Those who would lock in outdated cultural measures are not respecting the culture. They are 
coercing others by using the language of cultural rights to protect their own status(See the discussion of the 
Shah Bano case in Chapter Nine, pp. 263-264). Effective cultural rights keep multiple roads open, but they 
do not protect attempts to block the road. Cultural rights are asserted to protect cultural practices from 
being extinguished as a result of coercion, not through impersonal processes of social evolution390. 
Indigenous peoples in Australia and Canada have asserted cultural rights in response to a history of 
violence by the (now) dominant cultures in those states (Hodder, n. 200, pp. 861-882). New and competing 
measures cannot develop if non-dominant cultures are coercively extinguished. 
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the imposition of one agent’s plan on others. Common-good interests can, therefore, be 




The Case from The Hayekian Perspective: The Threat 
 
 The market is Hayek’s preferred method of organising society in a manner that 
minimises coercion. But the market cannot address threats to common-good interests. 
Hayek and Friedman favour a society in which diverse sources create new measures. The 
most effective measures emerge through competition. A mechanism is required to 
facilitate this process. State planning is coercive. Yet the complete absence of structures 
is also coercive. Hayek and Friedman reject the Jeffersonian391 reliance on human nature 
as the source of social organisation. For them, the strongest will coerce the weaker if 
there are no structures to prevent it. This will retard social progress, because the 
measures that survive any process of competition will be those favoured by the strongest 
rather than those most suited to the task at which they are directed.392 As Friedman 
argues: "However attractive anarchy may be as a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world 
of imperfect men."393 
 
The advantages of the market 
 
                                                          
391 Wood, n. 379, pp. 140-173 
392 Friedman, n. 347, p. 22 
393 Ibid, p. 25 
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 The market coordinates the efforts of a society, and facilitates experimentation, 
with minimum coercion. In a free market, agents take decisions based on their own self-
interest. If it is in their interest to perform an action, then the agent will perform that 
action394. Rational agents395 can weigh the costs and benefits of an action. If the benefits 
outweigh the costs the agent will perform the action. Given the limits on possible 
comprehension, the free market is the most objective mechanism that can possibly be 
achieved for identifying the most useful practices and discarding the least useful396.  
The market functions according to the price mechanism: The utility of a measure 
is indicated by the price people are willing to pay for it. Measures are evaluated by the 
whole of the combined wisdom of the agents in the market: “…an order arising from the 
separate decisions of many individuals on the basis of different information cannot be 
contained by a common scale of the relative importance of different ends.”397 The 
“merit” of a measure is indicated by the price the market awards. This price will change 
when alternative, more effective practices, emerge.398 In this way merit is determined in 
an “impersonal” manner. The most diverse spread of measures can compete with a 
minimum of coercion.399 In Friedman’s words, it provides “unanimity without 
                                                          
394 Ibid, pp. 2-20 
395 In the “Austrian School” of economists, with which Hayek identified, a “rational agent” is an economic 
agent with clear preferences who models uncertainty based on expected values of variables or functions of 
variables and always elects to perform the action with the optimal expected outcome for herself based on 
the information available to her. See Richard N. Langlois, “Knowledge and Rationality in the Austrian 
School: An Analytical Survey”, 9 Eastern Economic Journal 4 (1985), pp. 309-330 
396 Hayek, n. 339, pp. 89-105 
397 Ibid, p. 79 
398 Hayek, n. 339, pp. 85-102 




The limitations of the market 
 
 The market is an effective mechanism for social organisation. There are, 
however, limits to its utility which make it unable to adequately protect common-good 
interests. Friedman identifies three key limitations:  
1. The market cannot coordinate public goods. 
2. The market cannot coordinate necessary action on “paternalistic grounds”. 
3. The market cannot establish or regulate itself.401 
Common-good interests fall within the first limitation. When the protection of public 
goods is left to markets, the result is a “demand failure”.402 The increased cost of 
protecting the interest in the case of a single person is the same as the increased cost of 
protecting a million (or more). Any measure that effectively protects a single individual’s 
common-good interest will inevitably protect the common-good interests of a broad 
range of individuals. Costs can never be effectively recouped because no one has a 
greater incentive to pay than anyone else. If costs cannot be recouped there is no market 
                                                          
400 Friedman, n. 347, p. 23. Hayek and Friedman depart from classical theories of the market. Classical 
theories assume that a free market will ultimately reach an equilibrium at which the demand and prices are 
settled. The most the optimal distribution of resources across society is, thus, achieved ( this is called 
“Pareto efficiency”, see Dieter Helm, "The Assessment: The Economic Borders of the State", 2 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 2 (1986), pp. 1-24) Hayekian theory, however, embraces a market in which 
equilibrium is never achieved. In the Hayekian market, the absence of equilibrium means that there is 
always the potential for profit to be made. This drives the creation of new products and measures which, in 
turn, drive society forward. (See, Helm, pp. 1-24) 
401 Friedman, n. 347, pp. 22-36 
402 Ibid, n. 343 
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incentive to supply the necessary protection403. The common-good interest in question, 
thus, goes unprotected. In Friedman’s words, when it comes to public goods, “voluntary 
exchange is either expensive or impossible.”404 
The market is also ill equipped to address a conflict of freedoms. Hayek and 
Friedman accept that freedoms may sometimes conflict. As Friedman puts it:  
"Men's freedoms can conflict, and when they do, one man's freedom must be limited 
to preserve another's - as a Supreme Court Justice once put it, "My freedom to move 
my fist must be limited by the proximity of your chin."405 
In a subset of cases, the market can be an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of 
conflicts. When a freedom may be sacrificed for appropriate compensation from the 
other party without damaging the structures that protect personal freedom as a whole, the 
market can facilitate this exchange. When, however, the sacrifice of a freedom in an 
individual case equates to (a) the sacrifice of the freedom of others and (b) their consent 
may not be gained and appropriate compensation is not realistically possible, then any 
market exchange is coercive. If society is to be organised in a manner that generally 
minimises coercion, a non-market mechanism must protect common-good interests. 
 
The Rights Mechanism 
 
 According to Beitz’s model, the rights mechanism must be reasonably effective 
at protecting the interests in question if those interests are to be recognised as rights. 
From the Hayekian perspective, the human rights mechanism turns out to be reasonably 
                                                          
403 Helm, n. 400, pp. 1-24 
404 Friedman, n. 347, p. 27 
405 Ibid, p. 26 
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effective at protecting common-good interests because it both protects those interests 
and, at the same time, minimises coercion generally. The rights mechanism disperses 
power and maintains the rule of law. This simultaneously minimises the potential for 




The limitations of the democratic mechanism 
 
If the market is unable to effectively protect common-good interests, then some 
might argue that a democratic government should step in. It is surely the role of a 
democratic government to protect public goods. Hayek and Friedman are, however, 
sceptical of the effectiveness of the democratic mechanism when it comes to protecting 
generally important interests. For Friedman, governments tend to perform the same tasks 
less efficiently than private enterprises.406 This is because the democratic mechanism 
gives vested interests disproportionate power. The democratic process rewards those best 
placed to lobby the government. Friedman cites the example of the New York taxi 
monopoly.407 New York city placed a cap on the number of taxi permits that could be 
issued. This meant that existing permits became a scarce commodity, and thus could be 
traded for significant sums. It also meant that taxi drivers could drive up fares without 
fear of competition. The permit cap set supply at a fixed level while demand increased 
exponentially, due to the city’s rapidly increasing population. A proposal to raise or 
                                                          
406 Milton Friedman, “The Role of Government in a Free Society”, in Paul Peretz, The Politics of American 
Economic Policy Making, (Chicago; M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 7-13 
407 Ibid, p. 7 
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abolish the permit cap faced vociferous and organised opposition from taxi drivers who 
all had a direct vested interest in maintaining the cap. There was no comparative 
organised lobbying for scrapping the cap. The general public all had an interest in its 
removal, but no individual had a specific interest comparable to that of a taxi driver, so 
no one was prepared to abandon their other commitments in order to lobby. A practice 
that drove up prices and drove down quality, thus, continued to enjoy a government 
mandate.408 
 Furthermore, politicians often have an interest in perpetuating failure. A 
politician’s interest is primarily in the perceived success of a project, not necessarily in 
its actual success.409 As long as voters believe that a project backed by a particular 
politician is successful, they are likely to vote for that politician. It doesn’t actually 
matter whether that belief is accurate. Public projects that fail are thus often renewed 
because their political backers wish to create the appearance of success. By contrast, 
when a private project fails, those with an interest in it stand to lose money, so they 
cancel the project as quickly as possible or reform it to such an extent that it becomes 
profitable.410 
 For Hayek, democratic government is inherently coercive. The act of governing 
requires one agent to choose the path for society as a whole. In some cases, there is no 
alternative, but these occasions are limited. The democratic mechanism encourages 
government in favour of vested interests and neglect of the general interest.411 To win 
elections politicians must build coalitions. Once in office they must maintain that 
                                                          
408 Ibid, pp. 7-8 
409 Ibid, pp. 9-10 
410 Friedman, n. 406, pp. 9-10 
411 Hayek, n. 339, pp. 103-118 
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coalition. It is in politicians’ interest to reward each member of their coalition, to secure 
election in the future, rather than legislating for the general good.412 Furthermore, 
politicians have no inherent interest in being at the forefront of progress. The interest of a 
politician lies in winning election. This is most often achieved by embracing that which 
is already accepted, not that which (regardless of whether it is more effective) is more 
progressive.413 Hayek argues that the majority has no wisdom in determining great art or 
progressive intellectual endeavour.414 Democratic politics is therefore structurally 
unsuited to reward or encourage innovative thinking or entrepreneurialism. Yet 
innovative thinking and entrepreneurialism are necessary for social progress. 
Majoritarian democracy, therefore, incentivises social stagnation rather than social 
progress.415 
 Hayekian theory, therefore, prescribes a limited role for government. A 
democratically elected government is useful when it acts as a regulator for the market 
and acts on paternalistic grounds where the market is unable to do so. The government 
cannot, however, be trusted to consistently protect interests of high importance .416 
Individuals must have confidence that their important interests will be protected. 
Furthermore, common-good interests are global, while governments are state based. 
                                                          
412 Ibid, pp. 103-118 
413 Ibid, pp. 118-133 
414 Ibid, pp. 118-133 
415 Ibid, p. 120. Hayek might be criticised for appearing to believe that the same agents display entirely 
different characteristics when acting in the market and acting as electors. But his argument is structural, 
not a critique of the agents themselves. The market facilitates the reward of innovation and risk taking 
without the necessity for most participants to take risks themselves. However, the government makes rules 
that apply to all. So electors must themselves take a risk when they cast their vote. This means that the 
market is structurally designed to drive progress, while democratic governments are structurally 
predisposed to conservatism. Politicians must protect the interests of those who elect them. This creates an 
incentive to make laws designed to benefit certain sectors of society rather than society as a whole.  
416 Ibid, pp. 103-118 
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Common-good interests and threats thus transcend governments. Even if Hayek and 
Friedman had more confidence in the democratic mechanism, it would still be 





The rule of law 
 
 Rights apply generally and consistently according to the rule of law. The rule of 
law is central to Hayekian political theory. It maintains the appropriate balance of 
coercion in extended orders. Hayekian theory requires that the state take measures to 
prevent individuals from coercing each other. When states observe the rule of law, they 
minimise coercion between individuals without themselves becoming excessively 
coercive. If society is governed by a series of abstract rules, applied consistently and 
predictably, then individuals can regulate their behaviour accordingly.417 Consistent rules 
enable the greatest degree of liberty consistent with all members of society sharing an 
equal degree of formal liberty. In Hayek’s words: “To operate beneficially, competition 
requires that those involved observe rules rather than resort to physical force.”418 
Abstract rules must apply to the government as well. A government must only exercise 
specifically defined powers and refrain from infringing on specifically protected 
liberties. When it does make new rules, those rules must apply generally and equally.419 
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418 Hayek, n. 339, p. 20 
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The most important set of rules that a government can create and enforce are those 
governing the ownership and transfer of property. This is necessary because it forms the 
fundamental rules for the market.420 Hayek argues:  
“The prerequisite for the existence of such property, freedom and order, from the 
time of the Greeks to the present, is the same: law in the sense of abstract rules 
enabling any individual to ascertain at any time who is entitled to dispose over 
any particular thing.”421 
Hayek contrasts a rule governed society with a planned society. In the latter, the 
entire energy of society is directed towards a predetermined end through the application 
of predetermined methods. In the former society is free to experiment and develop its 
own ends and own methods through processes of competition and refinement.422  
Hayekian theory therefore requires that, even in a democracy, certain interests 
must be carved out from the authority of the majority. Certain interests are of sufficient 
importance that they must be treated as abstract rules and, as such, must compel the state 
to act or refrain from acting. Hayekian theory prescribes some of these interests (such as 
freedom of expression) but makes no pretence at the identification of a complete list. No 
agent can objectively identify a complete list of such interests because they can never 
access sufficient knowledge to do so. It is possible, however, to identify certain interests 
in a piecemeal manner. Hayek and Friedman do not proscribe public interests from 
belonging to this class. A democratic government is equally unsuited to protect public 
interests as the market, beholden as it is, to sectional interests. This leaves space for an 
alternative mechanism.  
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The rights mechanism 
 
The mechanism that protects common-good interests must have three properties 
in order to be consistent with Hayekian theory: the interests must be protected by (1) 
consistent, (2) accessible rules that (3) apply generally. Rights are accessible to all 
individuals and arbitrariness. In identifying a set of presumptions that apply generally, 
they minimise coercion.  
Solidarity rights disperse the power to provide for and protect common-good 
interests. This means that the individuals to whom those interests belong have the power 
to demand their protection or provision. If one’s aim is to minimise coercion then it is 
rational to, embrace structures that disperse power. The democratic process may disperse 
power occasionally, but it can only do so to a limited extent. In Hayekian theory, the 
democratic process is only capable of passing power to a different set of elites. The 
market also disperses power, but does not do so effectively in relation to public goods. 
Solidarity rights disperse power and, by doing so, protect common-good interests. This is 
the most effective means to ensure that they are protected and provided for with the 
minimum of coercion.  
Solidarity rights reduce coercion by holding states accountable for the external 
impacts of their actions. This is the outward-facing duty It is not possible for the market 
to impose appropriate costs for the violation of common-good interests.423 It is 
important, however, that some form of “cost” is imposed.424 If states are not held 
accountable for the external impact of their actions, then there is nothing to prevent 
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effectively unlimited coercion of peoples external to the state save the power of their 
own state. Solidarity rights empower individuals to hold states accountable for the 
protection and provision for their common-good interests. This can include imposing 
costs on those who abuse common-goods.425 
The right to development, for example, seeks to impose costs for the external 
impacts of state’s economic policies.426 Policies aimed at benefitting a domestic 
economy, such as tariffs, tax breaks, state aid and even state procurement policies can all 
have coercive impacts on peoples beyond the borders of a state.427 Furthermore, 
historical practices, such as extractive colonialism, have long lasting coercive impacts. 
The Seoul Declaration creates a duty for states to address those external effects.428 In 
fulfilment of that duty, states may provide aid, but also assistance with education, 
technological development and access to international trade.  
Solidarity rights also address domestic coercion. The right to development gives 
peoples the power to determine the course of their own development.429 This can include, 
inter alia, demands for democratic accountability, free markets, or the breaking up of 
monopolies. Indeed, the specific mechanisms are less important than the fact that, by the 
provision of a right to development, the power to determine the nature of development is 
dispersed where it might otherwise be concentrated. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
425 See the discussion of the right to a clean and healthy environment in Chapter Seven.  
426 Tatjana Ansbach, "Peoples and individuals as subjects of the right to development", pp. 155 - 165, pp. 
155-165 
427 Ibid, pp. 155-165 
428Declaration on the progressive development of international law relating to a new international 
economic order (Seoul Declaration, adopted at the 62nd ILA conference, 1986), Principle 5 
429 Ansbach, n. 426, pp. 155-165 
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 The objective of this chapter was to argue that, even from a hostile perspective, 
common-good interests can be understood as important, and appropriately protected by 
the rights mechanism. This was an argumentum a fortiori exercise, adopting an actively 
hostile perspective to indicate can be understood from non-sympathetic perspectives 
more generally. Hayekian theory is an appropriate choice of perspective because it 
rejects state intervention, embraces inequality and is suspicious of appeals to solidarity. 
It is thus conceptually hostile to solidarity rights. Hayekian theory seeks to organise 
society in a manner that minimises the coercion of the individual. In order to minimise 
coercion generally, certain interests must be protected. This class can include common-
good interests. To deny a common-good interest is as coercive as it is to deny an 
individual good interest. Both involve the imposition of one agent’s plan upon another. 
This limits their capacity to innovate and potentially retards the development of society.  
 For Hayek, the market is the preferable method of social organisation. It facilitates 
innovation and identifies the most effective measures, thus benefitting society as a 
whole, while keeping the coercion of individuals to a minimum. But the market is 
ineffective at addressing common-good interests. The rights mechanism is the least 
coercive alternative. It protects common-good interests by establishing consistent and 
generally applicable norms. In doing so it disperses power. This limits the potential for 
coercion. Solidarity rights can therefore be understood as important and appropriate from 
the perspective of Hayekian theory.  
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 This chapter aims to explain an anomaly in the treatment of self-determination by 
rights scholars. Few dispute that the right to self-determination is well established in 
international law. Indeed, rights scholars who are sceptical about solidarity rights often 
accept the legitimacy of the right to self-determination.430 Yet it does not obviously fit 
into either of the accepted classes of rights. A space exists, therefore, for analysis of self-
determination as a solidarity right. The right to self-determination protects the urgent 
common-good interest in political autonomy. Political autonomy means that individuals 
have a voice in determining the political status and direction of the polities with which 
they identify. The right to self-determination responds to the threat of domination by 
other groups or institutions. It provides for an outward-facing duty to refrain from 
domination of groups outside a state’s territory, and an inward-facing duty to refrain 
from domination of groups within a state’s territory. Political autonomy is integral for 
the functioning of both individuals and society, its importance can be appreciated from 
both perspectives that are sympathetic to solidarity rights and perspectives that are not 
sympathetic to solidarity rights. The latter will be demonstrated by analysing self-





                                                          





 Self-determination is an established right in international law.431 The 
international community’s attempts to protect political autonomy predate the Practice. 
Why is it necessary to analyse an established right in this thesis? There are two reasons: 
first, since the breakup of the USSR, political leaders have attempted to portray self-
determination as a remedy rather than a right. Second, the theoretical justifications for 
self-determination generally fail to offer a satisfactory argument for self-determination as 
a right rather than as a merely instrumental good.  
 
Right or remedy? 
 
 The right to self-determination was recognised in international law after the 
Second World War. It was initially applied in relation to colonial disputes. The 
inhabitants of territories, colonised by European powers during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, relied on the right to self-determination to argue for independence from the 
metropolitan power. Self-determination was thus, in practice, initially applied as a right 
to freedom from colonial rule.432 It was applied in a similar manner during the breakup 
of the USSR. Eastern European states relied on self-determination discourses to seek 
independence from Russia’s sphere of influence and secure recognition as independent 
states from the international community.433  
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 These newly formed, post-colonial states were rarely homogenous. They faced 
problems when groups within their territory relied on the same self-determination 
discourses to secure greater independence from the post-colonial state as the leaders of 
the state had used to secure independence from the former colonial power. Post-colonial 
governments responded that self-determination was not a continuing right: once used to 
secure independence from colonial domination, the right to self-determination is 
expired.434 I will refer to this construction as the “colonial interpretation”. 
 The colonial interpretation, however, makes self-determination a remedy rather 
than a right. A right involves a continuing entitlement for the holder and a continuing 
duty for the state. When one expresses a controversial opinion in public, one does not 
extinguish one’s right to freedom of expression. The right continues: one may express 
controversial opinions in public again in the future. A legal measure that is extinguished 
after responding to a specific harm is not a right, but a remedy. For example, the remedy 
of damages cannot be claimed more than once for the same harm. Once damages have 
been collected, the claimant’s entitlement, and the defendant’s obligation, is 
extinguished. The colonial interpretation construes self-determination purely as a 
remedy. Colonialism is the harm: self-determination remedies colonialism by compelling 
the colonial power to withdraw and recognise the former colony as a state. The 
entitlement to self-determination is then extinguished in the same way that the 
entitlement to damages is extinguished once damages have been paid.  
 The colonial interpretation is, prima facie, consistent with the principle of uti 
possidetis. This provides that, in the case of post-colonial states, the new state will inherit 
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the borders of the former colonial territory.435 If the new state must retain the borders of 
the colonial territory then attempts, by groups occupying portions of that territory, to 
secede from the new state are impermissible because they would inevitably require 
changes to the established borders.  
 Uti possidetis stands, for Antonio Cassese, in contradiction with the principle of 
self-determination. It means that only those individuals alive at the time of independence 
from colonial rule can exercise self-determination, confining the right to self-
determination to a single generation. Uti Possidetis is, nevertheless, a peremptory norm 
of international law.436 It governed the establishment of the independent states that 
emerged from the breakup of European colonial empires in Africa and has been affirmed 
by the Organisation of African Unity.437 Genuine self-determination is, for Cassese, thus 
“trumped” by uti possidetis. If the colonial interpretation is correct, self-determination 
either (a) does not belong in the class of “human rights” but, rather, the class of remedies 
or (b) serves to demonstrate the fragility of rights norms in the face of incompatible 
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The unsatisfactory nature of existing theoretical justifications 
 
The colonial interpretation is reflected in theoretical models, such as those of 
Allan Buchannan438 and Lea Brilmayer,439 that construe self-determination as a purely 
instrumental good. For Brilmayer, self-determination is important only as a remedial 
device: a means to end the particularly egregious oppression of a group. For Buchanan, 
self-determination facilitates groups in demanding respect for their other human rights. If 
those rights continue to be denied, then self-determination allows the group in question 
to secede from the territory of the oppressive state. For Brilmayer and Buchannan, self-
determination thus has value because it helps to secure the realisation of other human 
rights.440 In both constructions self-determination performs the role of remedy, 
correcting the harm caused by the violation of rights, rather than the role of right in itself. 
 For Ted Gurr, self-determination is valuable as a tool for peace-making.441 
Modern conflict is more often between cultural or ethnic groupings than states.442 In 
most such conflicts, the failure to respect a group’s right to self-determination is "an 
issue - sometimes the issue."443 Respect for the right to self-determination ensures that 
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groups can coexist in a state of mutual respect. They thus do not have to resort to 
violence to defend their political or cultural identity. This argument is attractive but, once 
again, offers only an instrumental account of self-determination. The threat addressed by 
self-determination is, for Gurr, war and violence. This threat is, however, more precisely 
addressed by the right to peace.444 If self-determination is simply a means to more fully 
realise the right to peace, then it is better understood as part of the duty for which that 
right provides and not as an independent norm of the Practice in its own right.  
In my view, self-determination should be construed as a right rather than a 
remedy or an instrumental good. self-determination protects an interest, political 
autonomy, that is urgent in itself. Further, I will argue that self-determination takes effect 
in international law as a continuing right. The reasonable effectiveness of this 
“continuing interpretation” demonstrates that the colonial interpretation is not reflected 
in international law and Buchannan’s and Brilmayer’s models of self-determination do 




The right to self-determination protects an urgent interest, in political autonomy, 
that is integral to the functioning of individuals in society. In my view, “political 
autonomy” refers to the balance of power between an individual and society. It should be 
understood in a broader sense than “personal autonomy” (the absence of excessive 
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coercion by the state)445 and “moral autonomy” (“being able to make one’s own moral 
decisions”).446 Political autonomy means that an individual can consciously influence her 
social environment at a structural level. An individual, exercising political autonomy, 
can engage in, inter alia, party politics or activism, culture, and social norms 
individually447 and will have a voice in determining the structure of society in which 
these activities occur.448 Personal and moral autonomy are, thus, necessary for political 
autonomy, but they are not sufficient. Political autonomy means living in a society that is 
responsive to its members in both its structure and its day to day functioning. Political 
autonomy is essential to both individuals and society as a whole.449  
 
The urgency of political autonomy 
 
 Without political autonomy individuals would be entirely subject to the decisions 
of others. Political autonomy requires both the absence of immediate restraints and the 
absence of structural constraints:450 the freedom to affect one's cultural and political 
context. Amy Gutman's extensive study of political structures explains how our 
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decisions, even those taken without immediate duress, are shaped, and in many cases 
defined, by our social, cultural, and political context.451 For Gutman, "many of the most 
important, along with the most trivial of our life choices are influenced and constrained 
by social context, over which political authority has the greatest human control."452 
Making almost any choice in society akin to choosing from a menu at a restaurant. If the 
individual was empowered to make a truly free choice, she could call through to the 
kitchen and instruct the chef to cook whatever took her fancy. This, however, is 
impossible. She must instead select from the pre-identified choices. Such is the position 
of the individual in society. When acting in society, the individual does not have a free 
choice. She must choose between the options available in her society. For example, the 
individual may be able to choose which party she votes for. She must, however, vote 
according to a pre-determined electoral system and generally choose between established 
political parties. The winner will govern according to pre-determined constitutional 
norms, in a state with a pre-determined political status. To vote for a government is only 
to exercise autonomy in relation to a fraction of the polity. Furthermore, the individual’s 
choice between parties is, in part, the product of her cultural and political education, the 
social norms she has internalised and her own, reflexively developed, self-perception.  
 The most complete way to maximise autonomy for a particular individual is 
either for (a) that individual to take dictatorial control of the society in which she lives, 
or (b) abjure society altogether. The latter option is not realistic. Living in a society is 
part of being human. Humans are social animals453 and society provides almost all of the 
things necessary to existence as a human as we understand it. So much for the autonomy 
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of the hermit. What of the dictator? Complete control of society would enhance 
autonomy, but only the autonomy of the dictator. We can't all be the dictator. What is left 
is to have a share in shaping society. Political autonomy requires that each individual 
have a share in the determination of the political status and governance of their society. 
We may not be able to instruct the kitchen with a free hand, but we can have a role in 
deciding what is on the menu. The political autonomy of all members of society is thus 
advanced to the greatest extent possible.  
 Will Kymlicka offers an alternative version of this argument454. For Kymlicka, 
culture defines the decision of individuals. Culture is "the media through which we come 
to an awareness of the options available to us".455 We only develop an awareness of 
ourselves through the prism of our socio-cultural context. We understand ourselves as 
individuals in the context of our society. Without political autonomy, the individual 
would be entirely at the mercy of others. Her sense of self would be entirely determined 
by the ancestors who established the political status of the territory and developed the 
prevailing social, cultural, and moral norms, and contemporaries who control the 
government and dictate developments in social, cultural, and moral norms.456 Political 
autonomy gives individuals a share in the control of the context in which we understand 
ourselves. As such, political autonomy ensures that individuals have the power to 
exercise a degree of control in their own self-realisation.  
 This can be illustrated in practice. In Canada, the government of Pierre Trudeau 
announced in 1961 that it intended to develop "Indian blind" laws.457 Indigenous 
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Canadians would be treated in exactly the same manner as all other Canadians. Their 
tribal lands would be freely alienable and they would vote for national, regional and local 
government in the same way as every other Canadian citizen.458 Indigenous Canadians 
protested fervently and successfully. In doing so, they appealed to their right to self-
determination.459 Trudeau's policy was not prima facie discriminatory, but it would have 
undermined the political and social structures that preserved the indigenous way of life. 
Indigenous Canadians would, in the future, lose the opportunity to develop a sense of 
self as "indigenous Canadians" (or members of a particular indigenous nation) rather 
than simply "Canadians". The Trudeau reforms would have undermined the political 
institutions that facilitated indigenous culture (such as tribal control of land and decision 
making) and replaced them with those used by the majority of Canadians, such as the 
free market. Although Trudeau offered them rights as individuals, indigenous Canadians 
demanded to exercise political autonomy in determining the context in which they could 
use those rights. Trudeau's government largely backed down and tribal land rights and 
structures of governance remain.460  
 Political autonomy is essential to a functioning society. Without autonomy, it is 
difficult to maintain legitimate normative structures. Individuals cannot reasonably be 
held responsible for their actions if their actions are largely the result of social structures 
over which they have no control.461 If autonomy is the standard assumption, then 
individuals can be held responsible for their actions.462 This allows us to have a 
meaningful discussion about the norms that regulate society and to enforce them in a 
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way that is transparent, understandable and capable of achieving popular acceptance and 
legitimacy. As such autonomy and society are mutually dependent. Without autonomy, 
the individual would be entirely defined by her social context. If its members did not 
enjoy autonomy, then society could not function according to generally applied norms. It 
can, therefore, be broadly understood that political autonomy is an urgent interest.  
   
Challenges 
 
 This argument has two prima facie problems. The first concerns balancing the 
autonomy of different groups. The second concerns whether an individual is truly 
consenting to their political context. The exercise of self-determination by a group may 
reduce the autonomy of the rest of the population of the territory in question. This impact 
would be most extreme in the case of secession. Yet it can also be relevant to more 
limited exercises of self-determination. The demand for self-determination on the part of 
indigenous Canadians in response to the Trudeau reforms, for example, represented a 
denial of a market to other Canadians. The land controlled by the tribal councils would 
not become freely alienable even for a fair price.463  
 Respecting the right to self-determination requires balancing the interests of 
different groups. 464 Indeed, balancing the interests of the different groups, to which 
individuals identify as members, is an aspect of respecting the political autonomy of 
individual. Almost every significant action represents the denial of an opportunity to 
someone else, even if only indirectly. If I eat a piece of toast then the opportunity to eat 
that toast has been denied to my companions at breakfast (and, indeed, to the rest of the 
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world). The application of rights generally involves striking a balance between 
competing interests. In Reference Re secession of Quebec465 the court balanced the right 
of the Quebecois to self-determination with the right of the Canadian people, as whole, 
to territorial integrity, along with a range of economic, social and cultural rights. In that 
case, the latter bundle of rights outweighed the former. In the Namibia case, 
representatives of the Namibian people argued that Namibia should be permitted to 
secede from South African control. In doing so, they relied on the right to self-
determination. The South African government, responding, also relied on the right to 
self-determination. The South African government argued that the status of Namibia was 
an internal issue, invoking the presumption of non-intervention contained in the right. 
The International Court of Justice held that both parties could rely on the right to self-
determination. Yet the balance of their competing interests fell in favour of Namibia.466  
 The second problem is one of consent. Most individuals have no say in the 
political status of their territory. Once established, even democratic states rarely check to 
ensure that their citizens still support the existing political status of the territory in 
question. Self-determination is only referred to when someone challenges the status quo.  
 Locke argued that we accept our social and political context simply by engaging 
with society as we find it.467 This seems to set a high bar that must be cleared to signal 
one's rejection. Can an individual only express dissent from the political status of her 
territory by completely refusing to engage with society? Construing the issue this way, 
however misunderstands the nature of self-determination. If individuals wish to 
collectively express dissent from the status quo then they can rely on their right to self-
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determination. This happens even in established democracies. In the UK, the 
overwhelming support for limited self-government in Scotland by the Scottish people 
was respected when Parliament passed the Scotland Act 1999 establishing a devolved 
government468. The UN Human Rights Committee has looked with scepticism on 
individuals who attempt to base their claims in self-determination. Yet it is much more 
generous when the applicant represents a number of individuals acting collectively.469  
 
The Hayekian Case 
 
 The importance of political autonomy can be further demonstrated by returning to 
the argumentum a fortiori exercise undertaken in the last chapter. Justifying a class of 
interests from an actively hostile perspective provides the strongest demonstration that 
the case can be understood from non-sympathetic perspectives. In the previous chapter I 
made the case for solidarity rights from the (hostile) perspective of Hayekian political 
theory. That case can be applied to the right to self-determination. Political autonomy 
can be understood as important from the Hayekian perspective. Autonomy is necessary 
to set general rules that maximise freedom and minimise coercion.  
Hayek and Friedman aim to minimise coercion of individuals and groups.470 
Coercion can be both direct, involving physical force, or indirect, privileging certain 
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groups ahead of others by means other than the free market.471 Yet a Hayekian society 
still requires restrictions on action. Friedman notes that a society with no coercive rules 
is likely to facilitate the coercion of the weak by the strong472 Societies must, therefore, 
impose certain restrictions on the liberty of individuals to preserve greater liberty 
overall.473 In an ideal world, the free market would play this role. It is the least coercive 
mechanism of social organisation because it "permits unanimity without conformity".474 
The free market, however, is not a universally applicable solution. It is important that the 
market has certain rules on which all participants agree.475 These rules don't pre-exist the 
market: someone must create them and that person or institution must have sufficient 
legitimacy that her creation, the market and its rules, is respected. It is unlikely that 
unanimity will be achieved on every rule so there must be a force that can enforce the 
rules.476  
Political autonomy ensures that, when a society creates general rules, it does so in 
the least coercive manner possible. If every member of society has a voice in the political 
structure, as required by political autonomy then coercion is minimised because the 
power of the state is regulated by the will of the electorate. Further, political autonomy 
requires that the state is accountable in all its dealings, not merely during elections. 
When states take measures to enforce the rules of the market, therefore, those measures 
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are likely to be the least coercive overall because the state remains accountable to its 
citizens.477  
Special treatment of any group is coercive towards all others. Some would argue, 
however, that self-determination requires special treatment for certain groups. When it 
abandoned the Trudeau reforms, the Canadian government gave indigenous citizens 
special treatment by allowing them to apply property rights478 and systems of 
governance479 that the majority of Canadians were not permitted.480 This disadvantaged 
the majority of Canadians. It denied them, for example, the commercial opportunities 
that would have resulted from the alienability of indigenous land.481  
 Hayek is also critical of democracies in which the government wins a majority by 
making promises to specific groups to win their loyalty, rather than by proposing policies 
with general popular benefit.482 It makes governments beholden to interest groups, and 
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thus compromises their incentive to represent rather the whole electorate. Laws become 
arbitrary and narrow rather than general, predictable and suitable for equal application to 
all. When a government ceases to make general and predictable rules, it becomes 
coercive the populace cannot engage with each other on equal terms.483 Special provision 
for indigenous Canadians, justified by self-determination, seems like special treatment 
along these lines.  
 In order to apply general rules, however, an executive may have to take different 
action in different contexts.484 This is the case for political autonomy. The general rule 
requires context-appropriate action in order for it to be realised. In the case of the 
Trudeau reforms, the government took specific action to protect some particular customs 
which meant preserving different institutions for indigenous and non-indigenous 
Canadians.485 In Kitok v Sweden it was the protection of hunting rights,486 in Gerhardy v 
Brown it was the exclusive use of a piece of land.487 These differing actions were all 
intended to achieve the same general goal: preserving the political autonomy of all 
individuals to the greatest extent possible.  
 Respect for political autonomy, including the autonomy to identify with and live 
according to structures associated with diverse cultures, facilitates greater innovation 
overall. Friedman does not consider self-determination in international relations. It is, 
however, a necessary prior assumption for his ideas to be meaningful. Both Friedman 
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and Hayek prescribe a certain form of society. They thus assume that the right of a 
people to determine the political status of a territory exists. 
Hayek values cultural diversity. He argues that history, language and culture are 
the basis for the development of morality and reason itself:488 
"Culture is neither natural nor artificial, neither generically transmitted nor 
rationally designed. It is a tradition of learned rules of conduct which have never 
been 'invented' and whose functions the acting individuals usually do not 
understand. There is surely as much justification to speak of the wisdom of 
culture as of the wisdom of nature - except perhaps that because of the powers of 
government, errors of the former are less easily corrected."489  
Hayek goes further, asserting that culture teaches us to reason and reason itself is the 
product of a collectiveness consciousness, the sum of our social and cultural experience. 
For Hayek: "Man did not adopt new rules because he was intelligent. He became 
intelligent by submitting to new rules of conduct...",490 furthermore, "…mind can exist 
only as part of another independently existing distinct structure or order, though that 
order persists and can develop only because millions of minds constantly absorb and 
modify part of it."491  
If, for Hayek, culture is essential for the development of reason then it must be 
protected. It seems rational to extend this line of reason to say that multiple cultures are 
necessary for the Hayekian world. Hayek and Friedman support the competition of 
differing viewpoints and perspectives, with as few restrictions as possible on speech and 
                                                          
488 Hayek, n. 471, pp. 153-177 
489 Ibid, p. 155 
490 Hayek, n. 471, p. 163 
491 Ibid, p. 157 
 164 
expression.492 Ideas, like products in the marketplace, must compete. The best way to 
determine between them is to see which succeeds in the "market" of public debate. If 
reason is the product of society then a world with a wide array of different societies is a 
world with a richer market of ideas and, thus, a higher quality of reason.  
 Political autonomy means that societies and cultures are protected. This is 
different from enshrining outdated practices (something of which Hayekians would not 
approve) in law. Autonomy comes from the recognition that culture is an evolution, not a 
description of community practice at a fixed point in time. In the Mashpee case in Maine, 
the applicants sought to protect a culture that was a hybrid of multiple inputs, developed 
over time, and with the potential to develop further.493 In Quebec, the Canadian Supreme 
Court recognised that the Canadian state had taken extensive measures to facilitate the 
expression of a set of cultural practices but of Quebecois culture as an organic, evolving 
reality.494 For both Hayek and Friedman, autonomy facilitates the ideal society. It 
therefore seems reasonable to conclude that politically autonomy is sufficiently 




Beitz’s model requires that an urgent interest be faced by a standard threat. Self-
determination responds to the threat of the domination of a group by another group or 
institution. The idea of self-determination predates the Practice. In the second half of the 
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18th century, revolutionaries in France495 and the (then) British colonies in America496 
based their arguments on the right of a self-identifying people to govern its own territory. 
In France, the advocates of self-determination responded to domination by an absolutist 
monarchy.497 In the USA, the Founding Fathers advanced the idea of self-determination 
to respond to British domination.498 In practice, the “self-determination” asserted by 
revolutionary France often meant that regions of metropolitan France were merely given 
a choice between becoming a French domain “voluntarily” or being invaded.499 The 
American experience, however, was the first time in modern history that individuals 
collectively asserted their right to political autonomy and were subsequently accepted 
into the international community.500 
 It was an American president, Woodrow Wilson, who first introduced the idea of 
self-determination as a de jure, or treaty based, aspect of international law.501 Wilson 
advocated for the inclusion of a right to self-determination in the Treaty of Versailles. 
Wilson’s construction of self-determination focused on minor European territories, such 
as Schleswig, under the domination of European “Great Powers”.502 Wilson only 
partially succeeded in inserting the principle into the text. He was, however, more 
successful in establishing a new standard for state practice.503 Between 1919 and 1939 
the behaviour of states in international relations increasingly recognised the importance 
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of political autonomy and acted to minimise domination within Europe.504 In the 
aftermath of the First World War it fell to the newly formed League of Nations to 
adjudicate international disputes. Many disputes concerned the territories which had 
formerly been part of the European empires that had belonged to the powers on the 
losing side in the First World War. After the war, the citizens living in these territories 
demanded greater political autonomy. The response of the international community was 
different from that of the pre-war years. Before the First World War, the political status 
of citizens within a territory was largely subject to the interests of the most powerful 
nations. Individuals in contested territories would almost inevitably suffer domination by 
one power or another. States did not abide by coherent abstract norms in international 
relations, they pursued their short-term national interest.505 In the inter-war years, the 
League of Nations began to develop a set of norms (albeit not applied consistently) 
which gave the citizens of a particular territory a voice in determining its political status, 
thus limiting domination by the great powers.  
 The political status of Schleswig, for example, had previously been determined 
by a series of wars between Prussia and Denmark. The territory and its citizens had thus 
been alternatively dominated by two larger powers for almost a century.506 In 1920 it was 
determined by a plebiscite. For the first time in history, the citizens of the territory were 
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consulted as to which state they would prefer to belong.507 Similar measures were taken 
in the case of the Aarland Islands in 1920508 and Upper Silesia in 1921.509 This was by 
no means self-determination as it is understood by the modern Practice. The citizens 
involved were only able to determine their political status insofar as they could choose 
which state they would join. There was no suggestion that they might exist as an 
independent state in themselves.510 Furthermore, this limited principle of self-
determination was selectively applied. Citizens in Europe were often granted plebiscites. 
The inhabitants of the vast African and Asian empires commanded by European states 
were, however, never consulted as to their preferred political status.511 When the 
indigenous inhabitants of the UK’s Indian empire demanded political autonomy, their 
requests were stalled, repressed or ignored.512 This period is nevertheless significant in 
establishing a state practice in which the external political status of (certain) territories 
was determined (to an extent) by the inhabitants of the territory themselves. For the first 
time, international relations began to recognise the standard threat of domination of one 
people by another. The right to self-determination continues to protect the political 
autonomy of individuals from domination by other states, groups or institutions.  
 
Reasonable Effect  
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Under the third Beitz criterion the rights mechanism must be reasonably effective 
at protecting the interest. The right to self-determination is reasonably effective in 
protecting political autonomy against the threat of domination. As a solidarity right, it 
provides for both outward-facing and inward-facing duties, thus protecting individuals 
from domination by another group or state and domination by their own group or state. 
The outward-facing duty is often described as the “external limb” or “external self-
determination”.513 It obliges states to respect the territorial integrity of other states and to 
facilitate the development of new states in accordance with international law. The 
inward-facing duty is often called the “internal limb” or “internal self-determination”.514 
It obliges states to refrain from excluding groups within their own borders from 
participation in the polity, refrain from measures that will eliminate cultural structures 
and practices that deviate from those of the majority, and take measures to ensure that 
non-state actors do not exclude or eliminate non-majority groups. The external limb 
protects individuals from domination by another group or state. The internal limb 
protects individuals from domination by their own group or state.  
Most states contain more than one self-identifying political group, and it is rarely 
possible to give each group its own state. Sometimes individuals identify as belonging to 
more than one group. The inward-facing duty thus can also involve measures to balance 
the self-determination claims of different groups within the same territory. It provides for 
a duty to ensure that all individuals are broadly consulted in the governance of the state 
and that the exercise of external self-determination is conducted with the consent of the 
individuals involved. These duties can be enforced through both legal and political 
mechanisms.  
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 External self-determination imposes a duty on states to refrain from dominating 
groups or polities outside their borders. This protects the political autonomy of 
individuals from domination by another group or state. The right to self-determination 
has, at its foundation, the principle of territorial integrity.515 Self-determination is 
meaningless without the guarantee that the borders of the territory in question will be 
respected once its political status has been determined. The importance of territorial 
integrity was affirmed in the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial 
Peoples516 and Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. This means that the right to self-
determination does not provide for an automatic right to secession. Secession is a 
possible remedy. It is only available, however, in the most cases of gross and systematic 
abuse.517 It is possible, in most cases, to respect the political autonomy of individuals 
without permitting their group to set up its own state. In the Quebec case the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that there is no prima facie right to secession in international 
law.518 
 Self-determination can be realised within the borders of the existing state. The 
Quebec case represents an instance of a duty of non-discrimination being effectively 
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respected. The Canadian Supreme Court found that legal protections for Quebequois 
culture and institutions, along with free and equal access to the government of Canada, 
were sufficient to realise Quebec's right to self-determination.519 The Canadian Supreme 
Court's decision can be compared with the African Commission's in KPC v Zaire.520 In 
that case, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights held that secession is a 
legitimate remedy if the right to self-determination has been egregiously violated (such 
as by state oppression of the people in question). The Canadian court found that that the 
Canadian government had not violated the Quebecois right to self-determination. Rather, 
it had actively taken measures to ensure it was realised.521 In KPC the African 
Commission came to a similar decision. Although the members of the Katangese People 
had a right to self-determination, it was not necessary for them to secede from Zaire in 
order for it to be realised. In both cases, secession was a possible remedy but was found 
to be unnecessary because the claimant’s political autonomy could be protected without 
violating the territorial integrity of the polities involved.522  
The African Commission has indicated that states should take specific measures 
to protect the political autonomy of individuals who identify as members of particular 
groups. It relied on the right to self-determination in, for example, protecting the political 
autonomy of members of the Yoruba people in Nigeria by, inter alia, implying a duty to 
protect the institution of chieftaincy in local government.523 In this way, the members of 
the Yoruba people were given a voice in choosing the political structure by which they 
were to be governed. Their political autonomy was, in this matter, preserved. 
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 The Quebec case also demonstrates how self-determination can apply to non-
homogenous states. Self-determination does not require that each group has its own state. 
A state may fulfil its duty to prevent domination if it takes reasonable measures to 
facilitate and respect all political identities within its borders in preserving and 
developing their customs and identity as peoples. The Canadian government took steps 
to do this in Quebec. The court therefore held that the Quebecois’ right to self-
determination was adequately respected within a non-homogenous state. 
 Self-determination is not an absolute right. Preserving political autonomy 
requires balancing the interests of all members of society. In states with multiple groups, 
the self-determination of one group must be balanced the rights of members of other 
groups. In the Quebec case, the court balanced the right of the Quebecois, to determine 
the political status of their territory by establishing an independent state, against the 
right, of Canadians as a whole, to continue to determine the status of their polity by 
maintaining its territorial integrity. The balance fell in favour of the latter. Membership 
of a federal Canadian state was not considered an infringement of sufficient severity to 
justify the, more significant, harm of violating the Canadian people’s territorial integrity.  
External self-determination is justiciable in international law. Individuals, self-
identifying groups, or institutions524 can thus use the international legal system to 
petition for protections for their members’ political autonomy and compel states to 
reduce or address domination. The right was first recognised as a universal human right 
in the UN Charter. In that document self-determination is described as the basis for 
relations between states.525 It further became part of treaty law with its inclusion as joint 
Art. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.526 The first section of Art. 1 
provides for the protection of the interest of a people in the determination of its own 
political status and pursuit of “economic, social and cultural development”. It implies a 
first-level duty upon member states to refrain from taking action that unreasonably 
compromises these interests. The second section qualifies the right by making it subject 
to existing international obligations and international law. Concessions of sovereignty, 
freely made as part of a treaty, do not constitute a violation of self-determination. This is 
an important qualification because, without it, any international effort to protect human 
rights through international treaties or intervention could be construed as violating the 
right to self-determination. The third section provides for the second-level duty to 
promote respect for the right, “in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations”. In effect, this provides for the international community to intervene, 
through the United Nations, should a state fail to perform its first-level duties 
In addition to being enshrined in treaty law, external self-determination is a 
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens). The Declaration on Friendly 
Relations Between Peoples527 and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Peoples528 both describe the right to self-determination as a “fundamental” 
aspect of international law. The inclusion of self-determination in General Assembly 
resolutions does not, in itself, establish self-determination as anything more than a 
principle of which the UN approves. The declarations, however, purport to describe 
existing state practice. Neither declaration asserts self-determination as a new addition to 
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international law, but as an existing fundamental pillar. The Declaration on Friendly 
Relations is explicitly presented as a statement of existing international law. Both 
declarations refer to self-determination as an existing principle, on which they build 
further arguments. The majority of states thereby accept self-determination as a norm of 
international law.  
The UK and USA initially advocated a more limited right.529 Although this 
doesn't affect the nature of self-determination as a matter of treaty law, it is more 
difficult to describe it as state practice or jus cogens without the assent of two states with 
significant influence in international politics. Both states have, however, since asserted 
that they consider self-determination, in both external and internal aspects, to be jus 
cogens530. The jus cogens status of self-determination was affirmed by members of the 
International Court of Justice in its ruling in the Namibia case.531 In that case the 
International Court of Justice held that, although self-determination was enshrined in the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, it had authority independent of these treaties, as 
a peremptory norm of international law.532 
 After its recognition in the UN Charter, the right to self-determination was 
primarily referred to in the context of de-colonisation relating, in particular, to the “salt 
water decolonisation”. Citizens of European colonies relied on self-determination to 
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assert their independence from their former colonial masters.533 Initial decolonisation 
claims were restricted to overseas territories. As a result, Warsaw Pact states and former 
colonies, facing demands for self-determination from minorities within their own 
borders, argued that self-determination only applied to the overseas colonies of the 
European states that had built colonial empires in the 19th Century. Once the right had 
been exercised and the former colonial power had withdrawn then it was exhausted534. 
The salt water construction is similar to the colonial interpretation.535 It would thus only 
effectively protect political autonomy in a small subset of circumstances. 
The colonial interpretation does not, however, reflect the manner that self-
determination takes effect in the Practice. External self-determination is a universal and 
continuing right.536 It is held by all individuals at all times and is not restricted to “salt 
water” cases, in which the territory claiming self-determination is geographically 
separate from the metropolitan power. It is thus more than a remedy for a specific 
grievance. Western states including, inter alia, the UK,537 USA,538 the Netherlands539 
and Austria540 have adopted the latter construction. A wider acceptance of the 
“continuing” construction is implied by the description of the right in the Algiers 
                                                          
533 Cassese, n. 78, pp. 71-88 
534 Ibid, pp. 101 
535 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self Determination: Moral Foundations for International 
Law, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 331-400 While a case could be made that almost every 
state “persecutes” a certain section of its population, it seems Buchannan sets a high bar to describe an 
action as “persecution”. Otherwise his thesis would mean very little as it would, in practice, allow self-
determination to be construed as equivalent to a continuing right.  
536 Cassese, n. 78, p. 206 
537 See remarks by the UK Delegate to the UN General Assembly Third Committee, BYIL, (1984), p. 432 
538 See remarks of the US Delegate to the UN General Assembly Third Committee in 1972, US Digest, 
(1974), p. 48 
539 See NYIL, 1977, p. 160 
540 Report of the Human Rights Committee to the G. A., 1988, UN Doc. A/43/40, para. 14 
 175 
Declaration on the Rights of Peoples.541 This is not a treaty. It was not made between 
states, but between statesmen and women, intellectuals, and the leaders of NGOs, all 
acting in a personal capacity. It is nevertheless a persuasive description of the existing 
law of self-determination because the framers, although acting in a personal capacity, 
represented a cross section of the international legal and political elite.542 The UN Third 
Committee expressed a similar construction of self-determination, arguing that it was not 
a "one off exercise" but must be "continually established".543 
 The “continuing” construction is reflected in the application of self-determination 
by international tribunals. On the break-up of Yugoslavia, its constituent states asserted 
their right to self-determination. The Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission recognised the 
legality of the claim.544 Shortly after, Kosovo asserted its independence from Serbia. If 
self-determination were an extinguishable right, then it would have been extinguished 
when Serbia won independence from Yugoslavia. Yet the international community 
recognised Kosovo's exercise of the right.545 This indicates that the right to self-
determination remains in existence for all individuals at all times. Individuals may, in 
certain circumstances, establish a new political entity if the one of which it was 
previously a part fails to provide for their political autonomy. The citizens of Serbia had 
the right to self-determination when they were citizens of Yugoslavia. When that state 
failed to provide for their political autonomy they were able to rely on the right to self-
determination to make their remedy, forming a new state, legitimate in the eyes of the 
international community. The international community was obliged, by its duty under the 
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right, to recognise the new state. This did not, however, extinguish the right to self-
determination. The Serbian state failed to provide for the Kosovar peoples’ political 
autonomy. Those who identified as Kosovans therefore relied on the right to self-
determination to legitimately secede from Serbia. The people of Kosovo were able to 
refer to an existing right in order to justify their secession. Their right to self-
determination had not been exhausted when they seceded from Yugoslavia as part of 
Serbia.  
 The continuing interpretation can also be reconciled with the principle of uti 
possidetis. It seems, prima facie, that the principle is more coherent with the colonial 
interpretation: when a territory exercises self-determination to become an independent 
state, it inherits its former colonial borders. Post-colonial or secessionist states may, 
however, decide to alter their borders by mutual agreement. Such agreements can be 
made at the behest of groups seeking to alter the political status of their territory. This 
was confirmed by the Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission.546 The Commission 
reconciled the continuing interpretation of self-determination with the principle of uti 
possidetis,547 holding that the borders of a new state could be altered with the agreement 
of the parties concerned. A group may, therefore, secede from a state that has, itself, 
thrown off colonial domination and establish a new state within the principle of uti 
possidetis.548 
Some African states have been reluctant to embrace the "continuing" 
interpretation of self-determination.549 In general, however, state practice within that 
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region demonstrates an implicit acceptance. Sudan had exerted its right to independence 
from its colonial occupier (the UK) in 1956. However, in 2011, South Sudan was able to 
secede from the rest of Sudan and established itself as an independent state, recognised 
by the international community550. The “continuing” interpretation was affirmed by the 
African Commission in KPC. In that case, the Commission based its authority on the 
existing right to self-determination in the African Charter and the Conventions. But the 
African Commission went further than merely affirming the right in a general manner. It 
held that, if the Art. 1 right was infringed in a particularly egregious manner,551 this 
meant the right could be directly exercised to justify secession.552 The Commission did 
not limit to remedy of secession to a “once only” use. To do so would run contrary to the 
principle behind its decision. If the remedy of secession becomes available, under the 
right to self-determination, in response to egregious abuse of human rights, then it must 
always become it must always become available in cases that meet these criteria. If it is 
only available after the first egregious abuse, then the successor state would not be held 
accountable to the same degree as the original state. To avoid such an absurd conclusion, 
it is better to construe secession, under the right to self-determination, as available in 
response to egregious violations of rights regardless of whether the state committing 
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Internal self-determination protects the political autonomy of individuals from 
domination by their own group or state. External self-determination can be legitimately 
exercised only if to do so is in line with the freely expressed will of the individuals in the 
territory concerned.553 This preserves the political autonomy of the individuals by giving 
all members of a polity a voice in determining its political status. Individuals thus have a 
voice in determining the political nature of their polity. Internal self-determination also 
requires that members of the polity be involved in its government on a day-to-day basis. 
The combination of the internal and external limbs of self-determination ensures that the 
political autonomy of individuals is protected from domination from other states and 
from domination by their own group or state.  
Internal self-determination requires that the members of the polity must be (a) 
consulted, usually in a referendum or election, and (b) clearly express a desire to 
determine the political status of their territory in a manner different from the status 
quo554. The new political entity will not be recognised in international law unless it is 
governed by institutions that ensure that all citizens, and if necessary every people, 
within that territory, can play an equal part in the government.555  
Not every state that is accepted as part of the international community is 
governed democratically. Many states deny certain groups access to the institutions of 
government. The internal limb of self-determination is nonetheless recognised by judges 
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in both international556 and domestic courts,557 political officials,558 and scholars559. The 
challenge becomes distinguishing between genuine custom (albeit custom that is often 
violated) and mere aspiration or assertion. Self-determination is a norm that states apply 
when they are explicitly acting in accordance with international law. When it is 
apparently breached (such as in the case of China which consistently ignores Tibet’s 
demands for self-determination560) the breach is often explicitly excused in rights 
language, and states that do respect human rights, or that claim to interpret human rights 
differently, offer an explanation for their engagement with the offender (generally public 
policy, economics or the need to encourage the state in question to “mend its ways” 
through “engagement”561). Even in breach, the norm is thus recognised. States recognise 
the norm when they offer an explanation for their failure to respect the duties for which it 
provides.562 Put another way, the norm is recognised in opinio juris.563 States recognise 
that they are acting in accordance with international law when the act in accordance with 
the norm. When states act in contravention of the norm they must justify their actions 
                                                          
556 Namibia, JCJ Reports (1971), separate (concurring) opinion of Vice President Ammoun, p. 51  
557 For example, in the UK, R. (on the application of Misick) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 1039 (Admin) 
558 1979 Memo from legal advisor to Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan was contrary to SD which was regarded as a peremptory norm of international 
law. In Cassese, n. 78, p. 136 
559 For example, Ibid, p. 1 
560 See Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama, (Oakland, 
California; University of California Press, 1997) 
561 See James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to 
Clinton, (New York; Taylor and Francis, 1998), pp. 4-10 
562 See discussion of the Opinio Juris principle in Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Norms as Customary International Law, (Ocford; Clarendon, 1989), pp. 41-61 
563 See Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., “The Degrees of self-determination in International Law”, 88 AJIL 2 (1994), 
pp. 304-310 
 180 
using rights language because they understand that they are otherwise acting outside 
international law.  
It is clear that internal self-determination is recognised as a check on external 
self-determination in both treaty-based and customary international law. In Western 
Sahara, the ICJ held that self-determination required paying regard to the “freely 
expressed will of peoples”.564 The importance of internal self-determination to the 
legitimacy of an act of external self-determination is clearly demonstrated by state 
practice. When the League of Nations supervised the exercise of self-determination in 
Silesia, Schleswig and the Aaland Islands, it did so by means of a referendum.565 The 
citizens were consulted. As the right evolved it has become necessary, not merely for the 
people to be consulted democratically, but for them to be involved in government after 
the secession has been achieved. The Baltic States seceding from the Soviet Union and 
Balkan States seceding from Yugoslavia based their claims for legitimacy on referenda 
or popular acclaim and their intention to govern themselves democratically.566 The 
people of South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to secede and subsequently established 
their own, democratic, government.567 In Bangladesh, although no referendum was held, 
its secession was triggered by the election of a government on a platform of demanding 
greater self-determination.568  
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The necessity of a democratic approach to external self-determination was 
recognised by the International Commission of Jurists in their report on East Pakistan.569 
The Commission found that citizens could only exercise their right to self-determination, 
and subsequently be recognised as a state, if each people in the new entity was able to 
work together “to form a new association endowed with democratic associations of their 
choice.”570  
Internal self-determination can create an incentive for dominating powers to 
populate areas with members of the dominant majority to avoid calls for secession or 
greater autonomy from homogeneous territories.571 This practice, in fact, indicates a 
recognition of self-determination as a norm of international law. In taking action, albeit 
action that is morally (and possibly legally) reprehensible, to avoid a claim based on self-
determination, the dominant state is recognising the legitimacy of the norm and seeking 
to subvert it. If the dominant power did not recognise the legitimacy of internal self-
determination it would simply reject claims based on the right to self-determination 
outright.  
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In summary, internal self-determination requires that a people be governed by a 
representative government from which no subset of the population of the territory is 
unreasonably excluded. There are three qualifications to this: (i.) All citizens must be 
involved in government across a broad range of issues, it is not enough that only “some” 
government is representative. (ii.) Citizens who identify as members of different groups 
in composite territories must be given a measure of autonomy sufficient for them to 
continue to exist according to the culture with which they identify (although without the 
need for secession). (iii.) Internal self-determination must not be used to disenfranchise 
the individuals in question in relation to the national government.572 
 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination addressed the 
extent of the requirements of internal self-determination. It found that it included the 
“rights of all peoples to pursue their economic, social and cultural development without 
outside interference”.573 When combined with the requirements described in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations574 and Helsinki Final Act,575 this indicates that 
representative government must spread across a broad range of public policy areas. This 
interpretation was applied in the South Tyrol/Alto Adige576 dispute. The UN resolution 
addressing the dispute provided that citizens, who identify as sub-groups within larger 
composite territories, cannot necessarily access the remedy of secession. Yet they may 
                                                          
572 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Namibia), (1970) JCJ Reports (1971) 
573 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, "General Recommendation XXI on the right to 
" 15 March 1996, Reprinted in "Compilation of Comments and General recommendations" p. 212, para. 4 
574 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 
1970, A/RES/2625(XXV), p. 8 available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda1f104.html [accessed 17 
October 2015] 
575 Cassese, n. 78, p. 111 
576 G.A. Res 1497(XV) and 1661(XVI) 1960 and 61 
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be granted “complete autonomy” in matters concerning their cultural development.577 
Group autonomy and participation in the government of the wider territory should not be 
considered mutually exclusive. In its resolution on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, 
the UN made it clear that government by a minority cannot be justified by arguments 
about the preservation of cultural traditions.578 The South African government argued 
that segregation and minority rule was necessary to preserve the different cultures of the 
black majority and white minority.579 This argument was rejected by the UN.  
The internal limb of self-determination was first explicitly recognised in 
international law in the UN Charter. Art. 1 of the Charter provides that self-
determination is the basis for friendly relations amongst nations. It states that “equal 
rights… of peoples” is a basis for friendly relations of equal importance to self-
determination,580 the manner in which such rights must take effect is ambivalent. It does 
not, however, state explicitly that states must be governed democratically. The UN 
Charter is clearer about the importance of democracy in the sections that deal with the 
trusteeship system. Those sections provide that a trustee is responsible for overseeing the 
development of a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The Charter refers to territories which 
have not “yet” achieved a full measure of self-governance, implying that self-
determination is the ultimate goal for all territories.581 The Charter mandates that trustees 
“develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples 
                                                          
577 G.A. Res 1497(XV) and 1661(XVI) 1960 and 61  
578 E.g. GA Res. 31/154 A 20 Dec 1976 (UN Ybk, 1976, 158-9) and SC Res 417, 31 Oct 1977 (UN Ybk, 
1977, 161-2)  
579 Herman Giliomee, “The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 1929-1948”, 29 Journal of South African 
Studies 2 (2003), pp. 373-392 
580 UN Charter, Art. 1(2),  
581 UN Charter, Art. 73(b),  
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and to assist them in the progressive development of their political institutions.”582 This 
implies that progress towards self-government and progress towards democratic self-
government are inseparable.  
The de jure force of internal self-determination was restated in the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations which provides that states “conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” will be “possessed of a 
government representing the whole people of a territory without distinction as to race 
creed or colour.”583 There are two important aspects to this provision. The first is that it 
mandates that a state that respects self-determination must have a representative 
government. The second this that it must represent the whole people “without regard to 
race, creed or colour”. It could be argued that final clause limits those preceding it. 
Under this interpretation, internal self-determination only prohibits exclusion from 
representative government on grounds of race, creed, or colour. Exclusion on other 
grounds, even unreasonable grounds, does not fall within the prohibition. Such an 
interpretation, however, is not accurate. In the first instance, it would be almost 
impossible for a government to “represent the whole people” if it made distinction based 
on any unreasonable characteristic. A state that excludes any class of citizen584 is, by 
definition, not representative of the whole people.585 The internal limb of self-
                                                          
582UN Charter, Art. 78 
583 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 
1970, A/RES/2625(XXV), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda1f104.html [accessed 17 
October 2015]; p. 8 
584 With the exception of states that exclude certain classes of citizens from the government with a 
reasonable justification, such as the necessity of achieving the age of majority before voting. 
585 For Cassese, the additional clause was added because these were the most common distinctions made at 
the time and thus the framers considered it necessary to give them special emphasis. (Cassese, n. 78, p. 
114) 
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determination expounded in the Declaration on Friendly Relations was subsequently 
affirmed in the Helsinki Final Act586 and the Vienna Declaration.587 The Helsinki Final 
Act explicitly emphasises the two limbs of self-determination, providing that:  
“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they 
wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and 
to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural 
development.”588 
 The recognition of internal self-determination has moved beyond declarations 
and is now, like external self-determination, considered jus cogens. This is clear from 
both state practice and jurisprudence. The majority of regional organisations, including 
the EU, AU, OAS and OSCE formally require democratic government as a condition of 
membership589. In practice, this requirement is often breached. Yet its formal inclusion 
indicates that states view democratic government as the standard that international law 
requires. When these organisations admit states that are not fully democratic the treaties 
which require the norm are not changed. This indicates that admitting non-democratic 
states represents a failure to conform to the norms of international law, not an 
abandonment of those norms. The General Assembly Resolution on Southern Rhodesia 
                                                          
586 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act of Helsinki, Art. VIII, 1 August 1975, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dde4f9b4.html [accessed 23 October 2015] 
587 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 
1993, A/CONF.157/23, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39ec.html [accessed 24 October 
2015] 
588 Helsinki Final Act, Art. VIII (2) 
589 Wheatley, n. 501, p. 128 
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and South Africa affirmed internal self-determination as norm of international law.590 
This is significant because the resolution was supported by a number of states which, at 
the time, were friendly towards South Africa and Rhodesia. This indicates that internal 
self-determination enjoys acceptance almost universally. This was recognised by the 
International Court of Justice in Western Sahara591 and the Yugoslavia Arbitration 
Commission, which held that internal self-determination is a peremptory norm of 
international law.592  
 In summary, both the external and internal limbs of self-determination are 
peremptory norms of international law. In the Practice, the right to self-determination 
responds effectively to the standard threat of the domination.593 The external limb of 
self-determination protects individuals from domination by another group or state. The 
internal limb protects individuals from domination by their own group or state. The right 
                                                          
590 GA Res on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa e.g. GA Res. 31/154 A 20 Dec 1976 (UN Ybk, 1976, 
158-9) and SC Res 417, 31 Oct 1977 (UN Ybk, 1977, 161-2)  
591 ICJ Rep 12, ICGJ 214 (ICJ 1975), 16th October 1975, paras. 58 and 59 
59231 ILM (1992) 1488, Opinion No. 1, 
593 It has been suggested that self-determination should not be described as a "right" because it is not 
justiciable at international level593. In the Lubicon Lake Band case the UN Human Rights Committee held 
that it would not rule on group rights because it was too difficult to identify a claimant (see Bernard 
Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, 10 May 1990, para. 2.1). However, the HRC is willing to rule on group rights 
when construed in conjunction with individual rights. In the case of the Lubicon Band the committee was 
effectively ruled on a group right by construing it in conjunction with Art. 17 and ruling on the facts. In the 
Norway case it relied on self-determination alone to protect the hunting rights of the Sami people (see UN 
Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on Norway, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Ass. 112, 1 
November 1999, para. 10). In addition, other courts clearly consider the right justiciable. The ICJ has 
applied the right in Namibia and in Western Sahara, and the African Commission regularly applies the 
right. Indeed in Mpaka-Nsusu v Republic of Congo (Zaire)(see African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, Comm. 157/1983, 26th March 1983) it explicitly asserted that it considered "group rights" 
like self-determination justiciable.  
 187 
to self-determination thus protects the urgent, common-good interest in political 




 Beitz’s model requires that, for an interest to be recognised as a right, it must be 
urgent, faced with a standard threat and able to be protected to reasonable effect by the 
rights mechanism. Furthermore, this case must be understandable from both sympathetic 
and non-sympathetic perspectives. In this chapter I have argued that the right to self-
determination meets that test. The right to self-determination protects the individual 
interest in political autonomy. It responds to the standard threat of dominance by one 
group or state over another. It protects the interest in political autonomy to reasonable 
effect through both treaty law and as a peremptory norm of international law.  
                                                          
594 Jan Klabbers has argued that self-determination has been “watered down” to the level of a “procedural 
guarantee” by the courts (see Jan Klabbers, "The Right to Be Taken Seriously: Self Determination and 
International Law", 28 H.R.Q. 1 (2006) pp. 186-20). For him, self-determination is simply too “big” an 
issue for the courts to handle. It should instead be considered a political principle594. There are two 
problems with this position. The first is that international courts and tribunals have not treated self-
determination in the manner described by Klabbers, as can be seen from the above discussion. The second 
is that all human rights are, in their most basic form, political principles. They differ from other political 
principles because they particularly urgent, and so given greater authority by recognition them as “human 
rights” in international law. Rights have both legal impact and persuasive impact. In the latter context they 
take effect as a means of asserting political pressure on recalcitrant states and as a guideline for other 
states. It is undeniable that self-determination has a persuasive impact. A number of recent instances of the 
right being exercised did not involve any specific legal claim for self-determination (Such as South Sudan, 
the Baltic states and devolution to Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish assemblies in the UK). But this does 
not mean it should not be considered a right. Klabbers claims the Western Sahara case is an example of 
self-determination being applied as a principle rather than a right (Ibid, p. 200). The court, in that case, 
used the term “principle”. But it clearly applied self-determination as a “right”. The court considered the 
relative claims of the parties, grounded their decision in existing human rights law and reached a 
conclusion based on the presumption that political autonomy will be respected. 
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The interest in political autonomy is urgent because it is integral to the effective 
functioning of individuals in society. This can be understood even from the Hayekian 
perspective, non-sympathetic to the very concept of political presumptions based on 
common-good interests, because it limits coercion. The right responds to the standard 
threat of domination by one political group of another. The rights mechanism is 
reasonably effective in protecting self-determination in imposing the outward and 
inward-facing duty to refrain from and regulate the domination of one people by another 
(external self-determination), which protects individuals from domination by a foreign 
state or group, and to involve all citizens in the governance of the state (internal self-
determination), which protects individuals from domination by their own state or group. 
The right to self-determination, therefore, meets the Beitz criteria and should be 
recognised in the Practice as a solidarity right.  
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 In this chapter, Beitz’s political approach will be applied to make the case for the 
right to a clean and healthy environment. This will demonstrate that the political 
approach can support emerging solidarity rights as well as established solidarity rights. 
The right to a clean and healthy environment is not yet justiciable in international law, 
but the common-good interest in a clean and healthy environment is nevertheless urgent, 
faced with a standard threat and can be addressed in a reasonably effective manner by the 
rights mechanism. Although the right to a clean and healthy environment remains an 
emerging right, there is thus a strong case for it to be recognised as a right in the 
Practice. 
 Environmental rights are often classed as either the right to a “clean and healthy 
environment” or human rights approaches to climate change. The former responds to 
localised pollution of water, air and land. The latter responds to the cumulative effects of 
the emission of greenhouse gasses on a global scale. This, however, is a false distinction. 
Localised pollution and climate change are two impacts of the same threat: damage to 
the environment. Climate change is, in part, the downstream impact of all localised 
pollution. Damage to the environment impacts on the same interests, whether it is caused 
by localised pollution or climate change. The jurisprudence addressing localised 
pollution is, however, far more developed than that addressing climate change. The 
discussion of the reasonable effectiveness of the right will therefore focus primarily on 
how the right addresses localised pollution. Based on this discussion, the final section 
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will offer some thoughts on how the right might evolve to address climate change in 
future.  
 This chapter will (1) consider the current state of the right to a clean and healthy 
environment at international level and the sceptical position of a number of NGOs and 
scholars. It will argue that (2) the interest in a clean and healthy environment is urgent 
and its urgency lies in intergenerational responsibility, (3) the threat to the environment 
is caused by humans and takes effect in the form of both localised pollution and climate 
change, (4) the urgency of the interest protected by the right to a clean and healthy 
environment can also be identified from the Hayekian perspective, demonstrating the 
breadth of the interest and (5) the rights mechanism is a reasonably effective at 
protecting the environment in cases of localised pollution. This will be demonstrated by 
analysing its application at regional and national levels. Finally, I will discuss (6) how 
the right could evolve to address climate change.  
 
The Current Status of the Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment 
 
 International law does not currently recognise a right to a clean and healthy 
environment. A number of inter-state bodies, multilateral agreements, courts, and 
tribunals have suggested that damage to the environment should be a human rights issue. 
Tuvalu has threatened a case against the United States in the International Court of 
Justice595 based on the right to a clean and healthy environment. Tuvalu argues that the 
USA, as the most significant contributor to climate change, has violated the rights of 
                                                          
595 Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, "Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues In Tuvalu's Threat to Sue 
the US in the ICJ", 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y 103 (2005), p. 105 
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Tuvaluan citizens who live in areas that are threatened by rising sea levels. The threat, 
thus far, not resulted in litigation.  
A number of international instruments recognise damage to the environment as a 
human rights issue. Under the Stockholm Declarations, "both aspects of man's 
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his wellbeing and the 
enjoyment of basic human rights and the right to life itself."596 The United Nations 
Human Rights Council has recognised that climate change “poses an immediate and far-
reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the 
full enjoyment of human rights”.597 A second Human Rights Council resolution states 
that human rights obligations and commitments “have the potential to inform and 
strengthen international and national policy-making in the area of climate change, 
promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes”.598 Human Rights 
Council resolutions, however, are of, at most, persuasive authority in international law. 
Given concerns about anti-western bias in the Council, even the persuasive authority of 
its pronouncements is open to question.599 
 Neither the Stockholm Declaration nor the Human Rights Council resolutions 
represent "hard law". They are therefore unenforceable between states. The multilateral 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters is, by contrast, directly enforceable 
between states. The Aarhus Convention identifies a specific right to a clean and healthy 
environment. It lays down a number of entitlements, such as public access to information 
                                                          
596 Principle 1, Stockholm Declaration, 16th June 1972 
597 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 7/231 
598 U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, in U.N. Human Rights Council, Draft Report of the Human 
Rights Council on its Tenth Session 13, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/L.11 (Mar. 31, 2009) 
599 Heinze, n. 187, and Freedman, n. 187, pp. 119-147 
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about polluters and the causes of climate change, which indicate specific steps by which 
states can respect the duty to protect the environment.600  
The signatories to the Aarhus Convention right are limited to European and Asian 
states. It would, therefore, be excessive to claim that the Convention establishes a 
justiciable right with general effect in international law. It is nevertheless a significant 
recognition that threats to the environment should be considered relevant to the Practice 
at an international level. This indicates that space exists for the international recognition 
of an effective right in the future.  
 
Scepticism about the right to environment 
 
Some scholars and NGOs are sceptical about applying the human rights 
mechanism to address damage to the environment.601 For sceptics, environmental 
problems are better dealt with through other public policy mechanisms. Recognising a 
right to a clean and healthy environment would unduly politicise the Practice. Edward 
                                                          
600 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to 
Justice on Environmental Matters, 25th June 1998, UNTS Vol. 2161, p. 447, Art. 1. Currently ratified by 
47 parties (including the EU member states and the EU in its own capacity), Art. 20(1) of the Convention 
provides for its entry into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the sixteenth instrument of 
ratification. The Convention entered into force on the 30th October 2001. The UK, on ratification, made a 
declaration stating that the right to a clean and healthy environment, contained in the declaration, was an 
aspirational rather than a justiciable right. It is not, however, clear that the UK still holds this position. No 
other contracting party joined the UK in its declaration. See discussion in Svitlana Kravchenko and John E. 
Bonine, Human Rights and the Environment: Cases, Law and Policy, (Durham, NC; Carolina Academic 
Press, 2008), p. 23 
601 The International Council on Human Rights Policy concludes that “In the absence of strong institutions, 
either at national or international level, it is not immediately obvious what human rights can add to a policy 
discussion that is already notably welfare-conscious, even if focused on the general good rather than on 
individual complaints” (ICHRP, "Human Rights and Climate Change", (New York, 2008), p. 4) 
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Cameron describes (although does not endorse) this position; "many climate change 
professionals fear that human rights can easily become politicised and controversial, 
injecting added complexity and cleavages into an already polarised global challenge”.602  
If, however, an interest otherwise satisfies the Beitz criteria, then perceived 
political controversy should not prevent it being recognised as a right. If the Practice 
only recognised interests that were politically uncontroversial, then it would not 
recognise any rights at all. Both human rights and climate change discourses are 
inevitably highly politicised. The recognition of an interest as a right represents a 
redistribution of power. Any redistribution of power will attract opposition because it 
means that someone's interests are being compromised. Powerful agents have interests in 
both human rights and climate change discourses603. Addressing climate change requires 
acting contrary to the interests of some of the most powerful multinational companies 
and political factions in the world.604 By analogy, there is significant global opposition to 
the right to freedom of expression,605 yet that is never described as "too politicised". We 
must accept that there will be always be opposition to human rights and ask, instead, 
whether the arguments in favour of the right outweigh the arguments against it. 
Opposition to an interest may indicate that it is not sufficiently urgent to be a right. We 
must evaluate the opposition arguments to determine whether they outweigh the 
arguments in favour of recognising the interest as a right. The mere fact that an interest is 
controversial should have no bearing on discussions about whether it should be protected 
with the rights mechanism.  
                                                          
602 Edward Cameron, "Development, climate change and human rights: From the margins to the 
mainstream?” 123 World Bank Social Development Working Papers [2011], p. 5 
603 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything, (Bloomsbury; London, 2012). ch. 1 
604 For an account of the highly politicised nature of the environment discourse see ibid. ch. 1 
605 Fareed Zakhira, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, (New York; 
Norton, 2007), p. 85 
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 The rights mechanism protects interests in a way that other public policy 
mechanisms cannot. Laws and regulations that protect the environment, whether from 
localised pollution or climate change, are created and enforced by governments or 
between governments through legislation, regulation or bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties. 
The response to the threat to the environment often pits one set of powerful people 
(legislators and diplomats) against another (polluters). Those who suffer from the threat 
to the environment tend to be those with less power.606 The response to the threat to the 
environment is, therefore, left to those least motivated to respond. Similarly, majoritarian 
or democratic controls are insufficient to address the environmental threat because they 
cannot easily take the intergenerational aspect (discussed below) of the threat into 
account.  
 Human rights give those with less power (individuals) a claim against those with 
greater power (states). A human right to a clean and healthy environment diffuses the 
power to mandate a response to threats to the environment. Environmental law is largely 
made by governments (a concentration of power). A human right to a clean and healthy 
environment, however, entitles individuals to demand action by their governments.  
 Human rights have been used to empower individuals in relation to 
environmental issues in both developed and developing states. In Lopez Ostra v Spain, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that the municipality (and by extension the 
State) had a duty to take effective measures to protect the applicant (and others) from 
pollution.607 An individual was, therefore, able to exercise the power, transferred to her 
by the human rights mechanism, to demand that her government take action. In 
                                                          
606 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (The Stern Review), (London; Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 11 
607 Lopez Ostra v Spain ECHR, App No. 16798/90, Series A no. 303-C, (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 277  
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developing states this transfer of power has had even wider impacts. Individuals have 
relied on various human rights to achieve environmental goals including to enforce 
national policy programmes and legislation.608 
Furthermore, human rights have a greater persuasive impact than ordinary 
legislation. As Cameron argues, “human rights are as much about ethical demands, calls 
for social justice, public awareness, advocacy and political action as they are concerned 
with legal norms and rules.”609 To borrow John Ruggie's analysis, human rights give the 
less powerful a claim in the "court of public opinion" even if they are unable to or 
unsuccessful in asserting their claim in a court of law.610 A right to a clean and healthy 
environment at international level would empower individuals in relation to 
environmental issues on a broad scale. 
 For Günther Handl, "(1) a simple right to environment may not address the 
complex and technical issues present in the environmental threat; (2) a right to 
environment merely addresses the social symptoms and does not solve the structural 
causes of environmental degradation, such as the relationships of political 
economy...".611 Yet, contrary to Handl’s assertion, the right to a clean and healthy 
environment addresses underlying social issues by dispersing power. Concentration of 
                                                          
608 For example, Dhungel v Godawari Marble Industries, Supreme Court of Nepal (Full Bench), WP 
35/1992 (31 October 1995) In which the Indian Supreme Court relied on both international and domestic 
environmental obligations when it ordered the Indian government to create new legislation to protect “air, 
water, and the environment”. 
609 Cameron, n. 602, p. 16 
610 John Ruggie, "Protect, Respect and remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights", Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises. A/HRC/8/5, Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council 
611 Gunther Handl, "Human Rights and Protection of the Environment" in A. Eide, C. Krause & A. Rosas, 
(eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, (2nd Ed.), (New York; Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2001), p. 117 
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power is a structural, and thus underlying, social issue. Human rights offer one way of 
addressing the dangers of concentrated power. It is not necessary for a right to 
environment to address, in the right itself, the detail of the technical issues relevant to the 
threat to the environment. Human rights are not public policy programmes: they are an 
entitlement to demand that such programmes be put in place. The human rights 
jurisprudence on environmental issues demonstrates this balance. In Lopez Ostra, the 
European Court of Human Rights did not seek to develop the finer details of 
environmental policy. It held that public policy, as it stood, did not sufficiently fulfil the 
government’s obligations mandated by the right to private and family life (Art. 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights) and sent it back to the government to do better. 
Exactly how the government was to “do better” was left to the government. In cases that 
demand a high level of technical expertise to settle, courts have means of drawing on 
such expertise. A court may assess threshold questions of climate science in the same 
way that a court can adjudicate the extent to which a doctor has been negligent in 
performing a highly complex and specialised medical procedure: by drawing on a range 
of expert witnesses and surveys of the profession as a whole.  
In summary, the right to a clean and healthy environment is not yet recognised as 
an enforceable right at international level and it is subject to a degree of scepticism. The 
objections raised do not, however, present an insurmountable barrier to recognition as 




The first of the Beitz criteria is urgency. The environment is a resource that is 
shared with future generations. For an interest to be protected as a right, in Beitz’s 
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model, it must first be established that it is “sufficiently important when reasonably 
regarded from the perspective of those protected that it would be reasonable to consider 
its protection a political priority.”612 Cases relying on an environmental right have cited a 
number of issues that indicate the importance of a clean and healthy environment. 
Prominent amongst them are the destruction of ancestral homelands613, health 
problems,614 the impact on sites of cultural significance,615 threat to traditional 
practices,616 and economic loss. Yet it is difficult to ground the right to environment in 
any of these alone. Each could be addressed by a different right, such as the right to 
culture, the right to self-determination, or the right to health. A better argument must 
identify the interest that underpins all these cases.617 
                                                          
612 Beitz, n. 5, p. 105 
613 Resolution 12/85 [Yanomami case] Inter-American Commisison on Human Rights IACHR Case 7615 
(Brazil) (March 5, 1985), printed in Inter-Am, C.H.R., 1984-1985 Annual Report 24, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, 
doc. 10, rev. 1 (Oct. 1, 1985) 
614 Guerra v Italy, ECHR, App No. 14967/89, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1998-I, (1998) 26 
E.H.R.R. 357 
615 Pennsylvania v National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower (USA), Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 
193 A.2d 588 (1973)  
616 Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the Support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, "Petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, (7th December 2005)  
617 An alternative case can be made for the urgency of the interest in a clean and healthy environment 
based on global justice. Those who experience the worst effects of climate change are those who live in 
areas that are vulnerable to droughts, sea level rises and extreme weather conditions. These tend to be 
developing states. Such states are often located in geographically vulnerable areas (deserts or islands), and 
have fewer resources to devote to creating the sort of infrastructure that can resist the impacts of climate 
change. But these states have contributed the least to climate change. Western states have been emitting 
greenhouse gasses for over 400 years. Developing states only began to emit greenhouse gasses in 
significant amounts in the second half of the 20th century. It is unjust that those individuals who have 
contributed the least to creating the general threat, should suffer its worst effects.  
This argument is, however, less persuasive than that based on intergenerational justice because it 
misrepresents the nature of the threat. Climate change will impact on developing states most significantly 
in the short term, but it will ultimately impact globally. The threat to the environment is a threat to all, not 
 198 
 The best argument for the urgency of the interest in the environment is based on 
intergenerational justice. The environment is a finite resource.618 When it is harmed 
unnecessarily, as by anthropogenic action rather than natural geological or environmental 
process, that harm affects future generations. The interests of future generations in the 
environment are particularly vulnerable. The market is 21st century society’s primary 
tool for determining the use and value of assets. The environment is an asset. We must, 
therefore, assess whether the market adequately takes future generations into account. 
Economists generally discount the value of future assets. Through technological 
advances, assets tend to be produced more cheaply in future. Assets also tend to lose 
value as they accumulate because we derive less marginal benefit from each additional 
unit of an asset that we consume.619  
 The environment will not, however, be less valuable in the future since it is a 
finite resource.620 Once the environment is damaged it takes centuries to repair itself. In 
many cases the damage cannot be repaired at all. Future damage to the environment will 
harm future generations. Clean air and water will become increasingly scarce. If 
environmental resources are scarce then there will be greater competition for them. That 
competition will, in turn, risk greater political instability.621  
                                                          
just citizens of developing states. Furthermore, this argument only takes climate change into account. The 
right to a clean and healthy environment addresses both climate change and localised pollution. An 
argument for the right must address both limbs of the threat to which it responds.  
618 Stern, n. 606, p. 6 
619 John Broome, "Discounting the Future", 23 Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, (1994), pp. 128-156  
620 Emilio Padilla, "Intergenerational equity and sustainability", 41 Ecological Economics [2002], pp. 69-
83  
621 Rosemary Rayfuse and Emily Crawford, “Climate Change, Sovereignty and Statehood”, University of 
Sydney Legal Studies Research Paper 11/59 (2011) 
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The situation might be different if future generations could exercise market 
agency. For Broome, this would mean that the value assigned to finite assets like the 
environment would be higher.622 Yet future generations cannot exercise market agency. 
Some have proposed that the interests of future generations should be represented by a 
tax.623 On Broome’s view, however, that measure would require that we judge the 
present monetary value that future generations will place on the environment. Such a 
judgement would be arbitrary. Of course, compensation in law is often arbitrary. In this 
case, however, we have no indication of the preferences of future generations beyond the 
assumption that they would hope to survive. In practice, it would be almost impossible to 
coordinate such a tax among states. Individual states would have to administer the tax 
and it would be easy for states to negate its impact through tax cuts in other areas. Even 
if governments were to interfere in the market in favour of future generations in this way, 
their actions are therefore unlikely to be effective.624 Some other mechanism must be 
found.  
What is important about protecting the interests of future generations?625 The 
earth is a finite resource. Future generations will have no option but to use the same earth 
                                                          
622 Broome, n. 619, pp. 128-156 
623 Ibid, pp. 128-156 
624 Ibid, pp. 128-156 
625 For Rawls, justice demands that we make provision for future generations (Rawls, n. 30, p. 291). In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls' justified this assertion from his "original position": If a rational individual did not 
know into what generation she would be born, but understood the concept of generations, she would make 
policy that took future generations into account. For Rawls, she would naturally be motivated to protect 
our descendants (Ibid, p. 301). Rawls later altered his argument. In Political Liberalism he maintained his 
claim that, in the original position, a rational person would choose a structure of society that protected 
future generations. But, instead of a natural motivation, he claims that one would reach that decision on a 
quasi-contractual calculation: past generations have cared for the present generation, therefore the present 
generation is obliged to care for future generations (John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 274). Brian Barry takes a similar position. For him, we owe a moral 
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that present generations use. In effect, we hold the earth on trust for future generations. 
Unlike a trust that takes effect in law, there is an imbalance of power. Future generations 
can't act to protect their interest. We must, therefore, remedy the imbalance of power 
with some other mechanism.  
 The Practice assumes that all humans have value. This means that all humans in 
the future will also have value. If future humans have value, then they are entitled to just 
treatment. The environment is fundamental to a wide range of human interests including, 
inter alia, food, shelter, communication, life and heritage. Yet future generations’ 
enjoyment of the environment lies in the hands of the present generation. We have, 
therefore, an intergenerational responsibility to protect the environment. This makes the 
interest in protecting the environment urgent.  
 For Marglin, intergenerational justice should not be a factor in public policy 
debates.626 Marglin believes it is undemocratic to impose structures for the sole purpose 
of protecting the interests of future generations. It requires sacrificing the interests of 
those who are currently entitled to vote in favour of the interests of those who cannot yet 
do so.627 The case in favour of a human right is, however, inevitably a case for rejecting 
the will of the majority in certain situations. Rights are political presumptions intended to 
take effect, if necessary, against the will of the majority. The inclusion of arguments 
about intergenerational justice hasn’t changed this, it has always been part of the 
Practice. The question is not "is this proposal compatible with respect for the will of the 
voting majority", but "is this interest of such importance that it justifies overriding the 
                                                          
duty to past generations, who have built the world from which we currently benefit (Quoted in Axel 
Gosseries, "Theories of intergenerational justice: a synopsis", 1 S.A.P.I.E.N.S. 1 (2008) online at 
https://sapiens.revues.org/165). 
626 Stephen Marglin, "The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment", 77 Journal of 
Quarterly Economics (1963), p. 97 
627 Ibid, p. 98 
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will of the majority?" Future generations must be able to experience a reasonably 
undamaged environment. Existing social structures do not sufficiently protect the 
interests of future generations. The interest in the environment should thus be considered 
both urgent and insufficiently protected by non-rights structures and mechanisms. 
The importance of intergenerational justice has been recognised in judicial 
consideration of the right to a clean and healthy environment. In Comunidad de 
Chanaral v Codelco Division El Salador628 the Chilean Supreme Court held that the 
constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment was owed to both current and 
future generations. The Supreme Court of the Philippines reached a similar conclusion 
Oposa v Factoran.629 In that case, the applicant was allowed to bring a suit on behalf of 
several children, representing "future generations". The suit was successful and the Court 
ordered a moratorium on all logging in the Philippines. In Carlos Roberto Meja Chacon 
contra el Minesterio de Salud y la Municipalidad de Santa Ana630 the Costa Rican 
Constitutional Court ordered a municipal waste site to be closed based on a suit brought 
by a child himself. According to Costa Rican law, the applicant was too young to bring a 
suit in his own right. The court allowed it because it was based on the right to a clean and 
healthy environment and that right has an intergenerational dimension. In Gray v 
Minister for Planning, The New South Wales considered arguments regarding 
intergenerational equity when invalidating the approval process for an open cast mine.631 
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629 Oposa v Factoran (Philippines) Supreme Court of the Philippines G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792 
(July 30, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994)  
630 Carlos Roberto Meja Chacon contra el Minesterio de Salud y la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, 
Sentencia No. 3705-93, July 30, 1993 (Sal Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Costa Rica) 





 The threat to the environment is caused by the actions of humans and transcends 
national borders. Ongoing and systematic damage to the environment, in any location, 
contributes to impacts transnationally. The threat cannot be addressed by the unilateral 
action of any individual state. Threats to the environment fall into two categories. The 
first, localised pollution, includes harm to the environment that has its primary impact on 
a definable geographical area. The causes of localized pollution are generally proximate 
to its impacts. The second, climate change, which includes impacts that cannot be 
specifically linked to corresponding local causes. Climate change is caused by the 
cumulative actions of multiple generations. It has a variety of harmful impacts. Yet it is 
not possible to link a specific cause to a specific impact. Emissions in one state don’t 
specifically cause impacts in another. All states are partially responsible for all impacts 




 Local pollution is caused by a variety sources. Its primary causes are power 
plants, industrial plants and factories, and road traffic.632 Coal-burning factories and 
power plants are the most significant cause.633 The discharge of chemicals, burning-off 
                                                          
632 David Coady, Ian Parry, Louis Sears, Baoping Shang, "How Large Are Global energy Subsidies?” IMF 
Working Paper WP/15/105, (IMF, 2015), p. 11 
633 Ibid, p. 11. 
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natural gas,634 and unanticipated emissions (such as oil spills) all cause damage to the 
local environment. Burning-off natural gas as a byproduct of oil extraction, for example, 
is the largest single source of air pollution in Nigeria.635 Localised pollution tends to 
have its primary impact on a definable geographic area. This does not mean, however, 
that it is confined within state borders. The area impacted may be within the borders of a 
single state but there is no necessary correlation between the geographical extent of the 
impact of an instance of localised pollution and political borders.  
 Although climate change is often the highest profile impact of damage to the 
environment, damage resulting from local pollution represents a significantly higher 
proportion of total damage to the environment.636 Local air pollution remains 
concentrated in the atmosphere for a relatively short time before it disperses. This means 
that the pollution remains in the atmosphere but is spread out over a wider area. 
Concentrations in any particular area are thus lower, but the polluting particles have not 
disappeared. Pollution caused by other emissions, such as chemicals, can remain in one 
place for hundreds of years.637  
 Climate change is caused by the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the 
atmosphere. The most common greenhouse gasses are Carbon Dioxide and Methane. 
These particles reflect heat. Heat from the sun is normally reflected from the earth's 
surface, back into space. When greenhouse gas particles collect in the earth's atmosphere 
in sufficient concentrations, they reflect the heat from the earth's surface back towards 
                                                          
634 Kravchenko and Bonine, n. 600, p. 581 
635 Ibid, p. 581 
636 Coady et al, n. 632, pp. 18-23 
637 Graham Merrington, Linton Winder, R. Parkinson, Mark Redman, Agricultural Pollution: 
Environmental Problems and Practical Solutions, (London; CRC Press, 2003), p. 149 
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the earth. This prevents it from dispersing into outer space. This raises the temperature of 
the Earth and its atmosphere.638 
 The increase in greenhouse gasses in the Earth's atmosphere is man-made. It 
primarily results from industrial processes, such as the burning of fossil fuels.639 The 
United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports on the consensus 
amongst credible scientific research on climate change. The Panel’s 2014 report was 
compiled by 235 writers, 38 review editors and 38 governments. The multi-stage review 
process involved 38315 comments and the final report includes nearly 10 000 
references.640 The report concluded that there is a 95% probability that the burning of 
fossil fuels, as a result of human industrial activity, is responsible for abnormally high 
concentrations of greenhouse gasses in the Earth's atmosphere641 as opposed to non-
human factors.  
 Climate change and localised pollution may be analysed as separate aspects of 
the threat to the environment, but they are not separate threats. The emissions that cause 
localised pollution are the same as those that cause climate change. When localised 
emissions disperse, they remain in the atmosphere in lower concentrations. As more 
pollution disperses, these concentrations increase. The result of increased concentrations 
of greenhouse gasses emissions in the Earth’s atmosphere is climate change. Climate 
                                                          
638 International Bar Association, Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Taskforce Report, Achieving 
Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption, (London; IBA, 2014), p. 40 
639 5 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers (Cambridge; 
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640 2 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Fact Sheet (13 April 2014), at http:// 
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change is therefore best understood as the cumulative effect of localized emissions in the 






 The impacts642 of damage to the environment have a tangible effect on 
individuals. They take effect regardless of location. Threats to the environment impact 
everywhere in the world, but these effects are indiscriminate with regards to political 
borders.643 Other types of local pollution have similar effects. Radiation from nuclear 
power generation causes serious health problems even in generations as yet unborn.644 
Nuclear accidents have health impacts that can last hundreds of years.645 Waste disposal 
                                                          
642 The impacts of threats to the environment are not without controversy. It is not my intention to engage 
with the “climate skepticism” debate to any significant extent. However, in order to avoid unnecessary 
controversy, I have selected sources that use the aggregate of a range of different studies (including those 
which are skeptical of the impact of environmental threats) in their analyses. Where this has not been 
possible I have only relied on the aspects of the sources cited that have not been subject to significant 
criticism.  
643 For example, Local air pollution is estimated to be responsible for between 10% and 20% of all cases of 
cancer worldwide. The World Health Organisation estimates that air pollution accounts for or contributes 
to two million premature deaths every year, with half a million in India alone. Air pollution also causes 
chronic illnesses such as silicosis, WHO Factsheet, Ambient (outdoor) air quality and health, (WHO, 
2014), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/ Radiation from nuclear power 
generation causes serious health problems even in generations as yet unborn (C.f. Fadeyeva v Russia, 
ECHR, App No. 55723/00, ECHR 2005-IV (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 10) 
644 C.f. Fadeyeva v Russia, ECHR, App No. 55723/00, ECHR 2005-IV (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 10 
645 John P. Christodouleas, Robert D. Forrest, Christopher G. Ainsley, Zelig Tochner, Stephen M. Hahn 
and Eli Glatstein, M.D "Short Term and Long Term Health Risks of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents", N. 
Engl. J. Med. [2011], available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/ref/10.1056/NEJMra1103676#t=references 
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plants have been found to cause chronic health problems even when partially shut 
down.646 In one case, an improperly secured rubbish tip caused a buildup of methane gas, 
resulting in a fatal explosion.647 Local pollution also affects agriculture, for example, 
through soil pollution which impairs crop growth.648 It affects rivers through chemical 
runoff.649 It can even destroy or irreversibly alter entire native homelands, such as 
through oil spills or mines.650 
 The impacts of climate change are likely to increase exponentially. If greenhouse 
gas concentrations remain at their current levels (430 parts per million), there is a 20% 
chance that the Earth's surface temperature will rise by up to five degrees centigrade 
above pre-industrial levels by 2100.651 If greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise then 
it is almost certain652 that the Earth's surface temperature will rise by at least 3.7ºC above 
20th century levels by 2100.653 The rise in temperatures will not be evenly distributed. 
With a global average warming of 4ºC, the polar regions will experience warming of 
around 8ºC, tropical regions will experience warming of around 3ºC, and middle 
latitudes will experience warming of around 5ºC.654  
                                                          
646 C.f. Lopez Ostra v Spain ECHR, App No. 16798/90, Series A no. 303-C, (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 277  
647 C.f. Oneryildiz v Turkey ECHR (Grand Chamber) App No. 48939/99, ECHR 2004-XII, (2005) 41 
E.R.R.R. 20  
648 Merrington et al, n. 637, pp. 149-151 
649 Ibid, pp. 149-151  
650 C.f. Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
rights Case No. ACHPR/Comm/A044/1, Decision Regarding Comm. No. 155/96 (2001)  
651 Stern, n. 606, p. 11  
652 Defined as “a 95%-100% probability”, 7 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, 
Summary for Policymakers (13 April 2014) 8:   http://mitigation2014.org, p. 17 
653 7 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers (13 April 
2014) 8:   http://mitigation2014.org, p. 17  
654 Stern, n. 606, p. 16 
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 It is difficult to quantify the impacts of this rise because models cannot accurately 
account for all anthropogenic action. Yet it is possible to predict a range of impacts if no 
action is taken to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The sea has hitherto absorbed 84% 
of the additional heat trapped by greenhouse gasses,655 but this is not sustainable. 
Increased or sustained warming will lead to a predicted sea level rise of 9-88cm by 
2100.656 As warming only penetrates the oceans slowly, sea levels will rise by 
significantly more over a longer period of time. Particularly dramatic rises will result 
from the melting or collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets.657 The rise 
in sea levels will threaten coastal cities and states. A rise of 1 meter, for example, will 
leave more than 20% of Bangladesh under water,658 Shanghai, New York, Tokyo and 
Amsterdam, among others, will also experience significant effects.659 The distribution of 
sea level rises will not be even. As sea levels rise in some locations, others will 
experience increased water scarcity. The area of land experiencing drought at any one 
time is likely to increase from 20% to 50% of the Earth's surface and the area 
experiencing extreme drought is likely to increase from 3% to 30% by 2090.660 
 Climate change increases extreme weather events. The frequency of hurricanes 
and typhoons assessed as category 4 or 5 (the top of the scale) has doubled since the 
1970s, because of rising sea surface temperatures.661 The UN High Commissioner for 
                                                          
655 Ibid, p. 15 
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657 Ibid, p. 18 
658 Ibid, pp. I-xxvii 
659 R. J. Nicholls, et al., working paper "Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to 
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Human Rights and Climate Change predicts that other impacts of rising temperatures are 
likely to include heat waves, food shortages and increased morbidity from malnutrition, 
cardio-respiratory and infectious diseases, and injuries from extreme weather events.662  
 The report of the UN High Commissioner on the Relationship Between Human 
Rights and Climate Change found that climate change alone would compromise several 
existing rights. These include the rights to life, food, water and health.663 A relatively 
modest rise in sea levels could result in island nations such as Tuvalu entirely ceasing to 
exist. This would likely create a global refugee and political crisis as millions of 
displaced people seek a new place to live and the international political system struggles 
to address states that no longer have territory.664  
 A rise in the Earth's temperature will trigger phenomena that contribute to a 
further release of greenhouse gasses and thus a further rise in temperatures. These 
"feedback" effects may add an additional 1ºC to 2ºC degrees of warming by 2100.665 The 
most significant feedback effect would be the release of greenhouse gasses from "carbon 
sinks" such as permafrost and peat bogs. These are natural phenomenon that “store” 
carbon. Plants and trees remove carbon from the atmosphere through photosynthesis. 
When these organisms die, the carbon is released, generally through decomposition or 
burning. Carbon sinks, like permafrost and peat bogs, prevent the release of carbon 
through decomposition. Models that take into account the release of carbon sinks predict 
the release of an additional 20-200ppm of GHGs by 2100.666 Thawing permafrost has 
                                                          
662 Annual Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Human 
Rights and Climate Change (Pillay Report), (15 January 2009), A/HRC/10/61 
663 Pillay Report, n. 662, p. 14 
664 Rayfuse and Crawford, n. 621, p. 14 
665 Stern, n. 606, p. 11 
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already increased emissions in Siberia by 60% since the 1970s.667 Feedback effects also 
increase local pollution, as the release of gasses from carbon sinks swiftly increases the 
concentration of carbon in the surrounding air or water.668  
 In summary, threats to the environment have tangible impacts on individuals but 
these impact without regard to political borders. Furthermore, the causes can rarely be 
identified in any specific sense. However, there is almost no doubt that certain actions 
cause damage to the environment and certain impacts are the result of that damage. It is 
just not always possible to identify which specific actions directly cause which specific 
impacts. Yet this does not mean that the impacts are any less severe.  
 
The Hayekian Perspective 
 
 The Hayekian perspective, hostile to the concept of solidarity rights, usefully 
illustrates the breadth of the interest in a clean and healthy environment. As in previous 
chapters, the Hayekian perspective is not endorsed in this chapter, but rather applied as 
an argumentum a fortiori exercise. Although Hayekian theory begins as actively hostile 
to the concept of solidarity rights, the case for the right to a clean and healthy 
                                                          
667 K.M. Walter, S.A. Zimov, J.p. Chanton, "Methane bubbling from Siberian thaw lakes as a positive 
feedback to climate warming", Nature 443 (2006), pp. 71-75 
668 While scepticism about climate change and its impacts exists, this represents only 3% of climate 
scientists (see John Cook, Dana Nuccitelli, Sarah A Green, Mark Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob 
Painting, Robert Way, Peter Jacobs and Andrew Skuce, “Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic 
climate change in the scientific literature”, 8 Environ. Res. Lett. 2, pp. 1-7), and their principal arguments 
have largely been debunked (see Stern, n. 606, p. 7). Indeed, even sceptics like Bjorn Lomborg, who 
argues that climate change is a real phenomenon but the costs of change make any attempt to address it 
untenable (see Bjorn Lomborg, The Sceptical Environmentalist, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
2001)), represent only isolated voices. In view of the overwhelming consensus amongst climate scientists 
about the existence and impacts of climate change, I will not consider scepticism here. 
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environment can nevertheless be understood from that perspective. Threats to the 
environment are coercive. They impose costs on individuals without their consent or 
possibility of reparation. They directly harm individuals and damage economic growth. 
They therefore compromise the overriding objective of Hayekian political theory: 
limiting coercion. The market cannot regulate exchange between those who harm the 
environment and those who suffer that harm. Moreover, threats to the environment are 
actively facilitated by government intervention when governments provide subsidies to 
polluters. 
 Damage to the environment causes economic damage on a global scale. A rise in 
global temperatures of between 5centigrade and 6 centigrade by 2100 is predicted to 
cause a 5% to 10% per cent loss to the global economy.669 In the UK floods in the year 
2014-1015 caused a 0.1% drag on the UK economy. A rise in the global average 
temperature of between 3C and 4C by 2100 will increase the economic impact of 
flooding in the UK to a drag of around 0.4% of GDP per year.670 In 2003 Europe 
experienced heat waves that killed 35 000 people. It is predicted that, on current rates of 
warming, such heat waves will occur regularly by 2050.671 Social scientists predict that 
the increased migration caused by climate change is likely to cause tensions that escalate 
into violent conflict. This will cause further economic and humanitarian damage on a 
global scale.672  
 The market is structurally ill suited to the task of minimising coercion from 
environmental threats. According to Friedman:  
                                                          
669 Stern, n. 606, pp. I-xxvii 
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"The man who pollutes the stream is in effect forcing others to exchange good 
water for bad. These others might be willing to make the exchange at a price. But 
it is not feasible for them, acting individually, to avoid the exchange or enforce 
appropriate compensation." 
Environmental damage represents, in the words of Nicholas Stern, "a market failure on 
the greatest scale the world has ever seen".673 The market should facilitate the most 
efficient allocation of resources while minimising coercion.674 The market calculates the 
relative cost of an asset. A market actor calculates the benefits of taking a certain action 
against the costs of taking that action. If the former outweighs the latter, she will 
proceed.675 The price of an asset or action is the average of every market actor’s decision 
about the relative costs and benefits. The market, however, cannot effectively assign the 
costs of environmental damage to the perpetrators. They are, instead, imposed on 
individuals who have had no benefit from the damage to the environment.676 This means 
that it is not necessary to weigh up the costs and benefits of damaging the 
environment.677 A market actor can damage the environment without having to bear the 
cost. The market thus fails to allocate the costs of damage to the environment with long-
term fairness or efficiency.  
The market, therefore, no longer allocates resources with minimal coercion. A 
market minimises coercion by ensuring that all market actors bear the cost or benefit of 
their actions. Every market choice is, thus, a free choice, individuals take action if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. Yet polluters impose costs on other market actors without 
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their consent and without having to pay them reparations. In relation to the environment, 
the market fails to provide “co-ordination without coercion”. Building a mine, for 
example, has numerous environmental impacts. It can cause subsidence in land around 
the mine or pollute local water sources. Burning coal extracted from the mine creates air 
pollution, which causes respiratory illnesses. The polluting particles remain in the 
atmosphere and contribute to climate change. Despite these multiple environmental 
impacts, only one market transaction has occurred. The land on which the mine is built is 
subject to the free market: the owner of the mine pays a market price for the land. When 
the mine owner’s actions (on his own land) impact beyond that land, the market cannot 
assign a price for those impacts, because the individuals who are subject to the impacts 
can’t avoid the exchange. Local landowners can’t refuse to have their lands subside. 
Local communities can’t avoid having their water polluted. Individuals can’t avoid 
breathing in the toxic particles in the air. The world can’t reject the impacts of climate 
change. The impacts of the mine can’t be avoided so it is impossible to extract a price for 
them. The mine owner can impose costs on others, and enjoy the consequent benefits to 
himself, without any incurring any cost. He has no incentive to voluntarily assume costs. 
The market alone cannot, therefore, regulate exchange in relation to environmental harm.   
 Furthermore, states actively intervene in the market to prevent it from properly 
assigning the costs of damage to the environment. The price mechanism is fundamental 
to the Hayekian market.678 The price of an asset contains information about the utility of 
the asset set against the cost of production.679 In the case of (environmentally harmful) 
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fossil fuels, however, governments artificially alter the price of energy generated by 
paying is subsidies to polluters.680  
 The efficient price of energy is indicated by (a) the basic costs of production and 
delivery added to (b) a Pigouvian tax (which represents the cost of the damage it causes 
to the environment) and (c) a consumption tax (representing the need for taxation on all 
assets to raise revenue).681 This is not, however, the price paid by the consumer. Instead 
polluters benefit from subsidies that reduce both the basic cost of production and 
delivery (pre-tax subsidies) and the cost of damaging the environment (the post-tax 
subsidy). Total subsidies amount to over $5 trillion per year,682 representing more than 
6% of global GDP.683 The largest subsidies are awarded to energy companies that extract 
and burn coal, but significant subsidies are also given to energy producers that extract 
and burn gas and oil.684  
Even without the cost of environmental impacts, fossil fuel industries are not 
efficient enough to succeed in the modern economy. Pre-tax subsidies represent 11.1% 
of total global subsidies to polluters.685 This prevents the market operating effectively. 
Markets rely on a process of "creative destruction" to facilitate progress.686 Measures 
will succeed because sufficient demand exists that they can be profitably sold in a free 
market. When new technologies or methods of manufacture find a way of recreating the 
same benefits more cheaply (or consumers simply lose interest and begin to demand a 
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different measure) it will no longer be possible to make a profit using the old (less 
efficient/in demand) measure. When this happens, the measure dies out is replaced by the 
new, more efficient model.687 If fossil fuel based industries require a pre-tax subsidy, 
there is not sufficient demand for them to sell their products on the open market at a high 
enough profit to survive. For the price of their products to remain competitive, it must be 
artificially depressed by government intervention. In a functioning market, fossil fuel 
industries would be allowed to decline and be replaced with a more efficient alternative. 
The global pre-tax subsidy is preventing the process of creative destruction from 
facilitating technological and social progress.  
 Governments' failures to properly tax polluters mean that the cost of damage to 
the environment is imposed on those who didn’t cause the pollution.688 Post-tax subsidies 
represent the increased cost that governments must assume due to the damage that 
polluters cause to the environment. The state or individuals must pay higher costs for 
healthcare, the impact on natural resources and numerous other externalities. This has 
wider knock on effects because it squeezes other areas of the economy.689 Government 
intervention is artificially shifting this cost away from polluters (who create the cost) 
onto innocent parties, who receive no compensation. This means that the price we pay 
for energy is not an accurate description of the actual cost of that energy: the price 
mechanism is not functioning, so the market cannot function. 
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 The majority of subsidies (75%) relate to domestic and localised pollution, the 
remainder relate to climate change.690 This means that there is an overwhelming 
Hayekian case for the right to a clean and healthy environment, even if it doesn’t address 
climate change. Statistically speaking, developing states account for the majority of 
subsidies.691 This, however, obscures the real source of the subsidies. The majority of 
production that uses energy from fossil fuels occurs in developing states, but the majority 
of consumption occurs in developed states.692 This means that, while energy use is 
allocated to developing states on the balance sheet, that energy is actually being used for 
the benefit of developed states.693  
Government subsidies are not limited to polluting industries. Subsidies to fossil 
fuel industries can, however, be distinguished from most other subsidies for two reasons. 
The first is that they facilitate actions that harm most individuals. Hayek and Friedman 
both accept that it may be necessary for governments to interfere in the free market in 
situations where interference will create a social benefit that the market cannot 
provide.694 In the case of environmental threats, governments intervene support 
industries that cause harm to the majority of individuals. The second reason is the scale 
of the intervention. Governments subsidise polluting industries on a global scale. It is not 
limited to any particular state or region, but takes effect in every part of the world. No 
other standard threat is so actively and directly facilitated by governments on an 
equivalent scale. 
                                                          
690 Coady et al, n. 632, p. 22 
691 Ibid, p. 23 
692 “European Union CO2 Emissions: Different Accounting Perspectives”, European Environmental 
Agency Technical Report No. 20/2013, (2013), pp. 7-8 
693 Cf. Ibid, pp. 7-8 
694 See generally, Friedman, n. 406 
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 This market failure makes environmental damage an important issue from a 
Hayekian perspective. Damage to the environment represents, in the first instance, a 
failure of the market to accurately assign costs and, in the second, an artificial 
intervention by governments to prevent the market functioning as it should. This is not 
merely a market failure, it is an active undermining of the free market, facilitating 
coercion on a global scale. Hayekian theories of social organisation are based on the 
premise that a free market will facilitate the efficient distribution of resources with the 
minimum amount of coercion. A market that is (a) incapable of properly assigning the 
cost of actions and (b) manipulated to artificially support an inefficient industry, is 
neither free nor functional. Hayekian political theory can therefore support a non-market 




 For an interest to be recognised as a right in the political approach, the rights 
mechanism must be reasonably effective in protecting that interest. In the case of the 
right to a clean and healthy environment, the effectiveness of the rights mechanism is 
demonstrated by its successful application at regional and national level. At regional 
level, the application of an explicit right to a clean and healthy environment is limited. 
Some tribunals have, however, applied a human rights approach to address the threat to 
the environment. At the domestic level, several states have recognised a justiciable 
constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment and this has been enforced by the 
courts. The application of environmental rights has been primarily focused on addressing 
localised pollution. The model offered by existing jurisprudence, however, offers an 








 The right to a clean and healthy environment remains vague at the international 
level. Regional instruments and tribunals have been more proactive in recognising the 
right. Art. 28 of the African Charter recognises the right of all humans and peoples to "an 
environment favourable to their development".695 This right was applied in Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria. In that case, the African Commission on 
Human and People's Rights relied inter alia on the Art. 28 right when awarding members 
of the Ogoni people substantial damages, after oil extraction in the Niger Delta exposed 
their homeland to air, water and soil pollution.696 The San Salvador Protocol to the Inter-
American Declaration on Human Rights recognises a right to a clean and healthy 
environment.697 In the Yanomami Case,698 Brazil was found to have violated the right to 
a clean and healthy environment when it authorised the building of a road through the 
Yanomami people's traditional homeland.699  
                                                          
695 Banjul Charter, Art, 24 
696 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
rights Case No. ACHPR/Comm/A044/1, Decision Regarding Comm. No. 155/96 (2001)  
697 Art. 11, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 17th November, 1988, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OAE/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992) (San Salvador Protocol) 
698 Resolution 12/85 [Yanomami case] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights IACHR Case 7615 
(Brazil) (March 5, 1985), printed in Inter-Am, C.H.R., 1984-1985 Annual Report 24, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, 
doc. 10, rev. 1 (Oct. 1, 1985) 
699 Ibid 
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 The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain a specific right to a 
clean and healthy environment. The Convention was drafted in 1950, before scientists 
understood the threat to the environment.700 Yet the European Court of Human Rights 
has noted the importance of the environment and sought to protect interests in a clean 
and healthy environment in the application of existing rights. The court has applied Art. 
2 (the right to life) and Art. 8 (the right to private and family life) of the Convention to 
address environmental issues,701 In Lopez Ostra v Spain the court found that the Art. 8 
right had been violated when emissions from a sewage treatment plant caused health 
problems for the applicant and her children. The court found that the municipality had 
"general supervisory powers" which implied the responsibility regulate and limit 
pollution from the plant. The municipality had failed to respect this duty because it had 
not adequately followed its own environmental protection procedures.702 In Giacomelli v 
Italy the local authority’s failure to conduct an environmental impact assessment when 
granting permission for a waste treatment facility, as required by Italian law, amounted 
to a violation of the environmental duty implied into the Art. 8 right.703 The Court 
expanded its reasoning on Art. 8 and environmental issues in Guerra v Italy. It held that 
the Art. 8 right imposes a duty on the state to actively protect individuals from the 
impacts of pollution. That duty includes the obligation to establish procedures to ensure 
the environment is adequately protected and to follow them to a sufficiently rigorous 
                                                          
700 Ben Pontin, "Environmental Rights under the UK's 'Intermediate Constitution'" 17 Nat. Res. &Envir. 21 
(2002), p. 21 
701 Lopez Ostra v Spain, ECHR, App No. 16798/90, Series A no. 303-C, (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 277; 
Giacomelli v Italy, App. No. 59909/00, ECHR 2006, (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 38, judgement of 2nd November 
2006 
702 Lopez Ostra v Spain, ECHR, App No. 16798/90, Series A no. 303-C, (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 277  
703 Giacomelli v Italy, App. No. 59909/00, ECHR 2006, (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 38, judgement of 2nd 
November 2006 
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degree.704 Nevertheless, it would be difficult to argue that the court has found a positive 
“right” to a clean and healthy environment. At best, it is a procedural right and only 
appears to exist when domestic law already provides for protection for the environment. 
While the court clearly sees a human rights dimension to environmental issues, it cannot 
go beyond the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not 
include a right to a clean and healthy environment. 
 The right to environment has not been successfully applied to respond to climate 
change at regional level. Nevertheless, the roots of an international jurisprudence exist. 
In the Inuit case, a group representing indigenous peoples of Alaska, Canada and 
Greenland705 petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. They argued 
that the USA had violated their right to a clean and healthy environment. The petitioners 
submitted that climate change was causing irreversible damage to their indigenous 
environment and, as the largest emitter of greenhouse gasses, the USA should be 
considered responsible706 for the damage.  
 The Inuit petition has been described as a failure because the Inter-American 
Commission refused the petitioners’ request for a hearing.707 Yet it can equally be 
considered a first step on the road to a recognised right against climate change. The 
Commission refused to hear the petition "specifically [because] the information provided 
                                                          
704 Guerra v Italy, ECHR, App No. 14967/89, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1998-I, (1998) 26 
E.H.R.R. 357  
705 This case demonstrates another variation on standing in the case of solidarity rights. The case was 
brought by an individual acting as a representative for a people which was geographically in three different 
states. The representative body for the people in question, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference supported the 
petitioner’s suit. Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the Support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, "Petition to 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, (7th December 2005) 
706 Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the Support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, "Petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, (7th December 2005) 
707 Kravchenko and Bonine, n. 600, p. 60 
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does not enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterise a 
violation of rights protected by the American Declaration".708 This choice of words 
leaves the door open to future petitions. These could be based on more detailed evidence 
concerning the role of the US in causing climate change or a more developed legal 
argument in favour of the justiciable effect of the San Salvador Protocol. In response to 
the Inuit petition, the Commission set in motion an enquiry into the links between human 
rights and climate change. In 2007 it invited the petitioners to make their case before the 
Commission informally. Although the Inuit case had only minimal juridical legal impact, 
it is therefore difficult to deny that it had a persuasive impact. It caused the Inter-
American Commission to begin an investigation into the human rights impacts of climate 
change, won the petitioners a hearing on a global stage, and raised international 




 National courts and legislatures have taken more significant steps towards 
recognising a justiciable right to a clean and healthy environment. More than 100 states 
recognise such a right in their constitutions, along with five US states: Hawaii, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Montana709 and Pennsylvania.710 The right has been construed in a more 
authoritative manner at national level than it has at regional or international level. It has 
been used as a basis for orders for specific performance and, in some cases, for courts to 
                                                          
708 Quoted in Ibid, p. 60 
709 Cape-France Enterprises v Estate of Peed, Montana Supreme Court, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 
P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001) 
710 Kravchenko and Bonine, n. 600, p. 68 
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overrule the decisions of legislatures and executives.711 National courts have enforced a 
duty on states to take measures to protect the environment, both in relation to their own 
citizens and to those outside their borders. 
 In Montana Environmental Information Centre v Department of Environmental 
Quality, the Montana Supreme Court enforced the inward-facing duty. It overturned the 
decision of the state legislature to amend the Clean Water Act 1995. The Court based its 
decision on the right to a clean and healthy environmental in the Montana constitution. 
The Court held that the right to environment was a "fundamental" right. Any legislation 
with the potential to violate the right should be subject to "strict scrutiny".712 Based on 
this test, the proposed amendment, which would have permitted contamination of certain 
water sources, was struck down.713 Regional decisions have used the environmental right 
to regulate executive or municipal action. The Montana Supreme Court construed the 
right as a presumption with a high level of authority. In the Environmental Information 
Centre case, the right trumped the decisions of both the executive and the legislature.  
 In Asia, environmental rights in national constitutions have imposed similar 
inward-facing duties. In Shehla Zia v WAPDA, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that 
the use of power lines that had been found to cause cancer should be reviewed. It took 
the additional step of appointing an independent consultancy to review the policy.714 In 
Dhungel v Godawari Marble Industries the Supreme Court of Nepal issued an order for 
                                                          
711 Ibid, p. 68 
712 Described by Wex Legal Dictionary as, “a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the 
constitutionality of certain laws. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further 
a "compelling governmental interest," and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.” 
Available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny, (last checked 4th May 2016) 
713 Montana Environmental Information Center v Dep't of Environmental Quality (USA) Supreme Court of 
Montana 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236 (1999) 
714 Shehla Zia v WAPDA (Pakistan), Supreme Court of Pakistan, P.L.D. 1994 S.C. 693 
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specific performance, based on the environment right. The court order mandated that the 
government enforce existing regulations on environmental impact assessments. It also 
required the government to enact further legislation aimed at protecting "our air, water 
and environment".715 This decision was based on both the right to a clean and healthy 
environment recognised in Nepalese domestic law and Nepal's international obligations 
relating to the protection of the environment. In both decisions, the right to a clean and 
healthy environment was construed as a political presumption with the authority to 
mandate positive action on the part of the executive.  
 National courts have also found outward-facing duties in constitutional rights to a 
clean and healthy environment. In Gray v Minister for Planning, the New South Wales 
Land and Environment Court invalidated the executive's grant of approval for an open 
cast mine. The Court found that the environmental impact assessment had been 
incomplete. The assessment included the emissions and other environmental destruction 
associated with the building of the mine, but omitted the emissions resulting from 
burning of the coal that the mine was intended to extract. The court held that, based on 
the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change, which engaged issues of human rights, 
approval for the mine should be invalidated. It ordered a new environmental impact 
assessment, taking into account the "downstream" emissions, be submitted for public 
consultation.716  
 This decision undercuts critics who argue that climate policy, being a political 
problem, should be undertaken by political rather than legal fora.717 The New South 
                                                          
715 Dhungel v Godawari Marble Industries, Supreme Court of Nepal (Full Bench), WP 35/1992 (31 
October 1995)  
716 Gray v Minister for Planning, New South Wales Land and Environment Court [2006] NSWLEC 720 
717 Such as Shubhankar Dam and Vivek Tewary, "Is a 'Polluted' Constitution Worse Than a Polluted 
Environment?", 17 J. of Envtl. L. 383 (2005) 
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Wales court did not replace the political process with the right to a clean and healthy 
environment. It simply ensured that the process was conducted in a manner that properly 
respected the importance of the interest in preserving the environment. The most 
significant aspect of the ruling is that, in considering both upstream and downstream 
impacts of the mine in question, it construed the environmental interest in bot a local and 
a global sense. The case, moreover, represents the first human rights based response to 
climate change in a developed state.  
 The case of Gbemre v Shell Petroleum directly addresses climate change. The 
High Court of Nigeria found that the practice of "gas flaring" (burning off gas released 
during the process of drilling for oil) contributed to climate change. Climate change was 
damaging the applicant’s homeland,718 so Shell and Nigeria were held, in part, 
responsible for the damage. Gbemre relied on Art. 24 of the African Convention. The 
Court found that the Nigerian government had not followed proper procedures in 
authorising the practice of gas flaring. The court ordered that the process of authorisation 
for the licence to extract gas be repeated with the proper impact assessments taken into 
account, and that gas flaring stop completely.719 This suggests that the violation in 
question did not lie only in the failure to follow correct procedure, as it would if the right 
to a clean and healthy environment were a purely procedural right, but in the act of 
authorisation itself. The court thus applied the Art. 28 right as a substantive right against 
climate change. This is significant because it shows that the right to a clean and healthy 
environment can be used in court to respond to climate change directly.  
 
                                                          
718 Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum (Nigeria), Federal High court of Nigeria. Benin Judicial Division, 
14th Day of November 2005, Suit No. FHC/B/CS/153/05 
719 Ibid 
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What would a duty to address climate change look like? 
 
The Ogoni case notwithstanding, the right to a clean and healthy environment 
generally only addresses localised emissions. Climate change is the result of the 
accumulation of localised emissions.720 By creating a duty for governments to protect 
individuals from the impacts of localised pollution, the right to a clean and healthy 
environment already indirectly protects the rest of the world from the cumulative effects 
of those emissions.  
 Opponents of a right that addresses climate change argue that it is not possible to 
identify a clear harm, violation and victim in the case of climate change.721 This means 
that the right, if recognised, could never be enforced. The emission of a tonne of CO2 in 
the UK cannot be directly attributed to the melting of a particular iceberg, the contraction 
of a particular case of respiratory disease or any other specifically identifiable "harm" 
from climate change.722 It is only possible to say that it contributes to a general rising 
temperature that, in turn, has general effects including melting ice burgs, and respiratory 
diseases. For opponents of the right, it would not be possible to prove in court that a 
particular applicant has suffered a particular harm caused by a particular violation on the 
part of the defendant.  
 This argument, however, misrepresents the nature of human rights. Recognising a 
human right and creating a cause of action can two different acts. Human rights impose 
duties on states. When a state fails in its first-level duty, other states may intervene to 
rectify the failure. Human rights are thus primarily enforced between states. States may, 
                                                          
720 Stern, n. 606, p. 4  
721 International Bar Association, Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Taskforce Report, Achieving 
Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption, (London; IBA, 2014), p. 40 
722 Stern, n. 606, p. 28 
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in part, respect their second-level duties by creating causes of action with respect to 
certain rights at international level. As shown in Chapter Six, action in the International 
Court of Justice can be based on the right to self-determination. A state may partially 
respect its first-level duty by passing laws that create domestic causes of action. In 
English law, the tort of nuisance helps fulfil the UK government's duty to protect the 
right to privacy and family life, while the criminal prohibition of murder is essential to 
fulfilling a government's duty to protect the right to life. These are, however, examples of 
the respect of the first-level duty, they are not the right itself. Justiciability at domestic 
level is thus not necessary for the recognition of a right addressing climate change. It is 
sufficient that it imposes first-level duties and, if a state fails to respect these duties, the 
international community can intervene. The above discussion of the application of 
environmental rights at regional and national level demonstrates that the right to a clean 
and healthy environment can impose first-level duties in relation to climate change.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage a right to a clean and healthy environment 
that addresses climate change and can be enforced by the international community by 
creating a cause of action for individuals in international (and, if necessary, domestic) 
courts. The right will impose a first-level duty on states to reduce their contribution to 
climate change to a reasonable extent. The precise extent can be ascertained by 
considering the state specific targets in various international climate change agreements. 
If a state fails in this duty it will be the second-level duty of the international community 
to intervene. The international community can partially respect this second-level duty by 
creating a cause of action, based on the right, at an international level. Any state which 
fails in its first-level duty will be liable to a suit from any individual who can prove that 
they have suffered a loss due to climate change. The duty will be both inward-facing and 
outward-facing. States will be vulnerable to litigation from citizens of other states. The 
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extent of the defendant state’s liability for the harm will be calculated based on the extent 
of its contribution to climate change, balanced against the extent of the measures it has 
undertaken to respect the first-level duty. If individuals from Tuvalu, for example, bring 
a suit against the USA, then the court will consider the measures that the USA has taken 
to reduce its emissions. If the court decides that the USA has taken measures that are 
sufficient to reduce its contribution to climate change to a reasonable extent (such as 
reducing its emissions of greenhouse gasses to the extent prescribed by the state specific 
targets in the Paris treaty) then the suit will fail. If the court decides that the USA has not 
taken reasonable measures, then it will take the USA’s long history of emissions into 
account when awarding damages.  
This will make the richest states most vulnerable to suits, even if they were not 
the biggest contributors to climate change. Claimants will likely prefer to sue rich states 
because they have greater resources to pay damages. This will have a positive effect. It 
will mean that the states with the most resources have the greatest incentive to take 
measures to address climate change. This will mean that the interest that the right 
protects, a clean and healthy environment, is more likely to be protected.  
 Most governments have agreed to take measures to combat climate change. Yet 
many of these agreements are non-binding. Governments argue that they should not have 
to live up to their existing obligations because other states (generally developing states) 
are responsible for more emissions and thus make a greater contribution to climate 
change than they do.723 Developing states argue that the industrialised states have 
historically made a greater contribution to climate change so should cut their emissions 
first.724 This would allow developing states a greater share of the "carbon budget" to 
                                                          
723 A Chayes and A. H. Chayes, “On Compliance”, 47 International Organisation 2 (1993), pp. 175-205 
724 Ibid, pp. 175-205 
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facilitate their own development.725 This creates a vicious cycle with each state 
demanding that someone else "goes first". The result is that, despite recognising the 
action necessary to combat climate change, states have little incentive to be the first to 
take the necessary action. No one fulfils his or her obligations so no one else has an 
obligation to do so either. This means that emissions continue to increase and permanent 
climate change (and its fundamentally destructive consequences) becomes ever more 
likely.  
 Unlike multi-lateral climate treaties, rights address process as well as outcome 
and the duty for which they provide is both non-reciprocal and owed to individuals, not 
other states. As the court in Gray found, it didn't matter that the mine in question would 
make a relatively small impact compared to the full extent of climate change, the right to 
environment was violated because the government did not take it into account when 
conducting their environmental impact assessment.726 A right to environment that 
included protection from climate change would allow individuals to demand that their 
governments fulfilled the obligations, to which they have already agreed, about climate 




 The right to a clean and healthy environment is not yet recognised as a justiciable 
right at international level. Some scholars and organisations are sceptical about the case 
for recognising a right. Yet it nevertheless meets the criteria for recognition as a right 
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according to the political approach. The interest that the right protects is urgent because 
we, collectively and as individuals, have a responsibility to future generations. In effect, 
we hold the environment on trust for future generations. The environment faces a 
standard threat in the form of localised pollution and climate change. This threat is 
entirely caused by humans and can be addressed by human action. It is also transnational 
and, as such, no state can address the threat with unilateral action. Even from the 
perspective of Hayekian theory, opposed to the concept of solidarity rights, the fact that 
polluting and contributing to climate change amounts to coercion (in that it imposes costs 
on others that they have no choice but to accept and for which they are not compensated) 
demonstrates the urgency of the interest. This interest cannot be protected by the market. 
The human rights mechanism, however, is reasonably effective at protecting the 
environmental interest, as demonstrated by its effective application at regional and 
national level. In this sense, the right to a clean and healthy environment is enforced by 
individuals but experienced in a collective context and imposes duties on states to protect 
and provide for a clean and healthy environment. It therefore seems reasonable to 
conclude that the political approach supports the recognition of the right to a clean and 
healthy environment.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RIGHT TO PEACE 
 
This chapter will examine whether the right to peace meets the Beitz criteria, of 
protecting an urgent interest, from a standard threat, to reasonable effect.727 In contrast to the 
rights considered in the previous two chapters, the right to peace does not, in my view, meet the 
Beitz criteria.  
The right was first recognised in the UN Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for a 
Life in Peace in 1978728 and the Declaration on the Peoples’ Right to Peace in 1984.729 These 
recognised that peace was a desirable goal, without justiciable effect. Since 1984, the right to 
peace has been the subject of a number of UN instruments, culminating in a three-year 
intergovernmental working group between 2013 and 2015,730 and a new Declaration on the Right 
to Peace.731 This was approved by the General Assembly in 2017 (“the 2017 Declaration”).732  
 The right to peace has proved controversial at the United Nations.733 While the 1984 
Declaration espoused principles that were broadly accepted in the international community,734 
that consensus does not extend to later iterations of the right to peace.735 The debate reflects a 
                                                          
727 Beitz, n. 5, p. 110 
728 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for a Life in Peace, 15th December 
1978, A/RES/33/73 (the “1978 Declaration”) 
729 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, (12th November 1984), 
A/RES/39/11 
730 Human Rights Council, Report of the Open-ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on the Draft 
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731 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Peace, (2nd February 2017), A/RES/71/189 
732 Ibid. 
733 Rosa Freedman and Philipp Lottholz, “Peace as a hybrid human right: A new way to realise human 
rights or entrenching their systematic failure?” in Nicolas Lemay-Herbert and Rosa Freedman (eds.), 
Hybridity: Law, Culture, and Development, (Oxford; Routledge, 2017), pp. 38-39 
734 Ibid., pp. 38-39 
735 Ibid., p. 46 
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clash of human rights ideologies.736 The later iterations of the right, which are mainly supported 
by states in the Global South,737 include a broad range of social entitlements, well beyond the 
1984 Declaration’s original focus on war and violence.738 They are therefore in tension with the 
human rights ideology espoused by states in the Global North,739 which values clearly 
identifiable and enforceable duties.740  
 The content of the right has changed since it was first expressed in the 1984 
Declaration.741 In that instrument “peace” was construed as purely the absence of physical 
violence.742 In the intervening time the focus of the right has switched, from limiting war and 
violence, to addressing social and economic entitlements which purport to “create the conditions 
for peace”.743  
 This chapter will first consider the nature of “peace”, as it is construed in the right to 
peace at the international level (the “international expression”). It will argue that, while “peace” 
was originally construed as the absence of violence, it is now expressed as a bundle of social 
entitlements with limited focus on violence. This contrasts with the its construction at national 
and regional levels, where violence remains central to the nature of the right. It will then turn to 
the Beitz criteria.  
                                                          
736 Ibid., p. 46 
737 Ibid. pp. 46-7 
738 Ibid., p. 46 
739 Ibid, pp. 46-7 
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Within International Human Rights Law?” [2013] 2 CJICL 4 
741 Ibid, pp. 45-49 
742 See discussion below at pp. 231-232 
743Freedman, n. 733, p. 48 
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The interest in peace, in the international expression, cannot, in my view, be considered 
urgent. The 2017 Declaration refers to a number of discrete interests that may be considered 
urgent in their own right. No urgency, however, exists at the level of the interest in “peace” itself. 
By contrast, a construction of the right in which “peace” is construed as the absence of violence, 
may be considered urgent. The constitutional jurisprudence of Japan744 and Costa Rica,745 and in 
the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (“the Banjul Charter)746 recognise a right to 
peace. Yet these focus on inter-state violence. The urgent interest in peace is an interest in the 
limitation of all forms of violence. The national-level construction of the right thus represents 
only a part of the interest.  
Similarly, there is no standard threat to the interest in peace that exists at the level of 
“peace” in the international expression. If peace is construed as the absence of violence, 
however, the threat of globalised violence can be considered a standard threat to peace. Finally, 
the rights mechanism cannot be reasonably effective at protecting the interest in peace in the 
international expression. In encompassing too broad a range of entitlements and obligations, the 
international expression of the right to peace has little practical impact. By contrast, the national 
construction of the right is capable of protecting the interest in peace, construed solely in relation 
to inter-state violence, as demonstrated by its effective application in Japan and Costa Rica.747 
This, however, fails to address the interest in peace beyond the sub-section of inter-state 
                                                          
744 See Hudson Hamilton, “Mori v Japan: The Nagoya High Court Recognises the Right to Live in Peace”, 
19 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 3, pp. 549-563 
745 See Ethan Katz and Matthew Lackey, “Costa Rica as a Peaceful State: One Costa Rican Lawyer’s 
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(1981) CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), Art. 23 
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violence. Common points of critique of the right to peace, as construed at international level,748 
do not apply to a right to peace if peace is construed purely as the absence of violence. 
 
What is “peace” 
 
When the right to peace was first expressed in 1978,749 “peace” was construed as the 
absence of violence. “Peace” is now presented as a bundle of obligations, aimed at creating an 
environment in which “peace” can flourish through enabling the fulfilment of other human 
rights.750  
 This evolution has progressed in three stages. In the first stage, between 1978 and 1997, 
peace was construed simply as the absence of war. In the second stage, between 1997 and 2015, 
expressions of the right referred to a wide range of interests and duties. These addressed war and 
violence but also included a variety of economic and social entitlements. In the third stage, 
exemplified by the 2017 Declaration,751 the range of interests is more limited than the second 
stage, yet they are expressed in more general terms. There is no longer any reference to violence 
in the operative clauses.  
 
 
                                                          
748 See, for example, EU letter to the IGWG, 15th February 2013, and US letter to the IGWG, 18th February 
2013, both available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCOuncil/WGRightPeace/StatesGeneralComments.pdf 
(last accessed 12th July 2017) 
749 The 1978 Declaration, n. 728 
750 Ibid., p. 46-7 
751 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Peace, (2nd February 2017), A/RES/71/189 
 233 
 
The first stage: Peace as the absence of war 
 
 The right to peace was first expressed at the international level in the 1978 Declaration 
on the Preparation of Societies for a Life in Peace.752 This was followed by the General 
Assembly Declaration on the Right to Peace in 1984 (“the 1984 Declaration”).753 In this 
instrument, “peace” is presented as the absence of war. The preamble states that the purpose of 
recognising the right is to eliminate war between states.754 Its operative clauses recognise the 
“sacred” right to peace,755 assign duties to states to refrain from war and violence,756 and 
condemn these as tools of international relations.757 The tone of the Declaration is exemplified in 
its third article, which: 
 
“Emphasizes that ensuring the exercise of the right of peoples to peace demands that the 
policies of States be directed towards the elimination of the threat of war, particularly 
nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the 
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means on the basis of the Charter of the 
United Nations;”758  
                                                          
752 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for a Life in Peace, 15th December 
1978, A/RES/33/73 
753 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, (12th November 1984), 
A/RES/39/11 
754 Ibid., Preamble 
755 Ibid., Art. 1 
756 Ibid., Art. 3 
757 Ibid., Art. 3 




The Second Stage: A Right to Rights 
 
The second stage of the right’s development began with the Oslo Draft 
Declaration in 1997 (“the Oslo Draft”).759 The Oslo Draft includes references to violence 
in a manner similar to the first stage instruments.760 It also introduces additional interests 
and duties under the overarching banner of “peace”.761 The first article is focussed 
entirely on violence: 
“Every human being has the right to peace, which is inherent in the dignity of the 
human person. War and all other armed conflicts, violence in all its forms and 
whatever its origin, and insecurity also, are intrinsically incompatible with the 
human right to peace;”762  
The second and third articles depart from the pattern established in 1984. Article 2 
provides that that peace must be actively “maintained” and “constructed”.763 This can be 
achieved by preventing violations of human rights and through addressing “inequalities, 
                                                          
759 Oslo Draft Declaration on the Right to Peace, in UNESCO, “Report by the Director General on the 
Human Right to Peace”, (29th October 1997), UN Doc 29 C/59, (the “Oslo Draft”), Annex II 
760 Ibid., Art. 1 
761 Ibid., Arts. 2 and 3 
762 Ibid., Art. 1 
763 Ibid., Art. 2 
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exclusion, and poverty”.764 The Declaration suggests addressing these harms through 
working towards “social justice”765 and “sustainable human development”.766  “Peace” is 
thus construed an entitlement to respect for other human rights and a general guarantee 
of social justice and development.767 This is a broader, and more general, collection of 
duties than those expressed in the 1984 Declaration.768  
Article 3 of the Oslo Draft mandates a “culture of peace”.769 The Draft indicates 
that this requires “recognition and respect for - and the daily practice of - a set of ethical 
values and democratic ideals which are based on the intellectual and moral solidarity of 
humanity;”.770 This broadens the scope of the right. Both the second and third articles of 
the Oslo Draft thus represent a broadening of the scope of the right to peace.  
 Subsequent international instruments reflected this broad interpretation. The 
Human Rights Council’s 2002771 and 2005772 Resolutions on the Right to Peace both 
echo the construction of peace in the Oslo Draft.773 The operative clauses of the 2002 
Resolution remain focussed on limiting violence. In this they are closer to the 1984 
                                                          
764 Ibid., Art. 2 
765 Ibid., Art. 3 
766 Ibid., Art. 3 
767Freedman, n. 733, pp. 46-49 
768 1984 Declaration, n. 729 
769 The Oslo Draft, n. 759, Art. 3 
770 Ibid., Art. 3 
771 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on the Promotion of the right of peoples to peace, (2002), 
UN Doc 2002/71 (the “2002 Resolution”) 
772 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on the Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the full 
enjoyment of human rights by all, (2005), UN Doc 2005/56 (the “2005 Resolution”) 
773 The Oslo Draft, n. 759 
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Declaration774 than the Oslo Draft.775 Yet, while framed in the language of the right to 
peace, the 2002776 and 2005777 Resolutions propose duties seem to relate more closely to 
a range of interests recognised in other rights, such as the right to development.778 The 
preamble of the 2002 Resolution recommends that states embrace disarmament and use 
the money saved to narrow the gap between developed and developing states,779 while 
the preamble of the 2005 Resolution urges states to address global inequality.780  
The proceedings of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Right to 
Peace781 represent a further turn away from the first stage expression of the right.782 
Meeting between 2013 and 2015, the working group produced a series of draft 
declarations that broaden the scope of the proposed right beyond even the Oslo Draft.783 
The Advisory Committee’s 2013 report, recommends provisions on “disarmament”,784 
but also “human security”,785 “resistance to oppression”,786 and a right to conscientious 
objection.787  
                                                          
774 1984 Declaration, n. 729 
775 Oslo Draft, n. 759 
776 2002 Resolution, n. 771 
777 2005 Resolution, n. 772 
778 Contained in, inter alia, UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, (1986), 
A/RES/41/128 
779 2002 Resolution, n. 771, Preamble 
780 2005 Resolution, n. 772, Preamble  
781 See the Working Group, n. 730 
782 Ibid.   
783 See Ibid.  
784 Ibid., p. 10 
785 Ibid., p. 9 
786 Ibid., pp. 11-12 
787 Ibid., p. 11; The preamble to the UNESCO constitution states that “since wars begin in the minds of 
men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” (UN Educational, Scientific 
 237 
 
The Third Stage: A Bundle of General Obligations 
 
 The third stage of the development of the right to peace is encompassed in the 
2017 Declaration.788 This does not refer to violence in its operative clauses.789 There are 
no obligations imposed in respect of war or violence and the preamble does not indicate 
that the right to peace is intended to limit war or violence.790 Duties to refrain from the 
                                                          
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 16 November 1945, Preamble) On this foundation, UNESCO has built 
its argument for “peace education”, a series of “teaching encounters” that focus on drawing out a desire for 
peace, non-violent methods for managing conflict, and analysis of structural inequalities. (Ian Harris and 
Jon Synott, “Peace Education for the New Century”, 21 Social Alternatives 1, pp. 3-6) Peace education is 
therefore a broad concept, addressing violence but also social, cultural, and political injustice. A number of 
UN instruments on the right to peace reference peace education. Yet a right to peace education (if such a 
thing exists) is not a right to peace per se. While peace education is, at least in the opinion of UNESCO, an 
important strategy for promoting peace, it is clearly a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is also 
broadly defined, encompassing violence, but also a range of other social goals. Peace education could, 
therefore, form part of a right that in which “peace” is construed purely as the absence of violence. Yet it 
could also form part of a right defined on much broader terms. Therefore, while it is mentioned in several 
iterations of the right to peace, the inclusion of peace education offers relatively little indication of the 
evolving construction of the right to peace. 
788 The 2017 Declaration, n. 731 
789 2017 Declaration, n. 731, Preamble; It makes references to the undesirability of war but these are, 
respectively, in reference to the purpose of the United Nations and the desirability of peace education. 
790 While the preamble acknowledges the general undesirability war, such language is common to a 
number of UN instruments (beyond those which address the right to peace) and so does not serve to 
distinguish the right to peace in any meaningful manner. 
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use or threat of violence, included in both first791 and second792 stage iterations of the 
right, are no longer present.   
 The interests addressed in the 2017 Declaration’s793 operative clauses are expressed in 
general language. Article 1 describes “enjoying peace” as a state in which “all human rights are 
protected and promoted and development is fully realised”.794 On this definition, it is difficult to 
see which interests would fail to fall within the concept of “peace”. The second article includes 
obligations to promote equality, non-discrimination, the rule of law, and freedom from fear and 
want.795 The fourth article mandates that the University for Peace should “contribute to the great 
universal task of educating for peace by engaging in teaching, research, post-graduate training 
and dissemination of knowledge.”796 The 2017 Declaration thus construes peace as a bundle of 
broad obligations.  
 
Alternative expressions of the right to peace 
 
 At both national and regional levels, the right to peace is expressed in a manner that 
accords more closely with the first stage of its development at international level, focusing on 
limiting inter-state violence.797 In Costa Rica, the abolition of the army was enshrined in Article 
12 of the state’s constitution in 1948.798 The Costa Rican supreme court has interpreted this 
                                                          
791 Such as in Art. 4 of the 1984 Declaration, n. 729 
792 Such as in Art. 1 of the Oslo Draft, n. 759 
793 2017 Declaration, n. 731 
794 Ibid., Art. 1 
795 Ibid., Art. 2 
796 Ibid., Art. 4 
797 See, for example, Art. 4 of the 1984 Declaration, n. 729 
798 Constitution of Costa Rica, (1949), Art. 12 
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provision, when read with Costa Rica’s international law obligations creating a constitutional 
right to peace.799  
It is clear that, in the Costa Rican construction of the right, “peace” relates to limiting 
inter-state violence. The court based its finding of the right to peace on the constitutional 
abolition of the army and public international law norms that prohibit violence in international 
relations.800 It has been applied entirely in the context of inter-state violence, first in relation to 
the second Iraq war,801 and then to constrain the potential development of nuclear weapons (even 
though these would not have been developed in Costa Rica itself).802 
 In Japan,  Article 9 of the constitution renounces war and violence as a tools for 
international relations.803 It bans military forces completely and prohibits recognition of the 
“right of belligerence”.804 This goes further than Costa Rica, which leaves space for the creation 
of an army if circumstances so demand.805 The Japanese right to peace was held to be a “concrete 
right”,806 one that may be directly enforced by citizens, in a series of cases in Japan’s regional 
courts.807 As with Costa Rica, this is clearly a right that is aimed at inter-state violence, imposing 
an obligation to refrain from the promotion of war or violence.  
 At regional level, Latin American states have led the promotion of a right to peace.808 
Peace is, for many, an important norm of national culture.809 Latin American states, through their 
                                                          




803 Constitution of Japan, (1946), Art. 9 
804 Constitution of Japan, n. 803 
805 Constitution of Costa Rica, n. 798, Art. 12 
806 See Hamilton, n. 744, pp. 549-563 
807 Ibid., pp. 549-563 
808Freedman, n. 733, p. 49 
809 Ibid, p. 49 
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UN group GRULAC,810 have been prominent supporters of the right to peace in the Human 
Rights Council.811 The most explicit expression of the right to peace at regional level, though, is 
found in Article 23 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter).812 
This is also focused on inter-state violence. Article 23 frames “peace” as a corollary of 
“security”, and both concepts are framed in the context of relations between states.813 The 
expression of the right to peace at state and international levels thus offers a different, and more 




 In Beitz’s model, an interest must be sufficiently urgent if it is to be considered a right.814 
In my view, the interest in peace, in the international expression, does not meet this standard. A 
more compelling case can be made, however, for the urgency of the interest in peace if “peace” 
is construed solely as the absence of violence. 
                                                          
810 See, United Nations, “Regional Groups”, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml (last accessed 28th July 2017) 
811 Ibis, p. 49 
812Organisation of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”), 
(1981) CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), Art. 23 The second part of Article 23 refers to 
transnational violence, particularly the destabilisation of states by dissidents operating from neighbouring 
states. While this represents a broader expression of “peace” than found in the Costa Rican or Japanese 
jurisprudence, it is still very much focused on peace as an antithesis of violence, rather than a bundle of 
social entitlements or the realisation of existing human rights. 
813 Rosa Freedman suggests that the successive broadening of the scope of “peace” at every level is the 
result of the politics of the Practice. At each level, the framers of the right are compelled to balance a 
broader cross-section of interests. The construction of the right thus becomes broader at each level. See 
Rosa Freedman, Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights, (London; OUP, 
2015), pp. 47-56 
814 Beitz, n. 5, p. 110 
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An enabling right or an ultimate aspiration? 
 
 Proponents of the right to peace locate its urgency in its relationship with other rights. 
For De Zayas, all solidarity rights are “enabling” rights: they create the conditions necessary for 
the realisation of civil and political rights and economic social and cultural rights.815 Peace, in De 
Zayas’ view, has an additional value: it is the ultimate goal of all human rights.816 “Peace” 
describes a condition in which all human rights are realised:  
“Indeed, we can understand the so-called third generation rights as “enabling rights”, 
empowering us to enjoy civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. But peace is 
much more than just an enabling right: it is also an over-arching and an end right. It is 
alpha and omega, the starting point, the means and also the end of human endeavour.” 817 
 On this view, the argument for the urgency of the interest in peace has two limbs. The 
first is that peace enables the realisation of other human rights (“the enabling limb”). The second 
is that peace is the ultimate goal of all human rights (“the goal limb”). The two limbs are not 
mutually dependent, each could theoretically stand alone as an argument for the urgency of 
peace. The workshop, organised by the Spanish Society for International Human Rights Law, 
that led to the Lucara Declaration on the Right to Peace in 2006 embraced both limbs: 
                                                          
815 Alfred de Zayas, “The Individual Dimension of the Right to Peace”, statement delivered to the closed 
expert meeting on the Advisory Committee Declaration on the Right to Peace, Caux-Montreux, 26-27 
November, 2012, available at www.chchr.org/Documents/Issues/IntOrder/CauxStatement.doc (accessed 
10th July 2017) 
816 Alfred de Zayas, “Peace as a Human Right: The Jus Cogens Prohibition of Aggression” in Asbjorn 
Eide, Jakob T. Muller and Ineta Ziemle (eds.), Making Peoples Heard: Essays on Human Rights In 
Honour of Gudmundur Alfredsson, (Leiden; Brill, 2011), p. 14 
817 Ibid., p. 14 
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“The workshop’s approach to peace saw it as an enabling right, empowering humanity to 
enjoy the other human rights. Moreover, peace was perceived as the reward, as a result 
of humanity’s many- faceted promotion of other human rights.”818 
Both limbs can be seen in the international expression. In his message to the UNESCO 
International Consultation of Governmental Experts on the Right to Peace,819 the Secretary 
General, adopted the first limb, arguing that “respect for human rights is the best guarantee of 
peace and the establishment of a durable peace is a condition of the respect for human rights.”820 
 The Oslo Draft821 and the Bamako Declaration on the Right to Peace822 each adopt one of 
the limbs. In the preamble of the Oslo Draft peace is described in terms of the goal limb, as “the 
ultimate aim of the United Nations system as a whole”.823 The Bamako Declaration, by contrast, 
adopts the first limb, arguing that peace is essential for the realisation of human rights.824 Its 
signatories: “Remain convinced that without peace it is impossible to guarantee respect for 
human rights.”825 
 A number of UN instruments also adopt the enabling limb. The preamble of the 2005 
Resolution proclaims that:  
                                                          
818 Ibid.,, p. 12 
819 The Secretary General, Message to Message to the UNESCO International Consultation of 
Governmental Experts on the Human Right to Peace”, in UNESCO, Report by the Director General on the 
Results of the International Consultation of Governmental Experts on the Human Right to Peace”, (17th 
April, 1998), 145 EX/40, Annex IV, p. 1 
820 Ibid, p. 1 
821 Oslo Draft, n. 759 
822 UNESCO, Bamako Declaration on a Culture of Peace (the “Bamako Declaration”), (1997), available at 
http://www.culture-of-peace.info/annexes/declarations/Bamako.pdf (last accessed 28th July 2017 
823 Oslo Draft Declaration, n. 759, para. 4 
824 Bamako Declaration, in UNESCO, “Report by the Director General on the Human Right to Peace”, 
(29th October 1997), UN Doc 29 C/59, Annex III 
825 Ibid, Annex III 
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“Life without war is the primary international prerequisite for the material well-being, 
development and progress of countries, and for the full implementation of the rights and 
fundamental human freedoms proclaimed by the United Nations.”826 
This phrase is repeated in the preamble of the Human Rights Council Resolution on the 
Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace 2010 (the “2010 Resolution”).827 The 2005 
Resolution makes a further reference to the enabling limb in its operative clauses.828 Article 1 
states that “peace is a vital requirement for the promotion and protection of all human rights for 
all.”829 
 
Problems with the two-limb argument 
 
 The two-limb argument fails to account for the urgency of the interest in peace in and of 
itself. Any urgency in this approach is located at the level of the discrete rights in the bundle 
collected under the umbrella of “peace”. Further, a “right to other rights”, is not necessary within 
Beitz’s model. Beitz adopts Joel Feinberg’s concept of “manifesto rights” to address the issue of 
realisation.830 In Feinberg’s view, rights contain a two-stage duty:831 the first stage is to reach a 
point at which the conditions exist for the realisation of the right (such as developing the required 
economic, technological, or governmental capabilities).832 The second stage duty is to exercise 
                                                          
8262005 Resolution, n. 772 
827 Human Rights Council, Resolution on the promotion of the right of peoples to peace, (23rd June 2010), 
A/HRC/RES/14/3, preamble 
828 2005 Resolution, n. 772, Art. 1 
829 Ibid., Art. 1 
830 See Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Prentice Hall; Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1973), pp. 41-67 
831 Ibid., pp. 41-46 
832 Ibid., p. 44 
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those capabilities to realise the right.833  
 A “right to other rights” adds nothing that is useful beyond Feinberg’s two stages. The 
duty to create the conditions in which human rights can be fully realised is already logically 
implicit, in a more focused form, in each right itself, as is the duty to protect and promote the 
interest that the right protects. A right to freedom of expression, for example, would be 
meaningless if it contained no obligation to ensure freedom of expression could be realised in a 
meaningful way. The same is true, in Beitz’s model, for any other right.834  
 The second limb, similarly, adds little that is useful. In this limb, the urgency of peace 
lies in the desirability of a condition in which all rights have been realised. Yet any urgency in 
this interest lies at the level of the discrete rights that have been realised. There is no specific 
urgency attached to the general condition beyond this.  
 
Can “peace” be urgent? 
 
This is not, however, to say that an interest in peace cannot be urgent. It is possible to 
identify the urgency of a right to peace if “peace” is construed as simply the absence of violence. 
As Bertrand Russell argues, violence dehumanises both the perpetrator and the victim.835 
                                                          
833 Ibid., p. 51 
834 Although little theoretical urgency can be found in a right to peace, there is perhaps some practical 
utility. Perhaps the interest in the realisation of other rights is urgent because it generates a greater political 
impetus towards creating the conditions for the realisation of those rights. Such an argument, however, still 
fails to identify any urgency at the level of the interest in peace itself. Ultimately it still relies on the 
argument that the right to peace should be recognised because other rights are important, rather than 
because peace is important in and of itself. A right to create the conditions for the realisation of other rights 
adds nothing, then, in either theoretical or practical terms, that is not already present in the cumulative 
duties imposed by those other rights. 
835 Bertrand Russell, “The Ethics of War”, 25 International Journal of Ethics 2 (January 1915) 
 245 
Preventing it is therefore an urgent interest. Russell analysed the harm inherent in violence as 
part of his critique of the First World War.836  
On the individual level, violence results in physical and psychological harm for both 
perpetrator and victim.”837 For Russell, the greater harm lies in the socio-cultural impacts of 
violence.838 To commit acts of violence one must see one’s victim as less human than oneself.839 
Russell described the soldiers that returned from the First World War as “brutalized and morally 
degraded by the fierce business of killing, which, however much it may be the soldier's duty, 
must shock and often destroy the more humane instincts.”840 Russell continues, “As every 
truthful record of war shows, fear and hate let loose the wild beast in a not inconsiderable 
proportion of combatants, leading to strange cruelties, which must be faced, but not dwelt upon if 
sanity is to be preserved.”841  
Dehumanization of the “enemy” is an integral aspect of violence. As Russell noted, 
British soldiers were taught to hate their German opponents with such intensity that “it cannot be 
doubted that, if the troops of the Allies penetrate into the industrial regions of Germany, the 
German population will have to suffer a great part of the misfortunes which Germany has 
                                                          
836 Ibid 
837 The psychological impacts of war and violence, on both soldiers and civilians, are well documented. It 
is estimated “that between 150 000 and 200 000 Vietnam veterans have committed suicide, three times as 
many soldiers than were killed in the war against Vietnam. During the Falklands/Malvinas war, 236 British 
troops were killed in battle, yet an estimated 260 have since committed suicide. As Paul Duckett puts it: 
“War is certain to result in increased incidence of such behavioural and emotional problems as drug and 
alcohol abuse, increased violence (both through trauma and through shifts in cultural norms around 
violence), suicide, self-harm and so on, as civilians learn new ways to cope with the ‘shock and awe’ that 
has brutalised their lives” (Paul Duckett, “Globalised Violence, Community Psychology and the Bombing 
and Occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq” 15 J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol. (2005), p. 417) 
838 Russell, n. 835, p. 3 
839 Emanuele Castano and Miroslaw Kofta, “Dehumanisation: Humanity and its Denial”, 12 Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations 6 (2009), pp. 695-697 
840 Russell, n. 835., p. 4 
841 Ibid., p. 4 
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inflicted upon Belgium.”842 This is not limited inter-state conflict.843 In the violence following the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, Serbian soldiers rationalised their war crimes844 against Muslims by 
describing the latter as “dogs” or “rats”.845 Islamic extremists are taught to view non-Muslims as 
“infidels”, inferior in the eyes of God.846 Violence also dehumanizes the perpetrators in the eyes 
of the victims.847 The perpetrators seem “evil” or “monstrous”: they cannot be viewed as sharing 
the humanity of those they persecute.848  
It might be suggested that the right to peace, as construed in the constitutions of Costa 
Rica849 and Japan,850 therefore meets the Beitz urgency criterion. Yet, while more closely focused 
on violence than the international expression of the right, these constructions remain 
unsatisfactory from the Beitz perspective. The interest in peace is urgent because violence is 
dehumanising.851 Both the Costa Rican and Japanese constructions of the right focus on a 
particular kind of violence: inter-state violence.852 They do not address violence in general. They, 
therefore, account for only part of the interest in peace. The dehumanising effect of violence is 
not limited to inter-state violence. All forms of violence dehumanise, whether perpetrated 
between states, groups, or individuals.853 That the violence is perpetrated between states does not, 
therefore, alter (except, perhaps, in terms of scale) the nature of the harm it causes. A right to 
                                                          
842 Ibid., p. 5 
843 G. O’Boyle, “Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups”, 14 
Terrorism and Political Violence 2 (2002), pp. 23-46 
844 See Payam Akhavan, "Justice in The Hague, peace in the former Yugoslavia? A commentary on the 
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal." 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 4 (1998), pp. 737-816 
845 Rorty, n. 127, p. 112 
846 Boyle, n. 843, pp. 23-46 
847 Ibid., p. 5 
848 Ibid, p. 5 
849 Constitution of Costa Rica, n. 798 
850 Constitution of Japan, n. 803 
851 Russell, n. 835, pp. 3-9 
852 As argued in this chapter at pp. 10-12 
853 See the argument in this chapter at pp. 17-18 
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peace that only addresses inter-state violence therefore only addresses part of the interest in 
peace. While limiting inter-state violence is arguably an important interest, it is only such 
because it is carved out of the broader urgent interest, in peace as a whole. The urgency lies at 
the level of the broader interest. The interest in limiting inter-state violence thus has no urgency 




 The second Beitz criterion is that the interest in question must be faced with a “standard 
threat”.855 There is no identifiable standard threat at the level of the right to peace. As with the 
question of urgency, however, it is possible to identify a standard threat if the right is construed 
as relating purely to violence.  
In Beitz’s model a standard threat is “reasonably predictable under the circumstances in 
which the right is intended to operate.”856 The right to peace, in its international expression, is a 
bundle of entitlements and obligations.857 Any reasonably predictable threat to such an umbrella 
right exists at the level of the discrete interests, not the umbrella interest. It is conceivable, for 
example, that an extremely conservative government might represent a threat to the interest in 
                                                          
854 It may be argued that, as human rights only impose duties on states, limiting inter-state violence is the 
furthest the rights mechanism can go in addressing violence. This position, however, ignores the full extent 
of states’ capabilities. In the Beitz model, a right can impose a negative obligation on a state (such as to 
refrain from violence), but it can also impose a positive obligation, such as to take action to limit or 
eliminate violence between individuals and groups. The rights mechanism therefore has the potential to 
address the interest in peace to an extent well beyond inter-state violence. The Japanese and Costa Rican 
expressions, however, do not achieve this. 
855 Beitz, n. 5, p. 109 
856 Ibid., p. 111 
857 As argued in this chapter at pp. 8-9 
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non-discrimination,858 but that government might be highly effective at addressing the interest in 
development.859 This would represent a threat to a discrete interest but not the bundle of interests 
as a whole.  
Standard threats may exist in relation to many of the constituent interests in the bundle. 
The 2017 Declaration identifies, inter alia, interests in development,860 non-discrimination,861 the 
rule of law,862 and the realisation of “all human rights”863. The threats to these interests, however, 
relate to them as discrete interests, not as a bundle. It is possible, perhaps, to argue that an 
economic or social system might represent a standard threat to some, or all, of the bundle, by 
systematically denying a raft of rights.864 There are, however, already rights that address such 
threats. The (proposed) right to a fair and equitable international order865 and the right to 
development866 address these structural issues specifically. If this is all the right to peace adds 
then it merely duplicates existing rights and is therefore not necessary.   
 
The threat of transnational violence 
 
As with the discussion of urgency (above) it is possible to identify a standard threat to 
the interest in peace if the interest is framed purely in terms of violence. The global 
                                                          
858 2017 Declaration, n. 731, Art. 2 
859 Ibid., Art. 1 
860 2017 Declaration, n. 731, Art. 1 
861 Ibid., Art. 2 
862 Ibid., Art. 2 
863 Ibid., Art. 1 
864 As, for example, Dustin Sharp does, see Sharp, n. [cross reference in another chapter] 
865 Human Rights Council, Resolution on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, 
(2011), A/HRC/RES/18/6  
866 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, (1986), A/RES/41/128 
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interconnection of the transnational age means that violence is increasingly transnational.867 This 
makes the threat of violence reasonably predictable in a global context. The United Nations 
Development Programme identifies several examples of transnational violence including “armed 
conflict, ethno-cultural violence, genocide, terrorism, violent crime, slavery, government 
repression, discrimination, environmental degradation, deprivation of basic needs, 
underdevelopment, and the spread of small arms, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass 
destruction.”868 The global nature of violence means that it cannot be addressed by unilateral 
state action.869  
States no longer have a monopoly on violence.870 As Mary Kaldor notes, “the state’s 
monopoly over violence is challenged by an increasing number of non-state actors—rebels, 
terrorists, guerrilla fighters, warlords, activists and urban youth delinquents. The boundary 
between who is a military actor and who is a civilian is no longer clear cut”.871 In the first half of 
the 20th century states were the primary exercisers of violence.872 In the transnational age, 
multiple agents exercise violence, on an equivalent scale to states.873 Criminal gangs, for 
example, operate globally and, within affected communities, exercise violence in a similar 
manner to states.874 Terrorist groups strike at civilian populations, causing fear and disruption 
                                                          
867 Patrick Hayden, “Constraining War: Human Security and the Human Right to Peace” 6 Human Rights 
Rev 1 (2004), pp. 35-55 
868 United Nations Development Programme, "Redefining Security: The Human Dimension," Current 
History 94 (1994), pp. 229-236 
869 Paul Duckett, “Globalised Violence, Community Psychology and the Bombing and Occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq” 15 J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol. (2005), pp. 414-423 
870 Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: Organized violence in the global era. (2nd Ed.), (Cambridge/Oxford; 
Polity Press, 2009), pp. 14-17 
871 Ibid, pp. 14-17 
872 Ibid., pp. 14-17 
873 Ibid, pp. 14-17 
874 Criminal gangs operate across continents. In the United States, for example, there are 760,000 recorded 
gang members, spread over 24 000 gangs. In Central America, there are between 69,000 and 200,000. In 
London are an estimated 270 gangs while in France there are around 480. Gangs are often organized along 
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similar to that caused by acts of war by foreign states.875 As a result, criminality and political 
violence are often interchangeable.876 Criminal gangs build networks of “civilian” supporters by 
employing quasi political discourses.877 In South Africa, for example, gangs use the language of 
the struggle against apartheid to build legitimacy amongst the communities in which they 
operate.878 The line between peace and war, civilian and soldier, has therefore become blurred.879  
Violence is therefore no longer confined within or between states.880 Violent conflict is 
                                                          
lines of ethnicity. In London gangs known as the “Wembley Boys”, “East Side Boys”, “Tooting Tamils”, 
“Harrow Tamils”, “Rayners Lane”, “Snake Gang”, “Red Line”, “VVT”, “Jaffna Boys”, and “Ariyalai” all 
take their members from the Sri Lankan Tamil community. These engage in a variety of violent activities, 
attacking opposing gangs or other perceived threats with guns, knives, and katana; and extorting between 
£10 000 and £15 000 per year from local shops and business in the borough of Newham alone. (See 
Orjuela, n. 876, pp. 124-125) Other non-state actors exercise violence to an even greater extent. In 
Columbia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia – Peoples’ Army (Farc) fought a 52-yearlong 
insurgency against the Columbian Government between 1964 and 2016 The Farc used terrorism and 
guerrilla tactics but also operated in an equivalent manner to a foreign state military power, administering 
and protecting significant swathes of territory and maintaining and defending a frontier against 
Government forces. (See James J. Brittain, and James Petras, Revolutionary social change in Colombia: 
The origin and direction of the FARC-EP. (New York; Pluto Press, 2010), pp. 70-81) In Pakistan, the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas are dominated by Islamist warlords who, at times, have effectively 
excluded government forces from their provinces, while imposing their own government on the region. 
(See Shuja Nawaz, “FATA - a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan”, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, (2009)) 
Significant territories in the Middle East are controlled by the group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria, known to opponents as “Daesh”,874 which conducts conventional warfare against and within 
neighbouring states and, at the same time, operates a global terrorist network. This is by no means an 
exhaustive survey but it demonstrates that, while not states, such actors clearly exercise violence on an 
equivalent scale. (See Audrey Kurth Cronin, "ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't 
Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat." 94 Foreign Aff. 87 (2015)) 
875 Duckett, n. 869, pp. 414-423 
876 Camilla Orjuela, “Violence at the Margins: Street Gangs, Globalised Conflict and Sri Lankan Tamil 
Battlefields in London, Toronto and Paris”, 48 International Studies 2 (2011), p. 120 
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879 Ibid, p. 120 
880 N. Ball, “The Reconstruction and transformation of war-torn societies and state institutions: How can 
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internationalised.881 Rivalry between regional powers can be played out in the theatre of local 
conflicts.882 Warring parties tap into global economic systems.883 Sometimes parties to violent 
conflicts rely on international criminal networks to advance their interests or maintain their 
position in a conflict.884 In many cases, non-state entities, such as criminal gangs or terrorist 
organisations, operate on a transnational scale.885 Violence between individuals and groups, as 
well as between states, therefore manifests on a global scale.886   
The transnational nature of the threat means that the right to peace, as construed in the 
constitutions of Japan887 and Costa Rica,888 is insufficient. In focusing purely on inter-state 
violence, the national-level construction fails to account for the change in the authors of violence 
in the transnational age, where states no-longer have a monopoly on violence. The threat of 
violence now extends beyond states. It cannot, therefore, be adequately addressed by a right that 
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887 Constitution of Japan, n. 803, Art. 46 
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focuses exclusively on inter-state violence. In misstating the threat, the domestic-level 





 As in the case of urgency and standard threat, the right to peace, as it is expressed at 
international level, does not meet the third Beitz criterion. The rights mechanism will not be 
reasonably effective in protecting the interest in peace if “peace” is construed as a right to rights 
or a set of general entitlements. In their responses to the Intergovernmental Working Group on 
the Right to Peace, the EU and USA each raised five issues in critique of the proposed right to 
peace.889 They argued that it (a) contains no practical obligations, (b) has no basis in international 
law, (c) undermines the legitimate use of force, (d) is promoted by and operates to protect non-
democratic regimes, and (e) is already, and more appropriately, addressed in non-rights fora.890  
 The strongest point of critique is the first. The right to peace, as expressed in the 2017 
Declaration, cannot protect the interest in peace to reasonable effect because (a) it does not 
include any clear definition of “peace” and (b) it does not contain any obligations with real 
practical value. In the first instance, many of the obligations it contains are too broadly drafted to 
be applicable in a practical sense. One outstanding example is the obligation for states to take 
“appropriate measures”891 to guarantee “freedom from fear and want”.892 While the obligation to 
                                                          
889 EU letter to the IGWG, 15th February 2013, and US letter to the IGWG, 18th February 2013, both 
available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCOuncil/WGRightPeace/StatesGeneralComments.pdf 
(last accessed 12th July 2017) 
890 Ibid. 
891 2017 Declaration, n. 731, Art. 4 
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take “appropriate measures” mirrors language common to many rights instruments,893 the 2017 
Declaration contains no definition or description of what “freedom from fear and want” might 
look like. In the case of some human rights, the substance may be fleshed out through the 
application of the right.894 The prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment, for example, has 
been clarified through a series of cases, primarily in the European Court of Human Rights, in 
which instances of “cruel and unusual treatment” have been identified as such.895 Yet the phrase 
“freedom from fear and want” is too broad and too vague even to admit the possibility of this 
type of clarification process. It simply includes too much. It is difficult to see what obligations or 
entitlements would not fall into the category of freedom from fear and want. This contrasts with 
the prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment.896 While the term “cruel and inhuman” requires 
further definition, it clearly excludes the majority of treatment. In encompassing too much, by 
contrast, the right to peace it ends up meaning very little.  
The more focused provisions, however, fail to add any real practical value because they 
simply duplicate entitlements or obligations found elsewhere. References to “all human 
rights”,897 “the rule of law”,898 or “non-discrimination”899 can all assign obligations that are 
enforceable in a practical sense. They are, however, already protected by other international law 
instruments900. This means that any obligations are also contained in those instruments. These 
                                                          
893 Such as, for example, Art. 1(2) of the UN Charter, n. 923 
894 For a more complete examination of this see Dustin N. Sharp, “Reappraising the Significance of Third 
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references in the 2017 Declaration, therefore, repeat entitlements and obligations already found 
elsewhere and therefore add nothing of practical value to the protection of urgent interests. 
 The expression of the right at national level demonstrates that it is possible to frame a 
right to peace that protects, at least part of, the interest in peace to reasonable effect. The 
expressions of the right in the Costa Rican901 and Japanese902 jurisprudence demonstrates that, 
where the right is tightly constructed, it can be enforced by individuals against the state and 
applied by the courts. It remains to be seen, however, if a right that protected the entirety of the 
interest in peace could be enforced to similar effect. In the case of the right to peace, therefore, 
meeting the third Beitz criterion is perhaps not out of the question, but no current construction of 




 The argument that the right lacks a basis in international law is, prima facie, less 
effective as a critique. It is nevertheless worth considering. Most obligations in the 2017 
Declaration are replicated in other international law instruments.903 There is a legal basis, for 
example, for the obligation to respect the rule of law, human rights, and non-discrimination.904 It 
is more difficult, although not out of the question, to find a legal basis for a right to peace that 
focuses purely on prohibiting violence. While inter-state violence is clearly prohibited by 
international law (with a few, limited, exceptions), it is not clear that this prohibition amounts to 
                                                          
901 See Katz and Lackey, n. 745 
902 See Hamilton, n. 744 
903 See discussion at n. 900 
904 This does not, however, redeem the 2017 Declaration to any real extent. Given that the obligations in 
the 2017 Declaration don’t go beyond their expressions in other instruments, their legal basis is of little 
practical consequence: they merely replicate duties already recognised elsewhere. 
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a right exercisable by individuals.905 The interest in peace, as the absence of violence, is well 
established as a norm of international law.906 It was originally recognised in the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact in 1928907 and the 1931 US foreign policy doctrine prohibiting recognition of territorial 
changes achieved by force.908 This doctrine was given international recognition by the League of 
Nations’ 1932 resolution on Manchuria.909 Non-aggression was subsequently recognised as a 
norm of international law in, inter alia, the 1934 Budapest Articles of Interpretation for the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact,910 the 1945 London Agreement,911 Articles 2, 4, 33-38 and 55 of the UN 
Charter,912 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,913 the 1978 General Assembly 
Declaration on Friendly Relations,914 the 1977 Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation 
of International Détente,915 and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.916 The 
US and EU responses argue that these instruments (and the others in which peace is recognised) 
establish peace as a right of states, but not a right of individuals.917 The majority of the above 
instruments refer exclusively to inter-state violence. An individual right to peace has primarily 
been recognised in soft-law instruments.918 It is therefore difficult to argue that a legal basis for 
an individual right to peace exists in international law as it currently stands (particularly as the 
US and EU’s scepticism prevents any international consensus). There is clearly potential for a 
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906 Ibid., p. 4 
907 Ibid., p. 4 
908 Ibid., p. 4 
909 Ibid., p. 6 
910 Ibid., p. 4 
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more tightly defined right to emerge from the soft-law expressions and the jus cogens prohibition 
of inter-state violence. This would, however, require bridging the gap between peace as a norm 
of inter-state behaviour and peace as a right exercisable by individuals. At present, it is not clear 
how this will be achieved. 
 
The Use of Force 
 
 It is incorrect to say that the right to peace will outlaw the use of force entirely, either as 
it is expressed in the 2017 Declaration919 or in a more focused construction. Indeed, the criticism, 
that the right will leave no room for legitimate force in international relations, seems to conflate 
the right to peace with a complete prohibition of intervention. This is not the case. All iterations 
of the right to date have leave space for humanitarian intervention, the use of force in discharging 
the responsibility to protect, or in self-defence, according to international law and the UN 
Charter. The 1984 Declaration, for example, sets the right in the context of existing international 
law920, as do the 2005921 and 2008922 Resolutions. Article 5 of the 2017 Declaration states:  
“Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations. The provisions included in the present Declaration 
are to be understood in line with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and relevant international and regional instruments ratified 
by States.” 
International law, and the UN Charter in particular, permits the use of force, including for 
                                                          
919 2017 Declaration, n. 731 
920 1984 Declaration, n. 735, Preamble 
921 2005 Resolution, n. 739, Arts. 5, 6, and 8 
922 Human Rights Council, Resolution on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, 
n. 865, Preamble 
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humanitarian intervention,923 discharging the responsibility to protect,924 or for self-defence.925 If 
the entitlements and duties contained in the right to peace are to be construed in accordance with 
existing international law and/or the UN Charter, then it should be assumed that they do not 
infringe on the space for the legitimate use of force set aside in international law. There is no 
reason that a right focused purely on violence could not be similarly structured.  
 
The Role of Non-Democratic States 
 
 While a number of democratic states, such as Costa Rica and South Korea, supported the 
2017 Declaration, the votes it received in the Human Rights Council were primarily from non-
democratic states.926 This raises the question of whether the right is truly aimed at establishing 
peace (concerns about the definition of that concept aside) or whether it was aimed at 
legitimising non-democratic regimes.927 This criticism seems valid in relation to the 2017 
Declaration. While states support the right to peace for various different reasons,928 states like Sri 
Lanka could undoubtedly use the 2017 Declaration to shield themselves from international 
critique or intervention in response to its repression of the Tamil minority.929  
 It is not correct, however, to suggest that the right to peace is solely or primarily the 
preserve of non-democratic states. The idea of a right that focuses on limiting violence has 
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incubated in Western democratic states.930 The Spanish Society for International Human Rights, 
which developed a comprehensive expression of a right to peace in the Lucara Declaration.931 
This was supported by over 500 civil society organisations.932 Before that, the idea of peace as an 
individual right had been approved by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 
Istanbul Declaration in 1967.933 The norm of non-aggression has also been endorsed and applied 
by “people’s tribunals”, such as the Russell Tribunal in 1967934 and the Clark Tribunal in 
2004,935 which came together to both declare and castigate their governments for acts of 
aggression. If Western governments have not yet embraced the right to peace, Western civil 
society has certainly done so. An expression of the right focussed on violence could not, 
therefore, be legitimately subject to the criticism of being primarily advocated by non-democratic 
regimes.  
 
Better addressed through other mechanisms 
 
 The argument that the right to peace is better addressed by other mechanisms seems, 
prima facie, to misstate the utility of human rights. Rights disperse power. Other, non-rights, 
mechanisms that address issues of war and peace are dominated by governments and therefore 
concentrate power. The interest in peace is an interest of individuals as well as governments. The 
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rights mechanism disperses power to demand the protection and promotion of the interest in 
peace to individuals. This makes it more likely that the interest will be protected. Even if the 
interest in peace is addressed by other mechanisms, the rights mechanism therefore plays a useful 
role.936  
 In the case of the right to peace (as it is construed at international level), however, this 
defence does not hold up. The bundle of interests addressed in the 2017 Declaration are generally 
already protected by other rights. They are thus already protected by the rights mechanism. Even 
given the argument in the previous paragraph, there is no utility in protecting an interest with the 
rights mechanism twice. The mechanism does not, therefore, add any new utility to the 






 The right to peace, as it is currently construed at international level does not meet the 
Beitz criteria. The international expression, as exemplified in the 2017 Declaration, construes 
peace as a bundle of social entitlements, an “umbrella” right, rather than as a protection against 
violence (as it was originally construed). Such an interest cannot be urgent in itself, nor can it 
face an identifiable standard threat, because any urgency or threat takes effect at the level of the 
discrete rights in the bundle rather than the umbrella “right to rights”. In containing obligations 
that are either too broad to be meaningful or already duplicated by other rights, the international 
expression has no meaningful impact in protecting the interest in peace (however it is defined). 
                                                          
936 This argument is made in more detail at pp. 280-284 
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The rights mechanism cannot, therefore, be described as reasonably effective at protecting the 
interest in peace. 
 The right, as construed at domestic and regional level, also fails to meet the Beitz 
criteria. At this level, as expressed in the constitutional jurisprudence of Japan and Costa Rica 
and the Banjul Charter, the right is focused tightly on inter-state violence. While it is arguable 
that limiting violence is an important interest, any urgency lies at the level of violence as a 
whole, not with particular subsets of violence (such as inter-state violence). The national and 
regional level constructions of the right also fail to address the globalised nature of violence in 
the transnational age. They do not, therefore, satisfy the Beitz criteria.  
 By contrast, if the “peace” is construed as the absence of violence, the right to peace has 
the potential to meet the Beitz criteria. Prohibiting illegitimate violence is an urgent interest 
because violence dehumanises both the perpetrator and the victim. The interest is faced with the 
standard threat of globalised violence. Any argument for such a right will, however, need to 
overcome the hurdle of the absence of a basis in international law for peace as an individual 
right. It seems, therefore, that the right to peace, in any of its current constructions, does not meet 
the Beitz criteria and should not be considered a right in the Practice. The potential remains, 








 In the final substantive chapter of this thesis I will consider the principal critiques 
of solidarity rights and argue that they are satisfactorily addressed by Beitz’s political 
approach, as I have applied it in Chapters Four to Seven. There are four chief critiques of 
solidarity rights. (1) They are incompatible with other classes of rights (the 
“compatibility critique”). (2) They are impractical as a tool for protecting important 
interests (the “practicality critique”). (3) They are unnecessary because other, non-rights, 
mechanisms already protect common-good interests (the “necessity critique”). (4) The 
“hybrid” nature of solidarity rights, combining rights discourses with discourses around 
other classes of political norms, means they are not an appropriate addition to the 
Practice (the “hybridity critique”). In this chapter I will argue that these critiques are only 
sustainable if common-good interests are either less urgent than independent-good 
interests, or it is impossible to effectively protect common-good interests with the rights 
mechanism. The main critiques of solidarity rights are thus addressed by applying two of 
Beitz’s three criteria for recognition as a right. In chapters four to seven I demonstrated 
that common-good interests can be both urgent and protected to reasonable effect by the 
rights mechanism. The principle critiques of solidarity rights are therefore answered by 






The Compatibility Critique 
 
 The compatibility critique of solidarity rights is that they are incompatible with 
the accepted classes of human rights. There are three versions of the compatibility 
critique. The first is that solidarity rights can be used by states to subvert other individual 
rights. The second is that solidarity right clash with other individual rights. The third is 
that solidarity rights “politicise” the rights discourse. In my view, all three versions of 
the critique rely on the premise that common-good interests cannot be of equal urgency 
to independent-good interests. As I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, this 
premise is mistaken.  
 
Rights of peoples or states? 
 
The first version of the compatibility critique is that solidarity rights can be used 
to subject the interests of the individual to the interests of the state. This version, 
however, assumes an interpretation of solidarity rights that is not reflected in 
international law. This critique is a by-product of the controversy regarding the definition 
of a “people” (analysed in Chapter Three). For Donnelley, solidarity rights are exercised 
by peoples rather than individuals. A people has no legal definition so, in practice, 
solidarity rights must be exercised by some form of institution.937 The most obvious 
candidate is a state.938 Donnelley cites the right to self-determination as a demonstration 
of this analysis, claiming there is no evidence of the right to self-determination being 
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938 Ibid, p. 498 
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exercised by a people against the state in which it resides.939 Self-determination is 
therefore a right exercised by states against domination by other states.940 This is 
incompatible with the nature of human rights, which are held against states not by them. 
In Donnelley’s words “the very idea of a human right held by the state is incoherent”.941 
If solidarity rights are exercised by states, then they cannot be human rights. Treating 
them like human rights devalues the Practice. It enables states to benefit from a 
mechanism that was specifically designed to limit their power. Furthermore, if states can 
exercise human rights in a manner equivalent to individuals, then states can use 
solidarity rights to undermine other individual rights. The United States withdrew from 
UNESCO in 1984 on a similar premise, claiming, inter alia, that UNESCO’s 
development of “peoples’ rights” was merely a means of advancing undemocratic forms 
of government and minimizing the impact of individual rights.942  
This critique, however, misstates the nature of solidarity rights. As argued in 
Chapter Three, a “people” is not the holder of a solidarity right. It refers to the condition 
in which a common-good interest is meaningfully experienced by the individual. 
Individuals are the holders of solidarity rights. Solidarity rights, therefore, need not be 
exclusively exercised by states. Indeed, contrary to Donnelley’s assertion, solidarity 
rights, including self-determination, can be and are exercised against states. In Bernard 
Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada the right to self-determination was 
                                                          
939 Ibid, pp. 499-500 
940 Ibid, pp. 499-500 
941 Ibid, p. 498 
942 Executive Summary of the US Department of State's Policy Review of US-UNESCO Relations, 432 
Aust. Int. Law. News. [1984], pp. 432-440 
 264 
exercised by members of a first nation tribe against the state of Canada943. In Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria the right to a clean and healthy environment 
was exercised by individuals (although the litigation was conducted by an NGO) against 
the state of Nigeria.944 In Comunidad de Chanaral v Codelco Division el Salvador the 
right to a clean and healthy environment was exercised by an individual (acting as a 
representative for future generations) against the state of El Salvador.945 Donnelley’s 
assertion, that solidarity rights are only exercised by states, is clearly not supportable. 
 Donnelley is right to say that institutions can play a role in the exercise of 
solidarity rights. Yet institutions play a role in the exercise of all classes of rights. 
Exercising a human right requires articulating a claim against one or more states. 
Institutions can, on occasion, articulate a claim more effectively than individuals acting 
alone. States can access greater resources, more prominent platforms, or greater political 
authority. When institutions articulate human rights claims, however, those claims are 
based on the rights of individuals. Institutions, such as NGOs, often undertake litigation 
based on civil and political rights. Amnesty International and the International 
Commission of Jurists (both NGOs), for example, both intervened in litigation between 
former Guantanamo Bay detainees and Poland.946 The litigation concerned the 
prohibition on torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, enshrined in Art. 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights947 and Art. 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. This does not mean that the Art. 3 right is held by NGOs. 
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945 (1988) S/Recurso de Protecion Corta Suprema 
946 Al Nashiri v Poland, European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 28761/11, 24th July 2014  
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The right is held by individuals but NGOs play a role in enforcing the duties for which 
the right provides.  
The same is true for solidarity rights. When one territory secedes from another, it 
may appear as if the right to self-determination is exercised by the new state or territorial 
government. In such cases, however, the internal limb of the right to self-determination 
requires that the state or territory respect the collective will of the individuals it claims to 
represent.948 When South Sudan seceded from Sudan, it made arguments based on the 
right to self-determination.949 International practice generally requires that secession can 
only be legitimately accomplished if it is demonstrated that it is the genuine will of the 
people in the relevant territory.950 International practice generally requires a referendum 
of the citizens of a territory that wishes to secede. This was the case on South Sudan.951 
Solidarity rights, like self-determination, can be exercised by states. This is only 
legitimate, however, when the exercise of the right is the collective will of the 
individuals in that state. The individual is the holder of the right.952 A better 
understanding is thus that the citizens of a state use the state as a tool by which to 
exercise their solidarity rights. This version of the compatibility critique seems to be 
largely based on an interpretation of solidarity rights that does not generally match the 
way they manifest in the Practice.  
 
Clash of rights 
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 An alternative version of the compatibility critique is based on the risk of a clash 
of rights. If solidarity rights clash with other individual rights they can be used to 
empower the collective at the expense of the individual, even if the collective is not 
represented by a state. This version of the critique is, however, ultimately based on the 
premise that common-good interests cannot be urgent in the same way as independent-
good interests.  
Sieghart argues that rights should protect individuals, not abstract concepts (like 
“solidarity” or “a people”). If the latter are given protection ahead of the former, then this 
will inevitably lead to injustice: 
"abstract concepts have in the past only too often presented great dangers to the 
enjoyment by individuals of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some 
of the worst violations of those rights have been perpetrated in the service of 
some inspiring abstractions, such as 'the one true faith', 'the nation', 'the state' 
(including, as a recent example, 'das Reich'), 'the economy' (including 'a strong 
dollar or pound'), and indeed 'the masses'. A 'people' is no less an abstraction than 
any of these: it cannot, in reality, consist of anything more than the individuals 
who compose it. If any of the individual rights and freedoms protected by modern 
international human rights law ever came to be regarded as subservient to the 
right of the 'people' - there would be a very real risk that legitimacy might be 




Yet Sieghart is not comparing like with like. The abstractions cited by Sieghart 
are all rhetorical devices used to win political arguments. That is not how the concept of 
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a people is applied in solidarity rights discourse. Individuals are not subservient to the 
“people”: “The people” describes the context in which individuals experience certain 
individual interests. The case for solidarity rights is that common-good interests are 
important to individuals in a manner equivalent to independent-good interests (as was 
argued in Chapter Four). Solidarity rights, like all human rights, are important because 
the individual is important. This is not an abstraction; it is a specific agreement amongst 
all participants in the Practice (see Chapter One). 
 
Sanders presents an alternative version of the clash of rights argument. For him, it 
is inevitable that, in a practical sense, individuals must sometimes rely on representatives 
to articulate their solidarity rights: 
“Collective rights cannot be satisfactorily recognised without the existence of 
representatives or institutions designed to further a collectivity’s goals, and so 
individual members of the collectivity play subordinate roles. And while group 
rights organisations have standing to promote the group’s interests, collectivity 
representatives and institutions have almost exclusive legitimacy to assert and 
manage the collective rights.”
954
 
Sanders accepts the conduct of litigation by representatives of a group will not 
necessarily lead to injustice. Yet it may, he suggests, have the effect of concentrating 
power in the hands of a small elite. Which can then pursue its own ends, using the 
authority conferred by the claim that it is articulating a right on behalf of the group. In 
the name of respect for a right belonging to the people as a whole, an elite can thus 
compromise the rights of individuals.955 
                                                          
954 Douglas Sanders, “Collective Rights”, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. 368 1991 
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The Shah Bano956 case in India can, prima facie, be seen as an example of this. In 
that case, both the claimant and defendant belonged to India's Muslim minority. Indian 
law stated that a man must pay maintenance to support an indigent wife after they have 
separated.957 Muslim law limits the period that a man must make maintenance payments 
to three months and ten days. It also imposes the condition that the woman remains 
celibate to protect the paternity of any possible child.958 The Indian Supreme Court, 
applying Indian law,959 held that the husband should pay maintenance indefinitely,960 
India’s (then) ruling Congress Party, however, had made protection of minority and 
cultural rights was a major theme in its election campaign.961 The court’s decision in 
Shah Bano provoked an outcry from leaders of the Muslim Community, exclusively 
wealthy males. In response, the Congress Party legislated to overturn the court’s decision 
in Shah Bano.962 The resulting law protected the “cultural rights” of the Islamic 
community by strictly limiting the rights of a divorced woman to claim maintenance 
money from her husband. These limits apply even when she has invested her own money 
in the family home, or is left with the responsibility of raising the couple’s children 
alone.963  
The Shah Bano episode demonstrates how a small elite can appeal to a supposed 
“group interest” to subvert the individual interests of the less powerful members of that 
group. It does not, however, demonstrate that solidarity rights necessarily lead to such a 
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conclusion. The episode resolved as it did because a rights-based analysis was 
abandoned rather than applied. The courts applied a rights-based analysis, in which the 
interest of the woman trumped the interest of the leaders of the Muslim community. The 
Congress Party abandoned a rights-based analysis. It legislated in favour of a particular 
group, Muslim men, because this was the best way to guarantee political support. The 
Shah Bano episode demonstrates the limitations of majoritarian democracy in protecting 
groups (like Muslim women) that are traditionally excluded from the democratic 
process.964  
Tension between rights is an inevitable feature of the Practice. It is certainly not 
unique to solidarity rights. As Eugene Kamenka puts it: "Claims, whether presented as 
rights or not, conflict."965 Civil and political rights can also conflict with each other, with 
economic, social, and cultural rights and with solidarity rights. In Open Door and Dublin 
Well Woman v Ireland966 the Irish government defended its ban on the transmission of 
information about abortions, relying, inter alia, on Art. 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (the right to life). The government argued that the ban on the transmission 
of information about abortions was necessary to protect the Art. 2 right of unborn 
children. The applicants relied on Art. 10 of the European Convention (freedom of 
expression). They argued that the government’s measure violated their right to freely 
express information about abortions. Two “civil and political” rights thus clashed. The 
courts resolved the clash by analysing the balance of interests involved in relation to the 
                                                          
964 Helen Rizzo, Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Latif, and Katherine Meyer, “The Relationship Between Gender 
Equality and Democracy: A Comparison of Arab Versus Non-Arab Muslim Societies”, 41 Sociology 6, pp. 
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(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 127-139 
966 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, (14234/88) [1992] ECHR 68 (29 October 1992) 
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particular circumstances of the case. This process has continued through Irish political 
discourse.967  
Tension will always exist between rights, but it may be resolved in the courts by 
consideration of the individual circumstances of the dispute on a case by case basis.968 In 
Gerhardy v Brown969 the Australian High Court considered a clash between a solidarity 
right and a civil right. It upheld the exclusion of an aboriginal man from certain lands in 
South Australia because he was not a member of the Pitjantjatjara nation. The court 
weighed the civil right (of the claimant to access the land in question) with the solidarity 
right (of the members of the Pitjantjatjara nation to self-determination). It held that the 
Pitjantjatjara nation was the traditional owners of the land. In the light of a history of 
marginalisation, their survival as a nation depended on continued exclusive access to that 
land. The court also held that the exclusion of the non-Pitjantjatjara man was a violation 
of his rights under both national and international law. Yet the violation was justified 
because the loss he suffered was, in the context, less significant than the loss the 
Pitjantjatjara nation would suffer if they were not able to maintain their exclusive use of 
the land. Gerhardy demonstrates that solidarity rights can be balanced against civil and 
political rights and a just resolution found. Alternatively tension between rights might be 
worked out through the political discourse. Arguments about the balance of rights are 
used by both sides in Ireland’s ongoing public debate about abortion.970  
If the clash between two civil rights is not inimical to the legitimacy of civil and 
political rights as a class, then it is difficult to justify the position that a clash between a 
civil right and a solidarity right must undermine a legitimacy of the latter class. A clash 
                                                          
967 Siobhan Mullaly, “Debating Reproductive Rights In Ireland”, 27 H.R.Q. 1 (2005), pp. 78-104 
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between a civil right and a solidarity right only becomes problematic if solidarity rights 
are, inherently, less important than other classes of rights. In that case, balancing the 
rights would be unjust because it would mean giving an unimportant interest equivalent 
status to an important interest. The crux of the compatibility argument is, therefore, the 
urgency of common-good interests. If solidarity rights can be urgent then they can be 
balanced against other classes of rights without inevitable injustice, in the same way as 
civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights are balanced against 
each other. If, however, common-good interests do not have equivalent urgency to the 
interests protected by other classes of rights, then it is unjust to balance them against 




It has been argued that solidarity rights represent the interests of powerful agents 
rather than the interests of the individuals they claim to protect. For Bilder, few 
governments see political value in opposing the creation of new rights outright.971 Even 
when governments do not believe that the interest in question merits protection with the 
rights mechanism, it is often more politically expedient to accept the right formally but 
ignore it in practice.972 The norms of the Practice do not, therefore, represent the true will 
of the international community, even after they have been enshrined in international law.  
This creates space for interest groups to manipulate the Practice to advance their 
own partisan agendas. If states do not take the formal mechanisms for the identification 
of human rights seriously, it is much easier for interest groups to advance partisan claims 
                                                          
971 Bilder, n. 210, pp. 171 - 217 
972 Ibid, pp. 171 - 217 
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and have them protected as “rights”.973 For Bilder, recognition of rights often 
“represent[s] the vagaries of current UN politics rather than widespread and significant 
popular demands”974. He cites, as an example, cooperation between Arab states at the 
Tehran conference to focus human rights discussions on Israel for abuses in Palestine.975 
This is not an isolated phenomenon. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation states 
have, on multiple occasions, combined to focus debate in the UN Human Rights Council 
on Israel.976 In doing so they have used the Council to advance a particular political 
agenda. Regional human rights treaties can also reflect political agendas. The Arab 
Charter of Human Rights was adopted in 2004 after the first draft was rejected as being 
too far from international norms.977 Although the second draft was closer to international 
standards of human rights it retained certain highly politicised aspects.978 Art. 2 of the 
Arab Charter, the right to resist occupation,979 is specifically aimed at the Israel-Palestine 
conflict.980 It therefore reflects a particular political agenda, not a generally important 
interest. 
International Human Rights treaties are negotiated by states, on the understanding 
that states are the best representatives of their citizens at international level. There is, 
however, little guarantee that this is the case. Access to UN or regional human rights 
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organisations is not limited to democracies.981 It is difficult to have confidence that rights 
protect the genuine interests of individuals if they are identified with mechanisms which 
afford equal influence to dictators as they do to democracies. 
If Bilder’s critique is correct then it must apply to all human rights, not merely to 
solidarity rights. If rights are created by a process that represents the interests of certain 
political elites, rather than the general will, then all rights must be considered 
“politicised”. Yet Bilder982 and Alston,983 the chief proponents of the "politicisation" 
critique, generally embrace civil and political and economic cultural and social rights984 
when, in the Practice, all human rights are identified and protected with the same flawed 
mechanism. There is a significant body of literature arguing that civil and political rights 
are, themselves, tools designed to advance the political agenda of western elites rather 
than the general interests of individuals.985 For Susan Brophy986 and Zehra F. Kabasakal 
Arat.987 the international human rights discourse has been manipulated to focus 
disproportionally on civil and political rights in a way that benefits a neo-liberal 
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economic agenda.988 If solidarity rights lack legitimacy because they reflect political 
agendas, then all rights lack legitimacy, because all rights reflect political agendas.  
It is inevitable that the rights recognised in the Practice are the result of political 
agendas because the Practice is a political undertaking. Claims to objectivity invite 
scepticism.989 Any proposition that “x interest merits recognition as a right” is therefore a 
subjective statement. It is also a political statement because it proposes a certain norm for 
application to the rest of society. Beitz’s political approach accepts that all statements 
about rights are political statements. All proposals for rights represent one or more 
political agendas. A proposal is successful in the Practice if the proposer can convince a 
sufficiently broad cross section of the other participants to endorse her proposal. In other 
words, to accept that aspect of her political agenda.  
Civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights generally 
reflect the political agendas of, respectively, western liberals and Eastern Bloc 
socialists.990 If the interests recognised by the Practice are limited to those classes of 
rights, then the Practice, as a whole, is purely a vehicle for two political agendas. In the 
absence of objective knowledge about what interests are more important than others, the 
Practice can only have widespread authority if it is open to all political agendas. When 
no agenda can be completely satisfactory, it is rational to open the Practice to the widest 
possible cross-section. It is imperfect and, occasionally, even unjust. Yet, when any 
political interest can be protected by a right, those of all political persuasions have a 
reason to participate in the Practice. All political positions must have the chance to make 
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the case that their interests are of sufficient importance to protect with the rights 
mechanism. 
In summary, if the interests protected by solidarity rights can be of equivalent 
importance to the interests protected other classes of rights, then solidarity rights are 
compatible with the Practice. Solidarity rights are held by individuals and protect the 
interests of individuals. They do not protect abstract concepts. All rights express political 
agendas. Excluding certain agendas from competition for recognition in the Practice de-
legitimises the Practice. It is only justifiable if the interests that are excluded cannot be as 
urgent as the interests protected by the accepted classes. As I have argued in Chapters 
Four to Seven, common-good interests can be of equal urgency as independent-good 
interests. Beitz’s political approach, therefore, offers a satisfactory response to the 
compatibility critique. 
 
The Practicality Critique 
 
 The second major critique of solidarity rights is that they have little or no 
practical impact in safeguarding the interests they are intended to protect. This is, in 
essence, a question of the reasonable effect of the rights mechanism in protecting 
common-good interests. As I have demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, the rights 
mechanism can be, and is, effective in protecting common-good interests. The 
application of Beitz’s political approach thus answers this critique.  
The leading proponent of the practicality critique, Philip Alston, charges the 
supporters of solidarity rights with failing to properly develop the practical implications 
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of the concept.991 For Alston, solidarity rights are too “vague” to be enforceable either in 
a political or judicial framework.992 The value of human rights lies in the potential to 
enforce them in a court of law. If rights cannot be enforced in court, then they are not 
human rights. So-called “rights”, which are too vague or imprecise to be used in court, 
may be authoritative moral claims, but they have no place in international (or domestic) 
human rights law.993 Furthermore, opponents of human rights often dismiss the Practice 
as utopian.994 Endorsing rights that cannot be enforced in any practical sense lends 
credence to this critique.995 Solidarity rights are thus doubly problematic: they lack 
legitimacy in themselves, and their very existence undermines the legitimacy of the 
entire concept of human rights as a body of law.996 
It can be argued that human rights have authority even if they are not justiciable. 
For Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im997, critiques like Alston’s show insufficient 
appreciation for the “political and discourse value”998 of describing interests as rights. 
International law does not take effect in the same way as domestic law. The latter is 
enforced in a direct manner by domestic institutions such as the police and the courts. 
These institutions can enforce domestic law effectively because they wield coercive 
power. There are no equivalent institutions to enforce international law. International law 
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may be applied by international courts or institutions, but these both lack coercive power 
equivalent to that wielded by the institutions that enforce domestic law. Sometimes 
international law may be enforced by other states, through intervention. These 
mechanism, however, are not applied with equivalent consistency to the methods of 
enforcement available for domestic law. International law, therefore, often takes effect 
through an international relations discourse. It is cited to put diplomatic or, occasionally, 
military pressure on another state. This is often occurs on an ad hoc basis rather than 
because of consistent judicial decision making.999 Enshrining a claim as a right in 
international law gives it greater political influence, even if it is difficult to articulate in 
court.1000 Indeed, the latter may never actually need to happen for the right to have the 
intended effect.1001 
An-Na'im's argument relies, however, on the assertion that human rights have a 
persuasive impact that is independent of their legal impact. For An-Na’im, the justiciable 
impact of rights can be separated from the persuasive impact and discarded. Yet this is 
not possible in the Practice. Human rights have value in international political discourse 
precisely because they are law. Enshrining human rights in international law indicates 
that the international community considers human rights to be norms of high importance. 
When state A appeals to an aspect of international law in pursuance of a diplomatic 
disagreement with state B, the implication of that appeal is that state B is legally obliged 
to concede to state A's demands. If State B refuses, State A is entitled to seek punitive 
measures, either in court or through political action. If this were not the case, then there 
would be no point in appealing to international law rather than some other normative 
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structure, such as natural law or a religious doctrine, as states did before the development 
of international law.1002 The assertion that rights need not be judiciable is therefore an 
insufficient response to the practicality critique. 
 We must, instead, engage with the veracity of the critique itself. The practicality 
critique relies on the assertion that solidarity rights cannot be enforced in a court of law. 
Donnelley suggests a version of the practicality critique. For him, the absence of a clear 
agent who can enforce the right makes solidarity rights effectively unenforceable.1003 
While rights are not immediately enforceable in courts of law, governments can, 
collectively or unilaterally, create structures that give them legal effect. This is part of 
discharging the first-level duty. In the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 makes the 
European Convention on Human Rights justiciable in English law. In turn, Section II of 
the European Convention makes the rights contained therein justiciable in the European 
Court of Human Rights. Chapters Six and Seven have demonstrated that, if appropriate 
provision is made, solidarity rights can be enforced in courts of law in the same way as 
the rights in the accepted classes. Donnelley’s version of the practicality critique is thus 
answered by the application of Beitz’s third criterion in this thesis, 
Alston’s posits a different version of the practicality critique. In his version, 
solidarity rights fail to place definable obligations on states. This means that the duty 
provision in the right, if it exists at all, is weak.1004 Alston’s critique, however, holds the 
duty element of solidarity rights to a higher standard of precision than that which is 
expected of civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural rights. Rights are 
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mid-level norms. They contain a general duty, not the specific steps required for that 
duty to be fulfilled.1005 If solidarity rights contained specific obligations, then they would 
be something other than human rights. As Dustin Sharp points out, the accepted classes 
of rights only contain general duties. The steps necessary to respect those duties must be 
clarified through further political and judicial processes.1006 The prohibition of torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is vague if one merely looks at the initial 
expression of the right (such as in the Universal Declaration,1007 International 
Convention in Civil and Political Rights1008 or European Convention on Human 
Rights).1009 It does not specify, for example, which actions constitute “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment”.1010 The specific tests for such treatment have been worked out 
through, inter alia, judicial consideration, domestic legislation and further international 
law instruments. Such a process is required to give clarity to any human right, not merely 
solidarity rights.1011  
As Eugene Kamenka puts it, the recognition of any right, whether civil and 
political right, economic, social, or cultural right, or solidarity right, is a “journey from 
the abstract to the practical”.1012 As mid-level norms, Rights do not contain the steps 
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required for their realisation, merely the duty to take some steps. That is why the 
respective international covenants provide for an obligation for states to adopt laws and 
measures necessary to ensure the realisation of the rights contained therein.1013 If rights 
contained the mechanisms for their realisation, then this provision would be unnecessary. 
There would be no barrier to “immediate realisation” because the rights themselves 
would provide the mechanism.  
It may be argued that Alston’s critique is better construed as a critique of any 
right that contains positive duties. Any right that imposes an obligation beyond the duty 
to refrain from a certain action, is too vague to be practical. Yet no right is entirely 
negative. Even the most ostensibly “simple” right contains positive obligations. The 
rights to life and privacy, for example, might be described as containing precise, negative 
mechanisms for their realisation. They, prima facie, require that the state refrain from 
killing its citizens or interfering in their private lives. Yet even these apparently simple 
rights include elements of vagueness. The right to privacy requires further definition 
between the “private” and the “public”. The right to life requires qualification in the case 
of the death penalty1014 and abortion.1015 Beyond this, both rights have been construed as 
including positive obligations to take measures to ensure that non-state actors do not 
infringe upon the rights of citizens.1016 These aspects of the rights have all been worked 
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out in both political and judicial fora through the development of further instruments, 
opinions and the application of the rights in specific contexts.  
The question for solidarity rights is not “do they contain precise duties ab intio?” 
It is “can we identify precise steps by which to respect the general duty for which they 
provide?” This is, ultimately, a question of reasonable effect. Imposing appropriate 
general duties is essential to effective protection of an interest. As demonstrated by 
chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, such steps can be discerned in the case of solidarity 
rights. Rights, such as the right to self-determination and environment, have been applied 
by international, regional and domestic courts. In Chapter Five I explored the steps that 
the international community has developed to respect the general duty in the right to self-
determination. These include the international law principle of non-interference, 
customary international norms that regulate the recognition of new states by the 
international community and justiciable rights that allow groups to pursue their claims 
for greater independence or secession. States have also developed measures to respect 
the inward-facing aspect of the duty for which self-determination provides. These 
include giving certain territories partial autonomy (such as in the Alto-Adige),1017 taking 
steps to protect the cultural institutions of self-identifying groups (as in Canada),1018 and 
developing systems of governance that respect the governance traditions of the various 
different political groups in the territory (as in Nigeria),1019 Chapter Seven argued that 
the right to a clean and healthy environment is moving towards a similar status and 
postulated further measures that might be taken to respect the general duty to protect the 
environment. In relation to pollution, states have respected the general duty be creating 
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justiciable legal rights that enable individuals to hold polluters accountable in domestic 
courts. In relation to climate change, I postulated that a justiciable right at international 
level that would facilitate individuals in holding states accountable for their failure to 
address climate change. These case studies demonstrate that solidarity rights can, and do, 
have a tangible impact as part of the Practice. 
 
The Necessity Critique 
 
The necessity critique is that solidarity rights do not add anything useful to 
international law. Where solidarity rights protect interests, this protection is already 
provided by non-rights mechanisms. This, however, misstates the purpose of human 
rights. As I have argued in the previous chapters, rights disperse power. The role of 
rights is not only to provide specific protections for an interest, but to give individuals 
the power to demand those measures from states.  
 For Carl Wellman, the increasing interdependence of international relations 
makes international solidarity necessary for the realisation of all human rights.1020 He 
accepts that this could be a basis for an argument for a new generation of rights.1021 For 
Wellman, however, new rights are unnecessary because human dignity is already 
adequately protected by other classes of rights.1022 If human dignity is still violated it is 
because the rights civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights are 
not adequately protected.1023 Proponents of international solidarity should, for Wellman, 
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focus on the realisation of civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural 
rights.1024  
Sigrun Skogly develops Wellman's argument with an analysis of the necessity of 
the proposed right not to be poor.1025 She argues that poverty already violates a range of 
existing human rights.1026 There is no need for a specific right not to be poor because 
every interest it might protect is already protected by other existing rights.1027 Attention 
should instead be focused on properly realising those rights which already exist.1028 A 
specific right not to be poor risks “diminishing regard that the HR system enjoys and risk 
using too much energy on getting something adopted, rather than using the already 
existing structures which, if implemented, would make a real difference in poverty 
alleviation”.1029 
                                                          
1024 Wellman, n. 177, p. 639 
1025 UN Commission on Human Rights: Resolution 2000/12 on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/12; Resolution 1999/26 on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, E/CN.4/RES/1999/26; 
Resolution 1998/25 on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, E/CN.4/RES/1998/25; Human Rights and 
Extreme Poverty, Report of the independent expert, Ms.Lizin, E/CN.4/1999/48; Report of the Independent 
Expert, Ms. Lizin, E/CN.4/2000/52; Report of the Workshop on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, E/ 
CN.4/2000/52/Add.1; Follow-up to the 4"h World Conference on Women: Review of mainstreaming in 
organisations of the UN System, E/CN.4/1998/22; (ii) UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights: Final Report on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, submitted by Special 
Rapporteur Mr. Leandro Despouy, E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1996/13; Resolution 2001/8 on Implementation of 
existing human rights norms and standards in the context of the fight against poverty, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/8; (iii) General Assembly: Resolution on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 8 
March 1999, A/RES/53/146; Implementation of the first United Nations Decade for the Eradication of 
Poverty (1997- 2006), Report of the Secretary-General, 7 September 1999, A/54/316; (iv) UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Statement on Poverty and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted on 4 May 2001, E/C.12/2001/10. 
1026 Sigrun I. Skogly, “Is There A Right Not To Be Poor?”, 2 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 59 2002 
1027 Ibid, p. 59  
1028 Ibid, p. 59  
1029 Ibid, p. 59  
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 Alston posits an alternative version of the necessity critique. For him, even if 
solidarity rights protect important interests, they remain unnecessary because those 
interests are already addressed by non-rights mechanisms in the international system.1030 
In Alston’s words "the world is unlikely to be a less peaceful place as a result of the 
failure to find a meaningful formulation of the right to peace."1031 
A response to this critique comes from Van Boven.1032 He begins with the 
proposition that human rights are universal, and interdependent.1033 For Van Boven, it 
makes practical sense that certain human rights are created to ensure the practical 
realisation of others.1034 Solidarity rights create the conditions necessary for the 
realization of civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.1035 For 
Van Boven, human rights are indivisible. This suggests that they are conceptually 
designed contribute to the realisation of each other.1036 This argument, however, casts 
solidarity rights as a second class of rights. It implies that solidarity rights only have 
value because they facilitate other, more important, interests. This thesis aspires to an 
argument that justifies solidarity rights because they are valuable in themselves. My case 
is that solidarity rights protect interests that are urgent in a manner that is equivalent to 
those protected by other classes of rights. Van Boven’s response to the necessity critique 
is therefore unsatisfying for the purposes of this thesis.  
                                                          
1030 Alston, n. 229, pp. 290-293 
1031 Ibid, p. 292 
1032 Theodore Van Boven, “A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities”, in Reflections on the 
Universal Declaration on Human Right: A Fiftieth Anniversary Anthology, (Copenhagen; Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1998), p. 461  
1033 Ibid, p. 461 
1034 Ibid, p. 461 
1035 Ibid, p. 461 
1036 Ibid, p. 461 
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As argued in the Chapter One, human rights disperse power by giving individuals 
recognised demands on their state. This transfers power from a concentrated form 
(concentrated in the hands of the state) to a dispersed form (shared between millions of 
individuals). It doesn’t matter that non-rights mechanisms already exist to address the 
interests protected by solidarity rights. The non-rights mechanisms, to which Alston and 
others refer, are generally international institutions. International institutions are 
generally dominated by states. All the power to respond to a standard threat is in the 
hands of states. Human rights put that power in the hands of the holders of the interests. 
The right to peace may not create a new mechanism for achieving world peace. But it 
places the power to recognisably demand action towards peace in the hands of 
individuals, where it was previously concentrated in the hands of states.  
An increase in the number of recognised rights will not devalue the concept of 
rights as a whole unless the new rights recognized have, in some way, less merit than 
those currently recognized. As Beitz argues, the Practice is evolving. Although common-
good interests may be addressed by other mechanisms, rights have a different function. 
Rights serve to place the power to demand action to protect certain interests in the hands 
of individuals, thus protecting an interest with a right has utility even if that interest is 
already addressed by other mechanisms. As was demonstrated in Chapter Seven, with 
the example of the right to a clean and healthy environment, the rights discourse puts the 
power to protect urgent interests in the hands of the holders of those interests, 
individuals, where non-rights measures often concentrate power in the hands of states. 
The Practice will only be devalued if rights are used to protect interests that do not merit 
that level of authoritative protection. The recognition of new interests as rights will 
undermine the practice only if those interests are not sufficiently urgent.  
 
 286 
The Hybridity Critique 
 
The most original critique of solidarity rights comes from Rosa Freedman. She 
applies hybridity theory as a lens through which to analyse solidarity rights. Freedman 
does not dismiss solidarity rights in totum, but rather identifies areas in which they 
require further scrutiny. Solidarity rights are, for Freedman, hybrid rights: resulting from 
a process of resistance and creation between the Global North and Global South.1037 In 
hybridity theory, new cultural phenomena are created by the process of resistance 
between dominator and dominated. Homi Bhabba, describes a metaphorical “third 
space” in which socio-cultural memes are created through the tensions between dominant 
and subaltern cultures, yet are the product of neither.1038 In Freedman’s words: “Bhabha's 
‘Third Space’ is a metaphor for the meeting of cultures—where the colonised and 
coloniser intertwine and from where the distinct hybrid identity emerges.”1039 
Freedman’s applies Bhabha’s theory of hybridity to analyse the Practice. For 
Freedman: “By engaging with the system of `rights', and by seeking to promote their 
own objectives within that framework, states from the Global South are using hybridity 
theories to inform their actions and to create processes and constructs that both meet and 
challenge the dominant ideology.”1040 The result is solidarity rights, which are “hybrid 
not only in terms of their substance, subjects and scope, but also in terms of the areas that 
they seek to bring into the human rights system.”1041 Solidarity rights thus challenge 
dominant ideologies of rights. 
                                                          
1037 Freedman, n. 3, pp. 935-959 
1038 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (Routledge: London, 1994), p. 10 
1039 Freedman, n. 3, p. 940 
1040 Ibid, p. 943 
1041 Ibid, p. 944 
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Freedman does not assign all solidarity rights to the class of “hybrid rights”. She 
posits two “waves” of development of solidarity rights.1042 The first “wave” was a direct 
reaction to colonialism. Rights such as self-determination and permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources were “crucial to the decolonisation process, enabling newly self-
governing states to assert collective rights to matters previously used by colonisers to 
subjugate and oppress those peoples.”1043 The “second wave” of solidarity rights 
developed after decolonization.1044 Freedman calls these “hybrid rights”. They represent  
“the intertwining of a range of national and regional—local—ideologies as well 
as the broad range of those states' colonial experiences. It is that merging of 
ideologies and experiences that brings different hybrid constructs to the fore 
within each new right. Each ideological construct depends on the states that 
create and promote the right, their own human rights objectives and values, and 
their experiences of the dominant, Western human rights ideologies.”1045  
                                                          
1042 Ibid, p. 941 
1043 Ibid, p. 948 
1044 I would challenge Freedman’s assertion that hybridity is unique to the “second wave” of solidarity 
rights. Hybridity is a fact of all human rights. Human rights are the product of centuries of resistance 
between individuals and states. Between elites, that have an interest in the concentration of power, and 
individuals, who have an interest in dispersing power (see Brownlie, n. 67, p. 205). Rights are only 
established in international law through negotiation, political trade off, cultural pressure, judicial 
interpretation and activist promotion. Every right, indeed the Practice as a whole, is the product of multiple 
and diverse socio-cultural, economic and political inputs. Civil and political rights and economic, social, 
and cultural rights have roots in western and socialist political culture (see Marks, n. 184, p. 255). But 
within those (broad) bands they are the product of a myriad of oppressions and resistance. Furthermore, 
human rights, as a concept, are ultimately the product of a process of oppression and resistance. Rights are 
only necessary due to unequal distributions of power. In Beitz’s model, rights respond to standard threats 
(see Beitz, n. 5, p. 129). This process of threat and response, worked out through discourse, is analogous to 
Bhabba’s model of hybridity. The Practice is, itself, effectively a “third space”.  
1045 Ibid, p. 949 
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Solidarity rights, for Freedman, challenge the dominant ideologies of rights 
(represented in the accepted classes) in their substance, subjects, and scope. Hybrid 
rights challenge traditional understandings of the substance of rights by bringing issues 
into the rights matrix that were previously addressed through non-rights mechanisms. 
These issues tend to reflect the interests promoted by states in the Global South. Hybrid 
rights also challenge dominant understandings of the subjects and scope of rights. They 
expand the nature of the duties that rights impose so that “states are made responsible for 
the behaviour of other states”.1046As a result, “human rights become a collective 
responsibility for all states”.1047 
Freedman does not distinguish between first level and second level duties in her 
discussion of the subjects and scope of rights. Her analysis, however, coheres with 
Beitz’s model. While rights have always, to a certain extent, made states “responsible for 
the behaviour of other states”, solidarity (or “hybrid”) rights alter the extent of this duty. 
The accepted classes of rights make states responsible for the behaviour of other states 
only when “other states” fail to respect their duties to their citizens. Solidarity rights 
concern duties that cannot be respected except by engaging with other states, because 
they concern transnational issues.  
For Freedman, the hybrid nature of solidarity rights does not make them 
necessarily problematic. It does, however, invite scepticism. Freedman’s hybridity 
analysis leads to a three-point critique of solidarity rights. For Freedman, hybrid rights 
create ambiguity as to the substance of rights1048 and the subjects of rights.1049 Further, 
                                                          
1046 Ibid, p. 953 
1047 Ibid, p. 954 
1048 Ibid, p. 949 
1049 Ibid, p. 952 
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they can be used by non-democratic states to avoid the duties imposed by the accepted 




Solidarity rights bring interests into the rights matrix that were not protected by 
the norms of the Practice under the dominant ideologies behind the accepted classes. 
This, for Freedman, means that the substance of hybrid rights can be vague. The 
substance of rights in the accepted classes, for Freedman, can be reduced to a “freedom 
from” or a “freedom to”. Solidarity rights do conform to an equivalent formulation. Yet, 
in my view, while the interests protected by solidarity rights differ in substance from 
those protected by the accepted classes, they all, ultimately, belong to the same class on a 
more fundamental level: the class of urgent interests.  
Solidarity rights do not alter the fundamental nature of the interests that may be 
protected by the rights mechanism. By encompassing inputs from the Global South, they, 
rather, represent the expansion of the discourse regarding urgent interests, to encompass 
a wider range or perspectives. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapters Six, Seven, and 
Eight, it is possible to specify the substance of solidarity rights without excessive 
vagueness. Like members of the accepted classes of rights, the substance of solidarity 
rights is clarified and specified through the rights discourse, such as through identifying 
specific steps that states can take to respect their first-level duty. The substance of the 
right to peace, for example, is specified in the steps detailed in the draft declaration. The 
substance of the right to a clean and healthy environment can be found in the network of 
international and regional environmental treaties.  
                                                          





The collective nature of the interests protected by solidarity rights mean that 
rights claims can be articulated by states. This creates a danger, Freedman suggests, that 
solidarity rights may begin to take effect as rights belonging states rather than the rights 
of individuals. For example: 
“The right to international solidarity and the right to a democratic and equitable 
order are aimed at states as an entity—rather than a group of people—and at 
groups of states, as they are collectives or groups of individuals. The Human 
Rights Council mandate on international solidarity, for example, requires the 
Independent Expert `to promote and consolidate international assistance to 
developing countries in their endeavours in development and the promotion of 
conditions that make the full realization of all human rights possible'. Although 
that responsibility discusses the individual as the rights holder, it is only in 
relation to secondary rights rather than to the right of international solidarity. It 
appears that states are the primary rights holders and that the realisation of the 
right to international solidarity will enable those rights holders—the states—to 
implement all human rights for individuals under their control.”1051  
States are necessary to represent the common-good interests of individuals at the 
international level. This does not, however, make states the holders of solidarity rights. 
While aid to states may play a role in the realization of various human rights, this does 
not make states the holders of those rights. States give aid to other states to respect their 
outward-facing duties under solidarity rights. The states that receive aid have an inward-
                                                          
1051 Freedman, n. 3, p. 952 
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facing duty, imposed by the rights in question, to use the aid to benefit the holders of the 
rights: individuals. When a state withholds the aid, it receives from its citizens, this 
represents a violation of their rights. When it is framed in human rights terms, the 
obligation to provide aid to developing states does not make states the holders of rights 
but, rather, the conduit through which the interests of their citizens can be more 
effectively protected. 
The Human Rights Council mandate on a democratic and equitable international 
order, for example, does not establish the right.1052 The mandate is part of the process by 
which states identify the steps necessary to respect the general duty for which the right 
provides. Nor does the mandate mean that the right is held by states. It rather indicates 
that distributing aid to states is one step by which the general duty can be respected. 
States are convenient institutions through which to distribute aid to individuals. It is 
certainly arguable that they are not the most effective structure by which to do so, but 




Freedman’s third point of critique is that solidarity rights facilitate non-
democratic regimes in minimising the impact of the accepted classes of rights.1053 Non-
democratic states, for Freedman, engage in the rights discourse in bad faith. They 
attempt to dilute the Practice by increasing the number of interests protected, thus 
obscuring their abuse of their own citizens. Yet the involvement of non-democratic states 
                                                          
1052 The right to a democratic and equitable international order was originally recognised by the United 
Nations General Assembly. (See UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Promotion of a Democratic and 
Equitable International Order, A/RES/65/223, 10th December 2010) 
1053 Ibid, p. 955 
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is not unique to solidarity rights. Most economic, social, and cultural rights were 
supported by members of the Warsaw Pact, few of which were democratic. Questions of 
the urgency of an interest are distinct from the nature of the states that support 
recognising that interest as a right. A dictatorial state may support protecting an urgent 
interest with the rights mechanism, or a democratic state may support protecting an 
urgent interest: the nature of the supporting party does not necessarily determine the 
urgency of the interest. Further, it is not possible, within the United Nations system, for 
an interest to gain recognition as a right (to the same level as the rights in the accepted 
classes) without broad support. An interest is unlikely to gain recognition as a right with 
the support of non-democratic states alone. While some non-democratic states 
undoubtedly engage in the discourse in bad faith, this should be understood as an aspect 
of the discourse that touches all rights, rather than as fatal to solidarity right as a class. 
Indeed, as Freedman argues, it is only by engagement in the discourse, particularly in 
relation to solidarity rights, that democratic states can effectively respond to the bad faith 




 The aim of this chapter was to argue that the principle theoretical objections to 
solidarity rights can be answered with the application of Beitz’s political approach. I 
have argued that all the principle critiques ultimately rely on assumptions about the 
urgency of common-good interests and whether they can be protected to reasonable 
effect by the rights mechanism. As chapters Four to Seven have shown, common-good 
interests can be urgent and in a manner equivalent to independent-good interests and they 
can be protected to reasonable effect by the rights mechanism. 
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The compatibility critique is that solidarity rights either empower the state or 
group in oppressing the individual, attempt to protect the relationship between 
individuals with a mechanism only appropriate for protecting the interests of individuals, 
or attempt to raise political propositions to the status of rights. Yet, in recognizing 
solidarity interests, one is not raising them above individual interests, only to the same 
level. This is only problematic if they are not of equivalent importance. According to 
Beitz’s approach, all rights are political propositions and thus will inevitably clash. The 
only reason a clash between rights that protect independent-good interests, and rights that 
protect common-good interests, would be problematic is if common-good interests do 
not merit being treated with equal authority to independent-good interests. Once again, it 
is a question of the urgency of the interests. Furthermore, to divorce the “relationships 
between individuals” with the same mechanism as “individuals” is only problematic if 
the relationship between individuals does not merit the same protection. The question of 
compatibility is thus, ultimately, a question of whether common-good interests are of 
equivalent urgency to independent-good interests. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, 
common-good interests can be essential to individual dignity in the same way as 
individual good interests. Thus, the compatibility critique is answered. 
 The necessity critique is that solidarity rights devalue the Practice as a whole, by 
using it to protect interests that do not require the protection of the rights mechanism. 
This is often because they already receive sufficient protection from other mechanisms. 
But this mistakes the effect of rights. Rights give individuals the power to demand that 
states take action to address standard threats. As the Practice is emergent it is to be 
expected that it will address new interests as human society evolves. Thus, the question 
is one of whether the interests that are protected merit the protection of the rights 
mechanism. In other words, whether the interests are sufficiently urgent. As 
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demonstrated by Chapter Four the urgency of common-good interests can be equivalent 
to that of individual good interests. As demonstrated by Chapter Five, this can be 
understood even from non-sympathetic perspectives. 
 The practicality critique is that solidarity rights cannot have a practical impact 
equivalent to other classes of rights because they are not justiciable in a similar manner. 
But it is incorrect to suggest that solidarity rights cannot have a practical impact. 
Methods of justiciability evolve to fit the interests that must be adjudicated. This is 
ultimately a question of reasonable effect. As demonstrated by chapters six and seven, 
the rights mechanism can, and does, protect common-good interests with reasonable 
effectiveness. 
 Finally, the hybridity critique recognises that solidarity rights represent the 
evolution of the Practice, but suggests it is evolution in the wrong direction. Hybrid 
rights are often proposed by undemocratic regimes and devalue the Practice by adding 
rights that are better addressed by other methods. But if the interests in question are 
sufficiently urgent then the states that propose them matter less than the individuals that 
will be protected. Similarly, adding interests of sufficient urgency to the Practice will 
strengthen and broaden its appeal, rather than devaluing it. The question is, once again, 
one of urgency. Chapters Four to Seven have demonstrated the urgency of common-good 
interests both in theory and in practice. As such, in addressing Beitz’s criteria for the 
recognition of interests as rights, this thesis has successfully to answers the principle 




In this thesis, I have argued that solidarity rights can be justified using Charles 
Beitz's political approach to human rights. I have used Beitz's innovative theoretical 
approach, construing human rights as political presumptions, to argue for solidarity 
rights and address scepticism from orthodox rights scholars. It has been demonstrated 
that common-good interests, as a class, can be urgent, address standard threats, and can 
be protected to reasonable effect by solidarity rights. This argument has been 
strengthened with case studies of the right to self-determination, the right to peace, and 
the right to a clean and healthy environment. It has demonstrated convincingly that 
solidarity rights should be recognised as a legitimate class of rights in the Practice. 
I began with the identification of the key tenets of Beitz's political approach, to 
apply it to solidarity rights in the subsequent chapters. The starting point was Beitz’s 
approach. This was initially explored as it relates to civil and political rights and 
economic, social, and cultural rights, because the aim of this thesis is to justify solidarity 
rights on the same terms as those other classes of rights. In Beitz's approach, rights are 
political presumptions, worked out at international level. They make the individual a 
subject of global concern and thereby empower the individual in relation to the state. In 
doing so, rights protect the urgent interests of individuals from standard threats. They do 
this by imposing a two-level duty: The first-level duty requires states to protect and 
provide for the interests recognised by rights. The second-level duty imposes a pro tanto 
obligation to intervene, as part of the international community, when another state fails 
in its first-level duty. An interest merits this protection if it is urgent, faced with a 
standard threat, and can be protected reasonably effectively by the rights mechanism. 
The interest must be of such high importance that even those who do not share the 
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interest can appreciate that it would be, for the interest holders, a bad thing if the interest 
were to be set back. The strongest version of this argument will set out the whole case 
from both the interest-holder and the non-interest-holder perspectives. 
Having set out the key tenets of Beitz's approach, it was explained why this is 
preferable to orthodox theories of human rights. Orthodox approaches tend to begin by 
attempting to establish moral foundations for rights. This both invites scepticism and 
means that they cannot account for the full range of rights recognised in the Practice as it 
stands. In Chapter Two I addressed three classes of orthodox approach: Agreement 
theories, naturalistic theories and juridical theories. Agreement theories model rights 
based on an implied underlying cultural agreement on certain norms. This is 
problematical because they imply empirical statements which are not supported by 
anthropological research. Naturalistic theories model human rights based on abstract 
goods. This is problematical because it assumes an objective platform which is 
impossible to achieve. Neither agreement theories nor naturalistic theories can 
satisfactorily account for the full range of rights recognised in the Practice. Both 
approaches are, therefore, of limited utility in analysing solidarity rights in relation to the 
Practice as it stands. Juridical approaches, the third class of orthodox approach, do not 
suffer from the same conceptual problems as naturalistic and agreement theories. Yet 
they are more appropriate for analysing rights in domestic legal systems than as part of 
the Practice, which includes both international law and international politics. By contrast, 
Beitz's political approach analyses the Practice based on its role in international politics. 
It is pluralistic and agnostic as to the foundations of rights. In Beitz’s model, rights are 
mid-level norms, supported by the participants in the Practice for a plurality of different 
reasons. The legitimacy of rights is derived, not from the moral authority of their 
foundations, but rather from the political authority accorded by state practice, discourse, 
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and international law. As this thesis intends to analyse solidarity rights in relation to the 
Practice as it stands, Beitz’s approach is the most appropriate model for its purpose.  
In Chapter Three a working description of solidarity rights was established. 
These are human rights, that protect common-good interests of individuals, by imposing 
duties on states that are both inward-facing and outward-facing. I departed from Karal 
Vasak's initial definition, and definitions based on Vasak's, because they do not reflect 
the application of solidarity rights in international law and politics. I also departed from 
attempts to identify a legal entity called a "people" as the holder of solidarity rights. The 
application of solidarity rights clearly demonstrates that they are rights held by 
individuals. The term "people" should, instead, be understood as referring to the context 
in which individuals experience the common-good interests protected by solidarity 
rights. Unlike other classes of rights, solidarity rights impose duties that face both inward 
and outward. They require that states cooperate with each other to secure common long-
term interests.  
Chapters Four and Five made the case for solidarity rights as a class according to 
Beitz’s model. In Chapter Four I argued that common-good interests can be urgent, faced 
with standard threats, and protected, to reasonable effect, by the rights mechanism in a 
manner equivalent to the individual-good interests protected by the accepted classes of 
rights. Individual good interests are based on the dignity of the individual. The status of 
an “individual” is a necessary status: in the central range of cases we cannot help but be 
an individual agent, regardless of how we identify. Common-good interests can be 
important to individual dignity in a manner similar to independent-good interests. The 
status in which the individual experiences common-good interests is this also a necessary 
status. In the transnational age, individuals are necessarily part of a global community 
and common-good interests therefore manifest on a global scale. The interconnected 
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nature of the transnational age means that standard threats can transcend state 
boundaries, thus impacting on common-good interests. Transnational interconnection 
can disempower individuals and states in relation to unaccountable transnational agents. 
The rights mechanism provides reasonably effective protection in the form of solidarity 
rights. The outward-facing duty in solidarity rights obliges states to cooperate to address 
threats. It is only by cooperating, that states can address transnational threats and protect 
common-good interests. The rights mechanism gives individuals the power to 
recognisably demand that their state exercise this duty of cooperation. It thus empowers 
individuals and makes the transnational common-good interests of individuals a subject 
of global concern.  
Chapter Five made the case for solidarity rights, as a class, from a non-
sympathetic perspective. To demonstrate that solidarity rights can be justified from the 
widest possible range of perspectives, I undertook an argumentum a fortiori exercise, 
making the case from the most conceptually hostile perspective possible: the political 
theory of Freidrich Hayek. Hayekian theory rejects solidarity as a concept. It is sceptical 
of activist states, embraces inequality and views appeals to collective interests as 
dangerous to liberty.  
Yet, although Hayekian theory begins as hostile to solidarity rights, the case can 
nevertheless be understood from this perspective. Hayekian political theory is based on 
the premise that it is impossible to gain or process sufficient knowledge to make 
decisions on a societal scale. The measures adopted by a society must, therefore, be 
allowed to emerge naturally through a process of competition. To artificially pick a 
winner requires coercion, which must be limited. Coercion stymies the development of 
alternative measures, which may be more effective. Different measures and ideas must 
be allowed to compete freely to objectively determine the most appropriate for a 
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particular society. Protecting common-good is essential if coercion is to be minimised. 
Solidarity rights promote the diversity necessary for alternative practices to emerge and 
compete. Yet the market, the preferred method of social organisation in Hayekian theory, 
cannot address transnational standard threats. An alternative mechanism is therefore 
required. The rights mechanism is the best mechanism for protecting common- good 
interests, from the Hayekian perspective, because it does so by dispersing power, thus 
limiting the ability of states and transnational agents to coerce individuals. 
Having outlined the theoretical case for solidarity rights as a class, I then 
demonstrated that Beitz’s political approach can justify solidarity rights in practice. In 
the Political approach, rights are emergent. A class of rights must be able to evolve to 
protect new interests. To demonstrate that solidarity rights fit this pattern, I selected, as 
case studies, an established solidarity right, an emerging solidarity right, and a right that 
is yet to be formally recognised at international level. The established right was the right 
to self-determination. In my view, the right to self-determination protects the urgent 
common-good interest in political autonomy. It is recognised in treaty law and as a 
peremptory norm of international law. Political autonomy exists when an individual has 
agency in relation to her social and political context on both a day-to-day and a structural 
level. The right to self-determination responds to the threat of domination by one people 
of another. 
 Political autonomy is also important to the Hayekian perspective. It is an 
essential prerequisite for the mechanisms by which Hayek proposes to organise society 
on a non-coercive basis. The rights mechanism is reasonably effective in protecting 
political autonomy. It imposes an outward-facing duty to refrain from domination of 
peoples outside a state's borders (external self-determination) and an inward-facing duty 
to avoid coercion of peoples and protect peoples from coercion within a state' borders. It 
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also imposes an inward-facing duty (internal self-determination) not to unreasonably 
exclude any individual from the governance of the state. Self-determination can therefore 
be seen to meet the Beitz criteria required, from both sympathetic and non-sympathetic 
perspectives: it protects an urgent interest from a standard threat and does so with 
reasonable effect.  
Chapter Seven addressed the emerging right to a clean and healthy environment. 
This imposes a duty on states to refrain from damaging the environment and to take 
reasonable measures to prevent those under their control from doing so. The urgency of 
the interest in the environment lies in intergenerational justice. The environment is a 
resource we share with future generations. We must preserve this resource so that future 
generations can also benefit from it. The right responds to the threat of anthropogenic 
damage to the environment. This manifests in the form of both localised pollution and 
climate change. The application of the right to a clean and healthy environment, and 
other human rights approaches to the environment, at regional and national level, 
demonstrate that the human rights mechanism is reasonably effective at protecting the 
environment from localised pollution. While the application of the right to a clean and 
healthy environment has not been successfully applied to climate change, it is possible to 
theorise about a duty that effectively responds to climate change within the existing right 
to a clean and healthy environment.  
Chapter Eight addressed the right to peace. It was argued that this has developed, 
from an original conception, in which it was aimed purely at limiting physical violence, 
to a point at which it has become a “right to rights” that is difficult to define. As such, it 
was argued that the right to peace, as it currently manifests in the discourse, does not 
meet the Beitz criteria.  
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Solidarity rights have hitherto been treated with scepticism by rights scholars. In 
Chapter Nine, I identified the four main critiques of solidarity rights. These were the 
compatibility critique, the practicality critique, the necessity critique and the hybridity 
critique. These critiques all, ultimately, rely on assumptions about the urgency of 
common-good interests, and the effectiveness of rights as a mechanism for protecting 
them. The main critiques of solidarity rights are therefore satisfactorily addressed with 
the application of the political approach.  
The arguments explored in this thesis can be applied to other solidarity rights, 
beyond the case studies considered here. The right to development, for example, meets 
the Beitz criteria. The urgency of the individual’s interest in development lies in, what 
Amartya Sen calls, “capabilities”.1054 Sen’s theory of capabilities, while of limited utility 
for analysis of the Practice as a whole1055, offers a persuasive account of the right to 
development. Sen distinguishes between “functions” and “capabilities”.1056 A function is 
an achievement, such as riding a bike, or a state of being, such as happiness. A capability 
is a “real possibility”. A “capability set” denotes the range of functions that it is possible 
for an individual to perform or experience. An individual will not necessarily make use 
of every capability in a capability set. Similar capability sets can, therefore, facilitate 
vastly different functions in practice. Two individuals may both enjoy, for example, a 
capability to engage in play. One might exercise their capability by playing tennis, while 
the other exercises the same capability by volunteering at an animal shelter.  
                                                          
1054 See generally Sen, n. 20; Martha Nussbaum also merits recognition as a leading proponent of the 
“capabilities” approach. Her version of Sen’s theory, however, identifies ten “central capabilities” that all 
humans share. It is thus more prescriptive than Sen’s. (See Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The 
Human Development Approach (Boston; Harvard University Press, 2011)) 
1055 See discussion at pp. 43-46 
1056 See Amartya Sen, “Development as Capability Expansion,” 19 Journal of Development Planning 
(1989), pp. 41–58 
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 The interest in development is an interest in expanding, as far as reasonably 
possible, one’s capability set. Numerous arguments might be made for the importance of 
expanding the capability sets of individuals. From the individual perspective, it increases 
one’s potential for economic gain, new experience, self-realisation, and to contribute to 
one’s family, community, or society. From the social perspective, it enables society to 
benefit from the cumulative capabilities of individuals and thus enjoy greater economic, 
cultural, and political progress.1057 This argument can also be appreciated from the 
Hayekian perspective. Societies in which individuals enjoy broad capability sets will 
benefit from a broader range of ideas and measures. Competition between such measures 
will mean that society benefits from a higher quality of ideas and measures than it 
otherwise would.1058  
 The individual interest in development faces a standard threat from a variety of 
sources. The expansion of an individual’s capability set may be stymied by, inter alia, 
historic injustice, global structures, or geography. Colonialism, for example, stymied the 
development of individuals in colonised territories. Inhabitants of colonies were seen as 
resources, to be used or the benefit of the metropole.1059 They were thus deprived of the 
space required to develop greater capabilities. The effects of colonialism continue to be 
felt even after a former colony has become an independent state. Centuries of treatment 
that retards the capability sets of individuals leaves inhabitants of former colonies at a 
disadvantage compared with individuals in states that did not suffer colonial 
                                                          
1057 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. (London; Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 35-53 
1058 See Hayek, n. 356, pp. 38-47 
1059 See Matthew Lange, James Mahoney, and Matthias Vom Hau, "Colonialism and Development: A 
Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies." 111 American Journal of Sociology 5 (2006), pp. 
1412-1462 
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domination.1060 Economic arrangements can also limit capability sets. Protectionist 
economic policies prevent individuals competing on equal terms in the marketplace.1061 
Economic measures and structures that privilege companies in the Global North1062 make 
it more difficult for individuals in the Global South to expand their capability sets.1063 
Geography can also limit capability sets. Individuals living in territories with poor soil, 
little water, or in remote locations face greater barriers to expanding their capability sets 
because the basics of life, such as food and water, and essential tools for expanding 
capability sets in the 21st Century, like access to the internet, are more difficult to come 
by.1064  
 The right to development responds to these threats with reasonable effect. The 
United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development imposes 
both inward-facing and outward-facing duties on states.1065 Article 2 of the Declaration 
imposes an inward-facing duty to facilitate the development of the domestic population. 
Article 3 imposes a duty to cooperate with other states to create international conditions 
that will facilitate the development of individuals on a global scale, in other words: an 
outward-facing duty. Global cooperation is necessary to address the threat to the interest 
in expanding one’s capability set. Colonialism, economic measures, and geographical 
                                                          
1060 Jutta Bolt and Dirk Bezemer, "Understanding long-run African growth: colonial institutions or colonial 
education?." 45 Journal of development studies 1 (2009), pp. 24-54. 
1061 See Michael E. Porter "Location, competition, and economic development: Local clusters in a global 
economy." 14 Economic development quarterly 1 (2000), pp. 15-34. 
1062 Such as international intellectual property rules allowing companies to extend patents for life saving 
medicines. See Gaurav Dwivedi, Sharanabasava Hallihosur, and Latha Rangan, "Evergreening: a deceptive 
device in patent rights." 32 Technology in Society 4 (2010), pp. 324-330 
1063 Ibid, pp. 324-330. 
1064 J. Henderson, Vernon Zmarak Shalizi, and Anthony J. Venables, "Geography and development." 1 
Journal of Economic Geography 1 (2001), pp. 81-105 
1065 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development: resolution / adopted by the General 
Assembly, 4 December 1986, A/RES/41/128 
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inequalities are all transnational phenomena. They can, at most, only partially be 
addressed by unilateral action. If individuals are to experience expanded capability sets, 
states must cooperate to facilitate this.  
 The right to humanitarian disaster relief also meets the Beitz criteria. 
Humanitarian disasters prevent individuals and societies functioning effectively for 
extended periods of time. There can be little doubt that the interest in receiving relief aid 
is urgent. Yet humanitarian disasters, whether the result of natural or man-made causes, 
are rarely neatly confined within the borders of a single state. They cannot, therefore, be 
addressed by purely unilateral action. A right to humanitarian relief entitles individuals 
who have suffered from a humanitarian disaster to the benefit of international 
cooperation in providing relief.  
Other solidarity rights have been discussed throughout this thesis. The right to the 
common heritage of mankind and the right to access communication technologies were 
discussed at length in Chapter Five. States respect the duties imposed by the right to 
common heritage with a network of treaties and norms, including international law 
mechanisms to prosecute those who destroy common heritage. Not all common-good 
interests merit protection with the rights mechanism. The right to access communication 
technologies does not meet the Beitz criteria because the standard threat to which it 
responds does not exist beyond the level of freedom of expression. The case studies in 
this thesis have, however, demonstrated that a significant number of candidates meet the 
Beitz criteria for inclusion in the class of “human rights” as solidarity rights. 
My conclusions are, therefore, as follows: Beitz’s political approach offers the 
most satisfactory model for the analysis of the Practice as it stands. In Beitz’s approach, 
an interest must be urgent, faced with a standard threat, and protected to reasonable 
effect by the rights mechanism, to be recognised as a human right. Solidarity rights are 
 305 
rights that protect common-good interests of individuals by imposing inward and 
outward-facing first-level duties on states. They have the potential, as a class, to meet the 
standard for recognition as a right. Common-good interests can be as important to 
individual dignity as independent-good interests. In the 21st century, common-good 
interests manifest on a global scale. This makes common-good interests potentially 
urgent. Standard threats to common-good interests transcend political borders. Solidarity 
rights, as a mechanism, provide a reasonably effective remedy, because the outward-
facing duty obliges states to act in a cooperative manner, thus addressing the 
transnational nature of the relevant interests and threats. The validity of this case can be 
understood even from the, non-sympathetic, perspective of Hayekian political theory. 
Solidarity rights protect individuals from coercion on a transnational scale. Standard 
threats to those interests can’t be addressed by the market. The rights mechanism is the 
least coercive alternative method of protection.  
The practical application of my argument is demonstrated by examination of the 
(established) right to self-determination, the (emerging) right to peace, and the (yet to be 
recognised) right to a clean and healthy environment. Self-determination protects the 
urgent, common-good interest in political autonomy from the standard threat of 
domination by other peoples or states by placing an outward-facing duty on states to 
avoid and regulate domination and an inward-facing duty to involve all members in the 
governance of the state. The right to peace protects the urgent, common-good interest in 
human security from the standard threat of transnational violence by imposing the 
inward-facing and outward-facing duties set out in the 2016 Declaration. The right to a 
clean and healthy environment protects the common-good interest in the environment, 
the urgency of which lies in an intergenerational responsibility to preserve the 
environment. It responds to the threat of anthropogenic damage in the form of localised 
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pollution. Although not yet recognised at international level, the application of the 
environment right at regional and domestic level demonstrates the reasonable 
effectiveness of the rights mechanism in responding to the threat of localised pollution. It 
indicates that the right could evolve to address climate change. The political approach to 
human rights of Charles Beitz thus justifies solidarity rights as a legitimate class of rights 
in the Practice.  
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